

KASHMIR: WHAT REALLY HAPPENED

by
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Kashmir: What Really Happened

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THE WAY DESTINY WILLED IT

THE Story of Kashmir since independence is politically and militarily chequered by illusion and make believe. The greatest mistake of all was made in 1948 by Major General Akbar Khan, an officer of the Pakistan Army, who assumed the pseudonym of 'General Jebel Tarik', after the great Muslim warrior of Morocco, who is said to have sunk his boats after landing on the soil of Spain. Although the Sandhurst-trained General had done some careful tactical planning, he left out of his calculations the human traits of the men he had deployed to carry out his plan.

The Afghan tribesmen employed by the Pakistanis had never been known for disciplined fighting and had been kept out of the Army by the British. They loved loot and women, and when the crucial bridge near Uri was blown up, they would not advance without hundreds of lorries and trucks which, they believed, would return loaded with the treasures of Srinagar. They lost three or four vital days waiting for an alternative bridge to be put up.

Again, at Garamulla, the raiders indulged in loot and rape and wasted another four days. By the time they left for Srinagar, the Indian soldiers had taken up positions. Indeed, the Indian Army's time-schedule was so tight that the first batch of *jawans* flown in under the command of Lt. Col. Ranjit Rai was given directions to circle round and ensure, before landing, that

the Srinagar airstrip had not fallen to the enemy.

Since the days of the Great Genghis Khan, star-gazing had been in fashion at the royal courts. Astrologers had created in the mind of the Maharaja of Kashmir, Sir Hari Singh, the illusion that he was destined to be sovereign ruler of a Kashmiri Empire. The beguiled Maharaja had to pay heavily for this folly.

India had built up a dream of faith in the United Nations and she needed a shock to be disillusioned. That was not long in coming. If India had waited for Pakistan to seek the support of the Security Council, the legality of Kashmir's accession would have been a perfect defence. A retired ICS officer, in a position to know, told me that the far-sighted Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel had remarked that even a school boy knew that it was not sound tactics to be the complainant. But this advice went unheeded. Even if Pakistan had forced a military solution, India would not have been the loser for she had to fight three wars with Pakistan in defence of the Kashmiri people.

Pakistan's propaganda machine had, from the start, created powerful lobbies in the U.S.A., U.K. and U.N.O. alleging that India had annexed Kashmir by "fraud and coercion". With the induction of the "commissar of the cold war" Dean Acheson, who was followed by a worthy successor, John Foster Dulles, as Secretary of State at Washington, Kashmir became involved in big power politics. India was non-aligned and would not toe the line of the Anglo-American bloc, but Pakistan had no such scruples. She took it as a godsend opportunity to win the sup-

port of the Western powers in the Kashmir dispute as the price for joining the American-sponsored SEATO. The next year, in 1955, when the Soviet Prime Minister Nikita Khrushchev visited India, he made an unscheduled trip to Srinagar and declared that Kashmir was a part of India. China was another major power which started with some ambivalence, but finally supported Pakistan in its claims on Kashmir.

Few writers on Kashmir, and there are many, have shown sufficient awareness of the vital bearing of Sir Cyril Radcliffe's award fixing the boundary between the East and West Punjab on India's involvement in Kashmir. Not by compulsion of law but of geography could an Indian State opt for one of the contiguous dominions, India or Pakistan. This is borne out by the case of Junagadh. This patchy State, save for some outlets on the Arabian sea coast, was landlocked on all sides by the States which had acceded to India. It had no contiguity with Pakistan, but the dog-loving, capricious Nawab opted for it. Later, the State acceded to India, which, fortified by geographical contiguity, cancelled the first option. Junagadh is now a part of India.

The Governor-General, Lord Mountbatten, had given to the Punjab Boundary Commission the vaguest guide-lines ever given to an arbitrator. It was said that the demarcation of the boundary between the two parts of Punjab should proceed on the basis of ascertaining the contiguity majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. What method was to be used to ascertain contiguity? If the criterion adopted was a natural feature such as a river, it would

give one boundary; if it was the administrative unit of a district, it would give another; if a *tehsil*, yet another; and if a village, a fourth line. Another imponderable element was enshrined in the cryptic phrase—"The Commission may also take into account other factors". What the other factors could be, God alone knew.

After the failure of the nominees of the Indian National Congress, the Muslim League and the Sikh M.L.As. on the Commission to agree, the Chairman, Sir Cyril, was called upon to give the final decision. He became the sole arbitrator, not circumscribed by any conditions. There could be no review of his award. Sir Cyril's award sounded like the verdict of some Greek oracle, never condescending to earthly logic. Logic and crises are incompatible and the sub-continent was passing through a tense crisis. The logic behind the award was very much as in Gandhiji's remark that "the Bihar earthquake is due to the sin of untouchability".

The award was the briefest possible on such a momentous issue. The factors constituting the totality of the situation on different parts of the boundary line thousands of miles long, were so diverse that any attempt to apply a uniform rule would have been stupidity. In places Sir Cyril adopted a river, in others a village, or a *tehsil*, and in still others a district, as units for demarcating the boundary. An amount of intuitive arbitrariness is unavoidable in such an event.

The district of Gurdaspur was situated in the extreme north-east of the Punjab and was the land route to Jammu and Kashmir. It was composed of four *tehsils*—Gurdaspur, Batala, Path-

ankot and Shakargarh. Shakargarh had a clear Muslim majority and it went to Pakistan. Of the rest, Pathankot was the northern-most and the only tehsil where non-Muslims outnumbered Muslims by about 60%. The two adjoining tehsils of Gurdaspur and Batala had narrow Muslim majorities. These three tehsils formed a compact land-mass and could not be divided without isolating the non-Muslim majority tehsil of Pathankot. Thus, Sir Cyril was confronted with the choice of awarding all the three tehsils either to the Dominion of India or to Pakistan. He gave them to India.

If this decision hurt Pakistan, there was another more glaring violation of the rule of majority which was to its benefit. In Bengal, the Chittagong Hill Tract had a bare three per cent Muslim population, but as it was surrounded on all sides by Muslim majority areas, the 'other factors' were brought in to rationalise the allocation of the Tract to Pakistan. The decision on Gurdaspur was assailed by Pakistan and that on the Chittagong Hill Tract by India. That is often the fate of an arbitrator and should cause no surprise. Even if we take the most uncharitable view of the awards on Punjab and Bengal, it can be said that the territorial loss of Gurdaspur to Pakistan in the west was counter-balanced by the gain of the Chittagong Tract in the east.

If the three tehsils of Gurdaspur, Pathankot and Batala had been awarded to Pakistan, the

land contiguity between India and Kashmir would have been lost and the Indian forces would not have been able to reach Jammu and Kashmir without violating Pakistan's territory or air space. In that event, Maharaja Sir Hari Singh of Kashmir, whatever may have been the plight of his State, could not have dreamt of acceding to India.

The partition of India was rushed through with a speed unknown in the history of civil administration. Little wonder that it left a legacy of running sores. Among them was the problem of enclaves and thrusts across natural features, like the Chicken's Neck near Akhnoor, the Pakistan enclave across the Ravi near Dera Baba Nanak, the Indian enclave across the river near Hussainiwala, all difficult to defend but the first object of attack in an India-Pakistan conflict.

The Maharaja of Kashmir was keeping his options open, as to whether to accede to India or Pakistan. India's hands after Partition were full of problems. The Nawab of Junagadh's accession to Pakistan had created an awkward situation for her. The Nizam of Hyderabad was truculent and was defying the Government of India, maybe waiting to see what happened in Kashmir. The communal disturbances in the Punjab and Delhi and the cross-movement of refugees from Pakistan to India and from India to Pakistan had thrown a heavy burden on the army.

In September 1947, the first information about Pakistan's hostile activities against Kashmir, received through Naval and Air Force interceptory channels, confused Army Headquarters, which did not know where the harried places were. It was only after the mention of the word 'Poonch' that the disjointed intercepts could be pieced together and it was realised that the places under pressure were parts of the Kashmir State. But as the State had not by then acceded to India, the information was treated as of little importance.

Gilgit, close to Soviet Sinkiang and bordering Chinese Turkestan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, was another area which, at Partition, had become vitally important. As far back as 1889, the British had established an Agency there under the control of the Resident of Kashmir, to counter the Czar's growing influence in Central Asia. In 1935 Soviet Russia took over control of Sinkiang and to counter-balance this, the British took a sixty-year lease of the Gilgit Wazarat from the Maharaja. This brought both the Gilgit Agency and the Gilgit Wazarat under direct British control.

About the end of July 1947, the British handed the Gilgit Agency in the extreme north-west of the State over to the Maharaja, who nominated Brigadier Ghansara Singh as the Governor of the region. However, on reaching there, Ghansara Singh found that the British officers of the Gilgit Scouts and the civilian officers in the service of the British had all opted for Pakistan. The Gilgit Scouts were in a particularly surly mood.

Even before the transfer of power, alarming news from Kashmir had begun to reach India. The Government held hurried consultations and decided to send an emissary to Kashmir to advise the Maharaja to take an early decision on accession. The Maharaja was allergic to the Congress and it was doubtful if he would welcome a visit from Jawaharlal Nehru or Gandhi.

At the request of the Union Government, Lord Mountbatten flew to Srinagar. He went on pleasant evening drives with the Maharaja and his Prime Minister, but the elusive king was stalling formal talks. On the last day, when the meeting could not be delayed further, Sir Hari Singh had a diplomatic illness and expressed his inability to meet the Viceroy. Thus the mission failed. Lord Mountbatten had, however, conveyed a message from the Minister of States, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, that if Kashmir decided to accede to Pakistan, India would not take it amiss. Had the Maharaja, even at that late hour, awakened to realities, his State might have been saved from the ravages of war.

The Maharaja had entered into a standstill agreement with Pakistan ensuring the State essential supplies, communications and common services. About a month or so later, however, complaints began that Pakistan had held back supplies of rice, sugar, salt, petrol, kerosene, etc. and that batches of armed Pakistani nationals had raided the State territory on the western border of Jammu Province. It was a clear attempt to coerce the Kashmir Durbar into accession to Pakistan. India made efforts to make

good the shortages, but transport difficulties limited her capacity.

The invasion of Kashmir began on October 22. According to the Government of India's initial information some 2000 or more armed and equipped tribesmen from the North-West Frontier Province came in motorised transport, crossed through Pakistan into the territory of the Kashmir State, and set the town of Muzaffarabad aflame, killing people and burning their houses indiscriminately. They advanced along the Jhelum road towards Srinagar. Towns and villages on the way were razed to the ground and large numbers of people were killed. In two days the raiders had reached a point close to the Uri gorge.

The Maharaja's small and poorly equipped forces were too thinly spread over the long border from Gilgit to Samba to offer serious resistance to the raiders. The only battle of any note was fought by Brig. Rajendra Singh, the Chief of Staff of the State Forces, in defence of the Uri Pass. He destroyed a bridge to the west of the pass and halted raiders' convoys. Like the three hundred Spartans who had died to the last man defending Thermopylae, Rajendra Singh's one hundred and fifty men fought in defence of the Valley until they were all killed. If the bridge near Uri had not been destroyed, the raiders would have reached Srinagar before the Indian troops' arrival.

The Maharaja of Kashmir lived in a dream-land of his own making, unaware of the winds of change sweeping the sub-continent. He had put Kashmir's popular leaders, Sheikh Moham-

mad Abdullah and others, behind bars and would make no attempt to associate the people's representatives with the administration. He was oblivious of the fact that the British (after their withdrawal) could not give protection to an Indian prince. When Pakistan withheld the supplies guaranteed under the Stand-still Agreement, the Maharaja naively cabled to the British Prime Minister for help.

The princely order of India had traditionally been susceptible to courtiers and the Maharaja appointed Ram Chander Kak as his Prime Minister and principal adviser. Kak was a man of little education and no vision. He had begun his life as a librarian. He advised the Maharaja to ban Jawaharlal's entry into Kashmir and when Nehru entered the State in defiance, he was put under arrest at Domel. Kak had planted in the Maharaja's mind the ambition to be ruler of a sovereign Kashmir. It was he who had manipulated the putting off of Lord Mountbatten's meeting with the Maharaja.

Kak made the Maharaja adopt an extremely ambivalent attitude on the issue of accession. He kept India at arm's length until supplies to the State, guaranteed under the Stand-still Agreement, were cut off and the Pakistanis had begun to raid Poonch. Even so India was cautious and gave Kashmir just what the State wanted namely, wireless equipment at Jammu, services for meteorological observations, a transmitter to combat Pakistan's Radio's propaganda, a special code to communicate, and supply of arms and ammunitions to defend the State borders.

Not until the raiders had reached the gateway to the Valley did the Maharaja awaken to the realities of the situation. He sent a pathetic appeal to the Government of India for military help. However, the Indian forces would have no *locus standi* in Kashmir, unless the State had acceded to India. The Secretary to the Ministry of States, V. P. Menon, was sent to Kashmir on a fact-finding mission. Menon has recorded that when he landed at Srinagar "he was oppressed by the stillness of a graveyard all round". The State police was nowhere to be seen and the city was guarded by the volunteers of the premier political organisation of the State, the National Conference led by Sheikh Abdullah. The Maharaja himself was in immediate danger, and Menon advised him to leave Srinagar. The Maharaja left for Jammu in a huge cavalcade taking his family and treasures. That provided a weapon to the ruler's critics who accused him of abandoning his people to the enemy. The Maharaja's prestige collapsed, though he boasted that he would take the command of the State Forces and die fighting.

The next morning, Menon flew to Delhi and gave an assessment to the Indian Cabinet. The Maharaja had offered to accede. Menon strongly pleaded that the offer of accession should be accepted and Kashmir be saved from destruction. India decided to accept the offer of accession but on Lord Mountbatten's advice a condition was attached: after the raiders were driven back and peaceful conditions restored, the final decision on the accession of Kashmir

would be taken by ascertaining the will of the people of Kashmir.

Menon flew, armed with the papers of accession, to Jammu and on 26 October 1947, the Maharaja signed the Instrument of Accession. The accession was confined to the three subjects of foreign affairs, defence and communications. The defence of Kashmir then became the responsibility of the Indian forces. The Maharaja repeated the request for military assistance and promised to release the Sheikh and form an emergency government of which he would be the head.

India's war for the Valley began with the landing of Lt. Col. Ranjit Rai at Srinagar. The division of the Army between India and Pakistan had split up many of its units and sub-units. When the Indian forces landed in Kashmir, they were made up of assorted men collected in a hurry. The land route to Kashmir was long. It was difficult and tortuous. The troops had to cross the Banihal pass. The raiders were inside the Valley and India was not left with any option except to transport her forces by air. The protection of the Srinagar airstrip was a matter of absolute necessity.

The government mobilised the Indian Air Force planes and requisitioned from civil aviation companies some vintage Second World War DC-3s. Many pilots landed planes on an airstrip unknown to them and without the normal navigational aids. They landed in quick succession raising a haze of dust, which at one stage was so thick that the Brigade Headquarters had to be shifted from the airport to a place nearby. The

planes had to be hastily sent to Delhi to return with reinforcements. There was not one single mishap.

The only military information Col. Rai could get at Srinagar was that the raiders had not till then reached Bramula. He did not know where they were and what was their strength. By the afternoon the Indian forces at the airport had risen to a battalion. Colonel Rai left a portion of his battalion to defend the airport and moved with the remainder towards Baramula in vehicles supplied by the Emergency Government, to forestall the raiders. Leaving his main force some two miles from Baramula, the Colonel moved with a small escort towards the town, but the party was fired upon by the raiders who had entered Baramula. Colonel Rai was killed and a large number of his men were also either killed or wounded. Whether Rai's bold thrust was sheer bravado or a calculated risk remains to this day a mystery.

On October 27 at midnight when Jinnah got news that Indian troops had landed at Srinagar, he bit his lips and ordered Sir Douglas Gracey, officiating as Commander-in-Chief for General Messervy, to move Pakistani troops into Kashmir. The General would not do it without the approval of the Supreme Commander of the Joint Forces of India and Pakistan, Field Marshall A. Claude Auchinleck. He contacted Auchinleck on the phone and the latter flew to Lahore the next morning. The Supreme Commander told Jinnah that the invasion of Kashmir would automatically and immediately mean

the withdrawal of every British soldier serving in the Pakistan army. Jinnah was subdued and cancelled his order of the previous night.

Jinnah then turned to diplomacy and decided to talk over the matter with Mountbatten and Jawaharlal, who were about to reach Lahore for a meeting of the Joint Defence Council on the first November. Nehru had to cancel his visit for reasons of health at the last minute. Mountbatten met Jinnah. Liaquat Ali Khan who, by a queer coincidence, was also ill, received Mountbatten in his bed-room. Mountbatten did not have plenipotentiary powers on behalf of India and he talked as an ex-Viceroy who had a major hand in partitioning the country.

What happened at the Mountbatten-Jinnah talks provides the key to the future unabated hostility which has already lasted about twenty-five years with four conflicts, endless wrangling in the Security Council and fruitless bilateral negotiations.

Mountbatten tried to assuage Jinnah telling him how he had gone to Srinagar for a peaceful settlement and how his efforts were frustrated. He had even asked the British Resident to pursue the matter further. About the end of August, his Chief of Staff, Lord Ismay had gone to Srinagar to try and persuade the Maharaja on the issue of accession, but the Maharaja was unhelpful. Jinnah similarly remarked that the Kashmir ruler was very elusive.

Jinnah agreed that fighting must be ended but suggested that it would end if the Indian forces and tribesmen withdrew simultaneously. The raiders were at Srinagar's gate and who

could guarantee that they would not fall on Srinagar as soon as the Indian forces crossed the Banihal? For the next four months, the Valley would remain inaccessible by land and air from India. Jinnah showed complete confidence in his ability to secure the withdrawal of the tribesmen and said: "If you do this, I will call the whole thing off". One must compare this confidence with the Pakistan Foreign Minister's persistent statements that his government had done everything short of war to prevent the tribesmen's march on Kashmir.

Jinnah accused India of keeping Pakistan in the dark about its decision to send troops. Mountbatten referred to Nehru's telegram despatched immediately after accepting the accession. Jinnah searched his files and found the telegram. But then he invented another excuse, saying that Nehru had not sought his cooperation. When asked by Mountbatten why he had said that the accession of Kashmir to India was obtained by fraud, all that Jinnah could say was that 'this decision was an end of a long intrigue'. Mountbatten showed Liaqat Ali the statement of the three British Chiefs of Staff to prove that India's decision to fly troops was not pre-planned but had been ratified in the two preceding days. Liaqat Ali took a copy of the statement, but remained far from satisfied.

Mountbatten assured Jinnah of India's genuine intentions in asking that Kashmir's future should be decided by the will of its people. He said that India was prepared to hold a plebiscite under the aegis of the U.N. But Jinnah said that the only two persons who could hold it were he

and Mountbatten. It did not concern Jinnah that Mountbatten was a constitutional head of state and that the British Government might not allow him to get involved in a plebiscite.

Both Jinnah and Liaquat Ali suffered from a sense of fatalism. "At the end Mr. Jinnah became extremely pessimistic" wrote Lord Mountbatten, "and said it was clear the Dominion of India was out to throttle and choke the Dominion of Pakistan at birth". Successive rulers of Pakistan were not less pessimistic than the Father of Pakistan.

India decided to organise a Jammu and Kashmir Force under the command of Maj. Gen. Kulwant Singh. Infantry Brigade 161 was to undertake the task of liberating the Valley under the command of Brigadier L. P. Sen. Before leaving for the battle field, Sen met Gandhiji who told him: "You're going to protect innocent people and to save them from suffering and their property from destruction. To achieve that, you must naturally make full use of the means at your disposal". A little before this, when the Brigadier sought the advice of General Russel of the Indian Army, the latter is reported to have told him: "The only advice that I can give is that if you get a chance of hitting them, hit hard with all that you have got, and don't let up". How close was the thinking of a Mahatma and a General during a crisis!

On November 2 at Srinagar, Sen was told that there were no Kashmir State Forces fighting in the Valley. The few soldiers in Badami-Bagh were either in hospital or convalescent cases. No one knew whether the raiders were being resist-

ed anywhere. It was by sheer accident that the Brigadier traced the Mountain Battery sent by the Maharaja of Patiala to the Valley in response to the Kashmiri ruler's request. Nobody was there to issue orders for the deployment of this force. In fact the dial sights of the guns were missing and the battery could not operate. The burden of protecting the Valley had fallen wholly on the Indian forces.

The first major assault of the raiders came from a depression near Budgam, a few miles from the airstrip, in which an Indian company commander was killed and his force repulsed. Fresh Indian reinforcements were called in but the enemy had massed in overwhelming numbers. It was close enough to put the airstrip out of commission and raid Srinagar. What prevented the raiders from taking advantage of the favourable situation is not known. Maybe it was the hard resistance of our jawans, or perhaps the raiders decided to keep themselves fresh for a major battle in the offing. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, who had reached Srinagar, was apprised of the precarious situation of the Indian forces. He gave orders that the city must be saved at all costs. He promised to send fresh reinforcements whose forward elements consisting of armoured cars, arrived just in time to join in the decisive battle of Shalateng.

Buoyed up by success at Badgam, the tribesmen had fanned out in the Valley. They could not be dealt with by the regular forces of India who were trained to fight orthodox battles. The Indian Brigade Commander made as much use of his wits as he did of his arms. He worked out

a plan to lure the tribesmen back to Baramula, by withdrawing the infantry battalion which had been posted at village Pattan to defend the road to Srinagar. The tribesmen took the withdrawal to be the result of the thrashing suffered by Indian jawans at Badgam. They could now move in their buses and goods-trucks on the tarmac road and reach Srinagar. What could be better! They marched in a grand procession and reached the Rifle Range on the fringe of Srinagar.

Two armoured cars and riflemen of the 7 Cavalry sent to Bandipur had just returned to Gandarbal, when they were ordered to turn about and to attack the rear of the raiders at Shalateng through the villages of Krahom and Sumbal. On the way they had to cross a narrow bridge with a free-board of barely two inches on either side. The Cavalry reached the rear of the raiders and its commander beamed a message to the Indian Brigadier saying that "there were masses of armed men moving about, some of whom approached his armoured cars, and touching them, had smiled at him and his men and said to one another that they were their cars". The trick worked. The armoured cars gave hell to the raiders from the rear, and at the same time the Sikhs opened fire from the front and the Kumaonis from the right flank.

The battle was won in twenty minutes. The raiders ran helter-skelter leaving 472 dead on the battle-field and another 146 between Shalateng and Baramula. The number of abandoned vehicles, which had brought the raiders into the death trap, was one hundred and thirty-eight. The battle field was littered with weapons, in-

cluding medium machine-guns and boxes full of ammunition and hand-grenades. Among the captured vehicles were two loaded trucks, one passenger bus equipped with medical stores, and other cars full of rations and warm clothing.

The raiders were on the run and Baramula capitulated without firing a shot. When the Indian forces entered the town, they found it in a shambles, its houses and shops, including the Mission Hospital, destroyed by arson and wanton violence. There was hardly any sign of life except a cocker-spaniel lamenting the death of its mistress, the Mother Superior of the Christian Convent. All the citizens had fled for their lives to the other side of the Jhelum. The few who had offered any resistance were fired upon. A National Conference worker, Maqbool Sherwani, had been nailed to a pole and shot. According to a report by an American photo journalist, Margaret Bourke-White:

"He—*Mir Maqbool Sherwani* — must have been a sort of Robin Hood character, from the stories the townspeople told me, championing peasants who could not pay their exorbitant taxes pitching into the police when he found them beating up some luckless victim, bolstering up the resistance of the people against their many oppressions.

"When the tribesmen invaded Kashmir and terrorised the countryside, Sherwani, who knew every footpath in the Valley, began working behind the lines, keeping up the morale of the besieged villagers, urging them to resist and to stick together regardless of whether they were Hindus, Sikhs, or Muslims, assuring them that help from

the Indian Army and People's Militia was on the way. Three times by skilfully planted rumours he decoyed bands of tribesmen and got them surrounded and captured by the Indian Infantry. But the fourth time he was captured himself."

The enemy had regrouped its forces and the eight miles from Rampur to Uri were riddled with ambushes and firing. The enemy blew up bridges on the main road and the movement of our forces was slowed down. At the Mahura power house, the raiders put one generator out of action and were about to blow up another, when the Indian forces arrived and routed them. It took our men fully four days to reach Uri.

Uri is half way between Srinagar and Domel. A prosperous town, it was the last halt for the incoming and the first for the outgoing tourists. The raiders had almost razed the town to the ground, leaving only one brick-built house standing. Uri is the gateway to the Valley and strategically important. One road from the town through the Uri pass goes to Rawalpindi and the other through the Haji Pir Pass to Poonch and Rajauri, where it joins the old Mughal route to Delhi. After recapturing the town, the Indian Brigade made Uri its main headquarters, the rear headquarters being at Srinagar.

The Brigadier wanted to pursue the enemy beyond the Uri Pass but General Kulwant Singh ordered him to lead two of his battalions to relieve the besieged Kashmir State garrison at Poonch. Determined to avenge the loss of Baramulla and misled by the diversion of our two battalions to Poonch, the raiders made repeated attacks on our pickets to the north and south

of Uri and finally gathered in battalion strength on slopes below the Haji Pir Pass. In the battle that followed at Bhatigiran, our forces suffered the heaviest losses of the war but the losses of the raiders were much heavier.

The Muslims of the Valley, led by Sheikh Abdullah and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, had opposed the raiders but the Muslims of Jammu from Akhnoor to Poonch had mostly gone over to them. Poonch was the first to receive the attention of the enemy and after a bitter fight, the State Forces were besieged in the town as early as September 1947. Poonch was cut off, the only link left being wireless. Reports were reaching the Indian Army Headquarters that the defences of Poonch might collapse any day.

The Indian Army planned a pincer movement to relieve Poonch. The 50 Parachute Brigade was to advance from Jammu and two battalions of the 161 Infantry Brigade from the north. The two were planned to meet at Kotla, but the Para Brigade's march was halted by the enemy. The column from the Valley was able to negotiate the heights of the Haji Pir Pass, but it was held up eleven miles from Poonch, at the Batar Nala bridge.

Even so, one Infantry Battalion was made to cross the palah and reach the town on foot. Brigadier Sen was told at Poonch that the nervous guards of the Batar Nala bridge had imagined that they had heard shouts of 'Pakistan Zinda-bad' from the Haji Pir, when actually the Indians were on it. The guards in a panic blew up the bridge. Both the Indian Army Headquarters and the Kashmir State Army Headquarters were

in Jammu, but the Indian Headquarters had not informed the State Headquarters about the movement of troops from Jammu or the Valley. The State Headquarters could not make use of the wireless. The garrison at Poonch was completely unaware of Indian troop movements although reinforcements from the Valley were welcome. With their help the garrison would be able to resist the enemy's onslaughts throughout the winter.

When the news of the raid on the Valley reached Gilgit, the Muslim soldiers deserted the States Forces and the Governor was put under arrest. A rebel government was installed. The Hindus and Sikhs were either massacred or driven into the mountains. The Pakistani flag was hoisted. By the third week of November, Peshawar sent an agent to take over Gilgit. Gilgit thus passed into the hands of Pakistan.

An interesting episode illustrates the degree of demoralisation in the State Forces. This was the discovery of some two thousand men of the State Forces who had remained concealed in Badami Bagh at Srinagar for well over a month when the fate of the Valley hung by a slender thread. As many as 1,854 of these two thousand were fit for duty. Most of these persons wore a campaign or other medal of the Second World War.

They were exposed by sheer accident: The Brigade Commander had been told that Badami Bagh was sheltering only some 200 sick or convalescent persons. But an indent for rations to feed 2,000 men for ten days raised the Brigadier's suspicions. He dashed to the Bagh to

check the numbers. The next day the Force Commander, General Kulwant Singh, was invited to witness the ludicrous parade of about 2,000 healthy men. The maligners were driven out. However, attempts to put one-third of them to active duty failed.

With the onset of winter, the first phase of the war in Kashmir was over. But for India the military situation was far from reassuring. The whole of the Gilgit area was in the enemy's hands. The non-Muslim soldiers of the State Forces and the surviving Hindu civilians besieged inside Skardu Fort, were ordered to hold out. However, during the winter there was no prospect of sending them relief from the Valley. Kargil was holding out, but the position in Ladakh Valley was obscure.

In the Kashmir Valley, the raiders had suffered heavy losses and had been driven beyond the Pir Panjal, but their threat was not eliminated. During the winter they made repeated attempts to capture Uri and the Mahura power house and ambushed the Uri-Srinagar road. The Indian forces in the Valley were virtually imprisoned during the winter.

On the western front of Jammu Province there was a positive deterioration in the military situation. The Maharaja wrote to Sardar Patel with some anguish that: "The Indian troops arrived in the Valley on 27 October. At the time we were in possession of about $\frac{3}{4}$ of Poonch and the whole of Mirpur district. We had by then lost only small bits of Poonch and Muzaffarabad district. Two months have passed and the Indian troops are still at Uri. They at-

tempted a venture on the town of Poonch and though they reached it, it was at a great cost and the road was eventually lost. In the Poonch Jagir, which was held by the State troops, inch by inch we had to withdraw and eventually lost the whole jagir except the town itself, where about 40,000 people are besieged with 4 battalions (3 State and 1 Indian)."

In Mirpur district since the arrival of the Indian troops there had been further losses: Mangla, Alibeg, Gurdwara, the town of Mirpur, the town of Bhimber, the villages of Dera and Battala, the town of Rajauri and the whole area adjoining Chamb and Naushera, Jhangar, a key place both for Mirpur and Kotli, was also lost.

On the Kathua-Sialkot border, attacks had been intensified. People were looted and killed and women raped. All the border villages were vacated and some 70,000 to 80,000 refugees rushed to the city of Jammu. The Indian forces, it was complained, were shy of engaging the enemy and actual fighting was left to local militia and the tired State Forces.

Many critics of Jawaharlal Nehru accuse him of submitting to Lord Mountbatten and agreeing that the final accession of Kashmir would be determined by the will of the people of Kashmir. But they forget that the proposal had the unanimous approval of the Indian Union Cabinet. The Ministers who were party to the decision included the iron-willed Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and Shyama Prasad Mookerjee who claimed to champion the cause of the Hindus.

In fact, things were moving so fast that neither Mountbatten nor Jawaharlal nor anyone else

had the time to work out the full implications of a plebiscite. Within months of making the commitment, however, doubts began to arise about the feasibility of a plebiscite. During the first round of talks with the members of the UNCIP, writes Korbél: "For the first time he (Jawaharlal) revealed scepticism about a plebiscite and expressed the thought that he would not be opposed to the idea of dividing the country between India and Pakistan". Jawaharlal sounded the UNCIP members on the division of the State, but when the proposal was put before Sir Zafrulla, he rejected it outright. When Korbél told him of the discouraging experience of plebiscites in Europe, which had turned into instruments of "propaganda, pressure and falsification", Zafrulla could not deny the facts but threw the burden of securing conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite upon the U.N.

There is no reason to doubt India's genuineness to abide by the will of the Kashmiris on the final disposition of Kashmir. India had made the commitment voluntarily at a time when there was no demand for a plebiscite either from the Maharaja or the people of Kashmir. No third party was in the field. If India wanted to quarrel with Pakistan, she could have had recourse to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter and asked for economic and military sanctions. But India filed her complaint under Article 35 which does not provide for sanctions.

While India wanted to create conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite, Zafrulla Khan played Janus: denying the charge of aggression, on Kashmir in the Security Council, and simul-

taneously preparing the Pakistani Army for another attack on Kashmir. The endless cry for *jehad* and continuous threats to take Kashmir by force hardened India's attitude, which the politically motivated Council Members misinterpreted as her intransigence.

THE COUNCIL TALKED WHEN SOLDIERS FOUGHT

By the end of 1947, the raider's concentration in Kashmir to the west of the Pir Panjal and the adjoining area of Pakistan had increased to a dangerous size. Some nineteen thousand raiders were massed at Muzaffarabad and another fifteen thousand were operating along the western and south-western borders of Jammu Province. A hundred thousand raiders had collected at various places in Pakistani territory close to the Kashmir border, some of whom were being trained for fighting by military instructors. They were fed, clothed, armed and transported with the direct or indirect help of Pakistan.

There were two options before India—either to persuade Pakistan to withdraw the raiders, through negotiations, or alternatively, to launch an attack from the Punjab across the international boundary as she had to do when hard-pressed in the Chamb-Jurian sector during the 1947 Indo-Pakistan War. Negotiations had failed because the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaqat Ali Khan, did not reply to Nehru's letter asking that the raiders be denied assistance and the use of Pakistani territory for operations against Jammu and Kashmir. The entry of Indian troops into Pakistani territory would lead to a full-scale war and India tried every possibility for a peaceful settlement before the worst

happened. She adopted a third alternative—that of seeking the United Nations' intervention.

On New Year's Day, India handed a complaint against Pakistan to the President of the Security Council under Article 35 of the United Nations' Charter which stipulates that any Member may bring any situation, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, to the notice of the Security Council. The complaint urged that the situation in Kashmir was dangerous and called for an immediate action. The Council was requested: (a) to prevent Pakistan Government personnel—military and civil—from participating or assisting in the invasion of the Jammu & Kashmir State; (b) to call upon other Pakistani nationals to desist from taking part in the fighting in that State; and (c) to deny the invaders access through Pakistani territory and to stop military and other supplies. The Council was warned that if it failed to give effective relief, India might be compelled in self-defence to enter Pakistani territory.

Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter, which includes Article 35, authorises the Security Council to recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment; but it does not provide for the application of economic sanctions or for military intervention. It does not even envisage the naming of any nation as an aggressor. Perhaps the reason why India chose this milder course was that she did not want to precipitate matters. India realised that the adoption of the other alternative, that is, moving of Indian troops into Pakistani territory would be an act of real

belligerence. Whatever were finally her motives, India felt shocked by the inactivity of the Security Council and the intense hate campaign launched by Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan.

Zafrulla Khan repudiated India's charges completely. His government had not given any aid or assistance to the raiders. It had not committed any act of aggression against India. On the contrary it had done everything to discourage the tribal movement by 'all means short of war'. It was wrong to say that Pakistan territory was ever used as a base for military operations. The Government of Pakistan had not supplied any military equipment, transport or other materials to the raiders nor did Pakistani officers give them training, guidance or help. The Hindu Maharaja of Kashmir was guilty of committing genocide of his Muslim subjects in the Jammu area and on hearing of those atrocities, the tribals were infuriated. They had gone to Kashmir to liberate their co-religionists.

Zafrulla Khan went further. In the second and third parts of his defence, he charged that India had never been reconciled to Partition and had done everything to destroy the newly born Dominion of Pakistan. She had withheld Pakistan's share of cash balances and military stores. The Reserve Bank of India refused to fulfill its obligations as the Bankers and Currency Authority of Pakistan. India was guilty of committing a planned genocide of the Muslims in large areas of Punjab, Delhi, Ajmer and in the princely States of Patiala, Kapurthala, Bharatpur and Alwar. She had forcibly occupied the

States of Junagadh and Manavadar which had lawfully acceded to Pakistan and formed part of its territory. The accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India had been obtained by fraud and violence. The Indian forces had joined the State authorities in a massive massacre and looting of the Muslims in Jammu.

Zafrulla posed as the aggrieved party and held out the threat of military action in Junagadh. It was a strategy aimed at obscuring the real issues. The simplest thing for the Security Council in the circumstances would have been to verify India's charges directly or through its representative. But the venerable gentlemen of the Council were content to pass, on 17 January 1948, an innocuous resolution calling upon the parties to refrain from recriminatory propaganda and action and report to the Security Council any material change that might occur in the situation.

Obviously the Security Council was not impressed with the urgency of the situation. The pleadings of India's representative, Gopalaswami Ayyangar, that the Council was unnecessarily getting involved in procedural and academic wrangles fell on deaf ears. He lamented that "We seem here to be fiddling while Kashmir burns", but to no effect. It took months for India to convince the Council that the hearing of her charges against Pakistan must be given precedence over Pakistan's charges against India.

India's case in the Security Council was based on the ground that the State of Jammu and Kashmir had acceded to her and become a part of her territory. India had become responsible

for the defence of Kashmir and her forces had gone there to defend Indian citizens. The Indian Army must remain in Kashmir in sufficient strength to protect Kashmir against external aggression and to maintain internal security. Abdullah's government was responsible to the Kashmiri people and neither Pakistan nor the Security Council tamper with it. The maximum that could be conceded was to replace the Emergency Government by a responsible Cabinet which would represent different political elements of the State. The promise of a plebiscite was a voluntary commitment by India, and Pakistan would be given no place in its processes. India would help to ensure free and impartial voting but without tampering with the lawful authority of the Kashmir Government. The plebiscite would be held after the withdrawal of the raiders and the restoration of peaceful conditions in the State.

Pakistan denied the validity of the State's accession to India. Withdrawal of the raiders, it was argued, was part of the process of a plebiscite and so long as Pakistan was not assured that there would be a free and fair plebiscite, it would not persuade the raiders to withdraw. The presence of the Indian Army in the State would itself be a threat to the free exercise of the vote.* The Indian and Pakistani forces both should therefore vacate the State simultaneously. The vacuum could then be filled either by posting a Pakistani force in predominantly Muslim areas and an Indian force in the predominantly Hindu areas or the neutral forces of the U.N. in both the Muslim and Hindu areas of

the State. The State Government should be re-constituted and the Azad Kashmir and the Muslim League of Kashmir should each be given one-third representation. The plebiscite should be conducted and controlled under the authority of the United Nations and the Kashmir Government should be kept out of it altogether.

The members of the Security Council shifted and changed their stand but, by and large, the solid block led by America and Britain favoured Pakistan. Soon after they had agreed to accord precedence to the hearing of India's charges, they decided to give simultaneous hearing to Pakistan's charges. They supported Pakistan in its demand for the simultaneous withdrawal of forces, reconstitution of the State Government and status of the plebiscite authority.

The solitary achievement of the Council during the first four months of discussion was the appointment of a Commission which gave itself the name of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), consisting of five members—one nominee each of India and Pakistan, and three of the United Nations. The Commission would proceed to the sub-continent, ascertain facts and suggest a solution for resolving the dispute. Pakistan accepted the resolution under protest and subject to its own interpretations. India rejected it but intimated to the Council that if it decided to send the Commission, "the Government of India would be glad to confer with it".

While the Security Council was sitting in the centrally heated room at New York counselling restraint to Pakistan and India, the forces of the

two countries were facing each other in combat position and the Generals were planning for a bigger offensive in the coming spring. Pakistan had concentrated her troops in the Sialkot region, and the Suchetgarh and Marla fronts were strengthened. Special squads were being raised at Lahore to infiltrate into Poonch. Muzaffarabad was fortified to serve as a base for an onslaught on the Valley.

The fact that India's planning in the early stages was most haphazard would be clear from a single instance. When Indian fighter planes were ordered to strafe the enemy positions at Badgam, they were held up for want of a scale map. With a razor blade the Brigadier cut out the relevant portion from the only map available at Brigade Headquarters and handed it over for the two fighter pilots to share it. On landing the incoming plane's pilot would hand over the fragment to the outgoing plane's pilot. In the end the fragment was returned to be replaced in the map from which it had been cut.

Except for the Gorkhas and Kumaonis, the bulk of Indian soldiers—especially the Rajputs and Madrasis—encountered snow for the first time in Kashmir. They were not provided with oxygen or snow clothing or Arctic fuel or special rations. A cup of tea took hours to boil. Many soldiers suffered from agonies of frost-bite because after walking through snow, they would heat their booted feet in front of a fire. The tribesmen and Muslim deserters of Kashmir forces were familiar with hilly terrain and snow-bound conditions. Snow to these people, even

at the height of winter, was not much of an obstacle.

The winter lull in fighting gave time for the Indian Generals to do some planning. The Indian Army in the State was split into two divisions—Srinagar to operate under Major-General Thimayya and Jammu under Major-General Atma Singh. Atma Singh's charge extended over Kashmir to the south and south-west of the Pir Panjal range and Thimayya's charge comprised the Kashmir Valley, Gilgit, Baltistan and Ladakh, an area of 35,000 square miles of which about one-sixth lay in the Valley. The defence of the Valley continued to remain the responsibility of the 161 Infantry Brigade.

An urgent problem in the Valley was to improve the intelligence services, and forest rangers were deployed to collect information about the enemy's concentrations and movements. The rangers knew every inch of the terrain and were understood to be going about in the normal discharge of forest duties. The information collected was checked and detailed plans prepared of the pathways, hill tracts, nullahs, bridges, important hill features and enemy hide-outs. Meanwhile, enemy snipers and ambushes were effectively dealt with by our men.

By the start of spring, India had consolidated her position and was ready to strike against the enemy. There were at least three passes which debouched into the Valley and unless these were plugged, the Valley would remain vulnerable to attacks from Pakistan-occupied areas. To the north of Muzaffarabad, about 18 miles, was the Tithwal Pass, not so popular a highway

as the Uri Pass, but strategically a potential threat to the Valley. The other passes were Razdhanangan (11,568 feet) leading to Tragbal which overlooked the area to the north of Bandipur near Wular lake and Zojila Pass (11,578 feet) in the easternmost corner of the Valley. All these passes had been occupied by the enemy.

Since the middle of February, intercepted messages from Gilgit had made it clear that Pakistan was planning to launch 'Operation Sledge', to capture the Buddhist town of Leh. India's position to the north of the Great Himalayan Range was precarious. Whatever State Forces were left had been besieged either at Skardu or in Kargil. The passes connecting the Valley with Gurez and Ladakh were covered with deep snow. The chances of sending any relief to the besieged garrisons were remote. The bead-counting Lamas in the monasteries were not fighting people.

The Skardu garrison which had been ordered to defend the fort to 'the last man and the last round' had to capitulate to the pressure of superior numbers early in August. The small State Force at Kargil was too weak to hold out and surrendered. Gurez fell into enemy hands, who then occupied Dras, the key town of Baltistan. The Pakistan regulars crossed the Razdhanangan Pass and captured Tragbal. The enemy advanced and occupied high positions on the two sides of the two-mile long Zojila Pass below which was the Gumri basin.

General Thimayya's immediate task was to dislodge the enemy from these passes. He planned a pincer movement of two brigades, one headed by Brigadier Harbaksh Singh who was to lead

an assault on Tithwal from Handawor, and the other under Brigadier Sen who was to advance along the Jhelum road. The two forces would converge at Muzaffarabad.

Thimayya has recorded that in this manoeuvre, he was moved by tactical considerations. "Even by posing a threat to the Tithwal Pass, I figured that most of the marauders would be driven to protect it. This would enable me to get another brigade along the Uri highway through the mountains. This brigade could then turn north to hit at Muzaffarabad from the south. My third brigade would be needed to secure Uri itself". Thimayya had failed to reckon that the Pakistan regular forces would come out and join the fight.

Stunned by Harbaksh Singh's surprise attack, the raiders fled from Tithwal towards the south and the route to Muzaffarabad was laid open. Harbaksh Singh liberated some 3,500 sq. miles of enemy-occupied territory and his forces were astride the road leading to Muzaffarabad. The Uri Brigade met with some initial success but before reaching Domel, it was given stiff resistance by the Pakistani regulars. Brigadier Sen had to withdraw. The pincer movement failed to achieve its objective. The capture of the Tithwal Pass, however, was a major gain which virtually insulated the Valley against invasion from the west.

Thimayya's next target was Razdhanangan, but there was no road leading to it from the Valley. After a devastating air strike, which drove the enemy out of Tragbal, our army jeeps rattled over a rough hill-track to reach it. The jawans had to trek the rest of the eight-mile stretch in wild unknown territory under territory under ter-

rible weather conditions to face stiff resistance from Pakistani regulars. General Thimayya has graphically described the battle: "The men climbed precipices, endured blizzards, waded through knee-deep snow and suffered the effects of rarified air. They had no special equipment and carried their supplies. In the vast area, getting lost was only too easy. They had to move quietly and secretly so that the enemy would not learn of their approach in time to set up an ambush". The enemy had no inkling as to the Indian forces' movements. As in the attack on Tithwal, surprise was the secret of success. On the approach of Indian jawans, the enemy decamped and the Razdhanangan fell into our hands.

The Indian forces established their base at Razdhanangan and moved north to Gurez. The Gurez valley is drained by the Kishenganga and is dominated on either side by high ranges with altitudes of 11,000 feet and above. Our army's operation consisted mostly of occupying steep snow-covered features, which the jawans did with admirable endurance and perseverance. Later, when the Zojila Pass had been captured our troops took Kargil, a strategic point where three roads met—one from Skardu on the north-west, another from Srinagar through Draz, and a third leading to Leh on the east.

In the depth of winter, when the Zojila Pass was under some 30 feet of snow, about forty highlanders hailing from Lahaul had volunteered to cross it. It was an act of super-human bravery. But they crossed the pass and moved towards Leh. By another equally miraculous

march, two companies of Indian soldiers moved from Manali in the Kulu Valley to Leh, a distance of about two hundred miles at an average height of over 15,000 feet. When the raiders eventually attacked Leh, they found that the town was well defended. The attack was repulsed with heavy losses.

Thimayya's own achievements were climaxed by a flight over the 23,000 feet high uncharted Himalayas without navigational aids, and a landing on an improvised air-strip at Leh. Credit for it must be shared by Air Commodore Mehar Singh, known for his daring and spirit of adventure, who flew Thimayya on this perilous journey. Twenty years later, as a member of the Defence Advisory Committee of the Union Government, I flew in a Russian freighter over the same area, and my mind went back to the heroes who had risked their lives to save the monks from destruction. It was then that I fully realised what risks these brave men had taken.

The autumn was passing and if we did not capture the Zojila Pass before the winter, our operations would have to wait till the following summer. Several frontal attacks by our men had failed and an alternative plan of attack had to be thought of. Thimayya had a brainwave. He arranged for a column of seven Stewart tanks (Honeys) to move concealed under low clouds from Jammu to Baltal, a distance of 260 miles. From Baltal to Zojila the tanks had to climb 3,000 feet over four miles of trail hewn out of rocks and full of hair-pin bends, but the tanks managed to clatter their way up and to entrench themselves in the pass. "The tanks could not

blast out the deeply dug enemy bunkers, but the unexpected sight and sounds of the armour terrorised the tribesmen. They fled in panic. Our planes caught them in the open, and before nightfall the Zojila was in our hands", said Thimayya. No tank battle the like of this at such a formidable height had been fought in the world's history. Our jawans debouched into the Valley, occupied the towns of Draz and Kargil and ensured the safety of the road to Leh. The threat to Ladakh disappeared.

While the Valley was hibernating under the winter snow, the Jammu front was enlivened. Winter rains in Jammu Province that year were abnormally heavy and the only surfaced road from the town of Jammu to Naushera was badly damaged. The Indian troops were in many places marooned in mud and slush. The enemy had the tactical advantage provided by two motorable roads—the Mirpur-Jhelum road and the Sialkot-Jammu road. It had to travel shorter distances from military bases in Pakistan. Our army had, therefore, for the most part, to remain on the defensive.

In Jammu Province the target for the spring and summer offensive was the recovery of Rajouri and the liberation of the Poonch garrison. On 8 April, the Indian forces moved and by four o'clock that afternoon, we captured the Barvati ridge. The next town of Chingas was set aflame by the retreating raiders as our armoured cars entered it. On 12 April the Indian forces captured Rajouri, arriving just in time to save 300 to 500 Hindu refugees who had been lined up by the raiders to be shot.

Rajouri had been ransacked twice, once when it was occupied by the raiders and a second time when they vacated it. The town was in a shambles with half of its 600 houses razed to the ground. Even after we had captured Rajouri, the enemy continued to be active in its neighbourhood and launched one attack after another. In one of the attacks on Jhangar, Brig. Mohammad Usman of Naushera fame was killed by a shell burst. During the rains the progress of the Indian forces was slowed down. They had to comb vast areas before moving forward. After heavy engagements, the raiders were driven out of Thanamandi and Mendhar and the Ramgarh Fort was stormed. On the night of 19th November, six months after the operations had begun, the Poonch garrison which had remained under heavy siege for over a year, was liberated by Indian forces under General Atma Singh.

For eleven weeks after the resolution to set up the UNCIP was adopted, nothing happened. When the Commission landed at the Karachi airport on 5th July, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Zafrulla had a bombshell for them. He told the Commission that three Brigades of the Pakistan army had, some time in May, joined the fight inside Kashmir territory. But there is a minute from Lord Birdwood recorded on 17th March mentioning that "a battery of mountain guns with an infantry escort was in action in Kashmir". The battery was pounding Poonch. A few days later, General Kulwant Singh had to abandon an attempt to land at the Poonch airstrip, which was under artillery fire. Did the tribesmen have mountain guns? That the Pakis-

tan Army had joined the fray earlier is a fact. The Azad Kashmir Poonch (AKP) force starting from scratch had, by the summer, risen to 32 battalions which, according to Pakistan's admission to the UNCIP, were "under the overall command and tactical directions of the Pakistan Army". The UNCIP agreed that this constituted a material change in the situation, but it was not prepared to brand Pakistan aggressor.

Mohammad Ali Jinnah who was ill could not receive the Commission. Zafrulla explained to the Commission that Pakistan had acted in self-defence. The Indian forces were on the offensive and had pushed the AKP and tribesmen close to the Pakistani border. If their design had close to the Pakistan's security would have been in jeopardy. Pakistan could not, in the circumstances, sit back passively, unmindful of the possibility that the Indian army might invade its territory. The other reasons given were that India might face Pakistan with a *fait accompli* and there might be an influx of refugees which Pakistan wanted to avoid at all cost. The members of the Commission listened to the Foreign Minister in silence and made no comment. The Commission then moved to Delhi to discuss the situation with the Indian Government.

At the Commission's first meeting, Jawaharlal Nehru talked of everything but what had brought the Commission to India, namely Kashmir. A few days later, Nehru expressed his extreme disgust at the Security Council's decision to admit Pakistan's complaint after its complicity in the raid on Kashmir had been established. Jawaharlal said that India's approach to the

problem was different from that of Pakistan. India was a secular democracy and looked upon the Kashmir affair from a political angle while Pakistan was a mediaeval theocracy and claimed the State because the majority of its population was Muslim.

Nehru insisted the Pakistani Army had no *locus standi* in Kashmir and should be withdrawn from the State before negotiations on a plebiscite could start. He was prepared to concede that the Kashmir Government's civil control would not extend over the territory vacated by Pakistan, but insisted that there must be a formal recognition of the State's authority over it. To demonstrate her right, India would occupy some advanced strategic positions, but would reduce its forces in Kashmir to the bare minimum necessary for defence against external aggression and internal disturbances.

Pressed by Korbél to indicate his solution of the problem, Nehru went on to say, "We ourselves asked for a plebiscite. We wish the nation of Kashmir to decide for itself. We did it spontaneously and not because of Pakistan. But now for almost ten months, there has been war going on in Kashmir. The country is devastated, the administration disrupted, the situation is different from what it was. The preparation for a plebiscite would of course require the withdrawal of the Pakistani forces and then a prolonged period of adjustment preceding the elections, including such necessities as the return of refugees, their settlement and the like."

Foiled in its efforts to evolve a mutually acceptable formula, the Commission proceeded

to record its opinion of what would be a fair solution. This took the form of the resolution of 13th August, which was supplemented by another resolution of 5th January 1949. These two resolutions were accepted both by India and by Pakistan and formed the basis for future discussions. These resolutions deserve a detailed examination.

The resolution consisted of three parts. Each part comprised a number of matters. It was like skittles where if you knock down the first skittle, the others fall automatically. It depended for its validity on the agreement of India and Pakistan. Although it left several ambiguities, it was the one effort which yielded some fruit during the dreary negotiation on the Kashmir dispute through the U.N.

The resolution started with a declaration that the Governments of India and Pakistan agreed to simultaneously order all the forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir to cease firing. The date from which the cease-fire would become effective would be fixed by mutual agreement. The High Commands of the two forces would refrain from augmenting the potential of their forces in Kashmir. These would include all forces, organised or unorganised, engaged in hostilities. But Pakistan had some reservations about the inclusion of AKP among the forces under its control. The Commission would appoint military observers to supervise the CFL and note any violations. Both Governments would appeal to their respective people to assist in creating and maintaining conditions helpful to the negotiations.

Simultaneously with the acceptance of the above proposals, the representatives of the two governments would negotiate a truce agreement. There was an admission that the presence of Pakistani troops in the territory of Kashmir 'constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council'. It was stipulated that Pakistan would withdraw its troops from the State. Pakistan would make its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals from Kashmir. Pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by Pakistan would be administered by local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission. Who were the local authorities, and what would be the nature of the surveillance were anybody's guess.

When the Commission notified them that tribesmen and Pakistani nationals had withdrawn and that Pakistani forces were being withdrawn from the State, the Government of India would begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces from the State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission. Until the conditions for the final solution were settled, the Indian Government would be entitled to maintain on its side of the CFL the minimum forces which, in concord with the Commission, were considered necessary for the observance of law and order. Would the observance of law and order include defence against external aggression? The Government of India would publicise their statement that peace would be maintained and human and political rights

guaranteed. The truce agreement would be made public after it had been signed by the parties.

Finally the Governments of India and Pakistan would reaffirm their desire that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir would be determined according to the will of its people. Upon the acceptance of the truce agreement, both Governments would start consultations to lay down fair and equitable conditions to ensure free expression of will.

In a letter dated 20th August, the Prime Minister of India made it clear to the Chairman of UNCIP that the portion dealing with local authorities "should not be interpreted, or applied in practice, so as:

(a) to bring into question the sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir Government over the portion of their territory evacuated by Pakistan troops;

(b) to afford any recognition of the so-called 'Azad Kashmir Government'; or

(c) to enable this territory to be consolidated in any way during the period of truce to the disadvantage of the State."

He emphasised that the strength of Indian forces in Kashmir should be enough to meet an external invasion and internal disturbances. Further, Pakistan would have no part in the plebiscite.

The Chairman replied that the Prime Minister's interpretation coincided with that of the Commission. On 20th August, India communicated its acceptance of the resolution to the UNCIP, but Pakistan took another two weeks to give a final reply. Even that was hedged by

so many "reservations, qualifications and assumptions" that the Commission had little option but to take it as a refusal.

A fresh attempt was made to mollify Pakistan. The UNCIP passed a resolution at Paris on 5th January 1949. It declared that the question of the accession of Kashmir to India or Pakistan would be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite. This would be held when the cease-fire and truce arrangements had been carried out and all preparations completed. The Secretary-General of the United Nations would nominate a Plebiscite Administrator "who shall be a personality of high international standing and commanding general confidence", although formally he would be appointed to the office by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. The Plebiscite Administrator would be given all the powers necessary for organising and conducting the plebiscite and for ensuring freedom and impartiality of vote.

When the Commission was satisfied that peaceful conditions had been restored in the State, it and the Plebiscite Administrator would, in consultation with the Government of India, determine the final disposal of the Indian and State armed forces. This would be done with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite. All citizens of the State, who had left it on account of disturbances, would be asked to return and exercise their rights as citizens. Unauthorised persons in Kashmir would be made to leave the State. The State would ensure that no threat, coercion, intimidation, bribery or undue influence was exercised

on the voters and no restriction was placed on legitimate political activities and free expression of opinion. All political prisoners would be released. There would be no victimisation and minorities would be accorded adequate protection.

The cease-fire became effective one minute before the midnight of December 1948, a year after India had filed her complaint before the Security Council, and the work of demarcating the cease-fire line was started. A dozen member-countries of the U.N. assigned their teams, headed by military officers of high rank, as observers appointed by the Secretary-General. They established their headquarters at Rawalpindi and Srinagar, and the observers were deputed to take up positions on either side of the CFL. Whenever need arose, the observers would assist in the local fixation of the line.

The CFL was born prematurely at a time when the Indian troops were in fine form and on the offensive. If their commanders had been alerted, they would have sealed the Valley by occupying some vulnerable places like the high posts near Kargil, portions of Lipa Valley or the Haji Pir Pass. That would have saved much bloodshed in the 1948 and 1949 Indo-Pakistan wars. But the CFL was based on the status quo, as it existed one minute before the last midnight of 1948. It had no rationale except the timing. It did not follow any physical feature like a water shed or a valley or a river.

The CFL was finally established on 29th July 1949, and an agreement was signed by the military representatives of India and Pakistan at Karachi. It was, however, a flimsy document apt

to be blown away by a hostile gust of wind. That is not to argue that the CFL has served no useful purpose. In fact, all international boundaries, not to speak of the temporary CFL, hold good only during normal times. In war, boundaries are swept away, whether they are claimed to be customary or temporary.

The task of demilitarising the State required effective action but the members of the UNCIP were divided in their approach. The working of the Commission had become difficult. It recommended to the Security Council that the work of implementing Parts 2 and 3 of the 13 August resolution as supplemented by the 5 January resolution, should be entrusted to a single mediator. With the acceptance of this recommendation, the Security Council was once again involved in the Kashmir dispute. Gen. A. G. L. McNaughton of Canada, its President those days, was named by the Council 'Informal Mediator' to prepare a plan for the demilitarisation of the State which would be followed by a plebiscite.

McNaughton's proposals envisaged that there would be an agreed programme for the 'withdrawal, disbandment and disarmament' of all armed forces from either side of the cease-fire line, in stages, so as to avoid a scare among the people. It would include the withdrawal of regular Pakistani forces from the State and such Indian forces as were not required for maintaining law and order on her side of the CFL. The AKP as well as J & K's regular forces and militia would have to be reduced in numbers and

strength. In Gilgit and Baltistan the 'local authorities' would function under United Nations' supervision. When the agreed programme of demilitarisation had been implemented to the satisfaction of the United Nations Representative nominated by the Secretary-General, the Plebiscite Administrator would proceed with his task in terms of the UNCIP resolution of 5th January.

The proposals met with an exceedingly hostile reception in India. The State Government of Jammu and Kashmir brought it on record that "The Kashmir dispute.....has come to be viewed in the context of the present international situation with its compelling necessity upon the Governments of U.K. and U.S.A. to make concessions to Pakistan with a view to gaining its goodwill and support. Naturally, whatever proposals have emanated from these Governments for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute have, overtly or covertly, favoured the position of the Pakistan Government". The augmentation of the AKP, in violation of the 13th August resolution, was validated and that force was put at par with the regular forces and militia of the Kashmir Government. The 'local authorities' of the Northern region, though they had no legal sanction, were recognised. The lawful government of Kashmir was denied even notional sovereignty over the territories in Pakistan's occupation. The U.N. Representative was given arbitrary powers.

The Security Council approved the proposals and Sir Owen Dixon, an eminent jurist and a Judge of the Supreme Court of Justice of Aus-

tralia was appointed the United Nations Representative.' On 14th April 1950, the Council adopted a resolution calling upon India and Pakistan to prepare and execute a programme for the demilitarisation of the State in five months on the basis of McNaughton's proposals. India formally accepted the resolution but subject to objections regarding the validity of the AKP and the Northern Areas in McNaughton's proposal. Pakistan accepted the proposals without any reservations.

The AKP which had, by that time, grown to a huge size, became the main obstacle in the implementation of demilitarisation. What it meant would be clear from paragraph 225 of the UNCIP report:—

“There is, indeed no doubt that the Azad forces now have a strength which changes the military situation and to that extent makes the withdrawal of forces, particularly those of India, a far more difficult matter to arrange within a structure which considers only the regular forces of two armies. Although it might be a matter of discussion whether the numerical strength of the Azad Kashmir forces has actually increased since August 1948, there is no question that those forces, who have since then been working in close co-operation with the Pakistan regular army and who have been trained and officered by that army, have increased their fighting strength. It is reasonable to suppose that, if the Commission had been able to foresee that the cease-fire period would be prolonged throughout the greater part of 1949 and that Pakistan would use that period to consolidate its position

in the Azad territory, the Commission would have dealt with this question in Part II of the resolution of 13th August."

- India has been criticised for her reservations on demilitarisation and her refusal to disclose her programme of withdrawal of forces, but little effort has been made to understand the reasons. The Pakistani military concentrations were within short distances of the Kashmir border — at Abbotabad 16 miles, at Rawalpindi 31, at Murree 15, at Jhelum 4 and at Sialkot 6 miles. They could strike at the State of Jammu and Kashmir at will. India could not afford to take unnecessary risks and her programme of withdrawal would depend on how far the threat from the Pakistani Army and the AKP had been removed.

Sir-Owen arrived on the sub-continent on May 27, a lucky time when the Nehru-Liaquat Pact of 2nd April had considerably improved Indo-Pakistani relations. The two Prime Ministers and Sir Owen met on 20th July to discover that neither India nor Pakistan had prepared any positive plan for demilitarisation. The buck was passed to the United Nations Representative. Thus two-thirds of the time allowed to Sir Owen had been wasted without achieving any result.

Sir Owen was of the view that Pakistan had violated international law. He has gone on record to say that:

"Without going into the causes or reasons why it happened, which presumably formed part of the history of the sub-continent, I was prepared to adopt the view that when the frontier of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was

crossed on, I believe, October 20, 1947 by hostile elements, it was contrary to international law; and when, in May of 1948, as I believe, units of the regular Pakistan forces moved into the territory of the state, that too was inconsistent with international law”.

Sir Owen tried to bring about a settlement on demilitarisation. But India refused to ask the Kashmir Government to disband its militia, which was needed for policing. Further she would not countenance the idea of limiting her forces in the State so long as the Pakistani regulars and Azad forces were there. Sir Owen's proposals about the Northern Area were not acceptable to India so long as the District Magistrate appointed by Pakistan remained there in office. The negotiations fell through.

Sir Owen suggested several plans for a united administration of Kashmir State, but these plans implied either the abrogation of Abdullah's Government or forcing it to enter into an incompatible partnership. They were turned down by India and this provoked Dixon into making adverse remarks against her. Dixon was sceptical about an overall plebiscite in the State and proposed two alternatives—(a) a plan for taking the plebiscite by sections or areas and the allocation of each section or area according to its voting; and (b) a plan in which it was assumed that some areas would vote for accession to India and others to Pakistan. Without taking a vote in those areas, they were to be allotted by the consent of the parties and the plebiscite confined to disputed areas like the Kashmir Valley. India was sympathetic to this

approach, but Pakistan rejected it outright. She refused to attend a conference to discuss a solution on these lines.

• Having failed in his attempts to secure agreement, Sir Owen submitted his recommendations to the Security Council which rejected an overall plebiscite. Kashmir was not one economic, geographical or demographical entity, and any attempt to allocate the whole of it to either India or Pakistan would create serious problems of dislocation and exodus. In his view a partition based on territorial contiguity and geo-topographical considerations was the only alternative. "If this view was accepted, it is perhaps likely that the initiative should now pass back to the parties". Both in India and Pakistan there was widespread resentment against the recommendation.

The Security Council once again relapsed into somnolence until it was shaken into awareness by Sheikh Abdullah's decision to summon a Constituent Assembly for Kashmir to frame a Constitution for the State and to decide the question of its accession to India. Pakistan requested the Security Council to stop India and the State of Jammu and Kashmir from convening the Constituent Assembly. India's representative gave an assurance that the framing of the Constitution would not prejudice the issue before the U.N. He said that the Indian Government was of the view that the Constituent Assembly might, if it so desired, express an opinion on the question of accession but take no decision on it. Britain's delegate, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, reminded the Council that—

“Never’ was it more necessary, as indeed it is now, for two peace-loving states to give practical evidence that these issues which divide them, great and troubling though they are, are still capable of adjustment....”

The Council accepted Sir Owen’s resignation and appointed another representative. This time it was Dr Frank P. Graham of the United States. He was asked to effect the demilitarisation of Kashmir within three months, in consultation with the Governments of India and Pakistan. In case of failure to reach agreement, the differences were to be referred to an arbitrator appointed by the President of the International Court in consultation with the parties. Nehru reacted violently to this saying that he would not allow the fate of four million people to be decided by a third party. He told the Indian Parliament that:

“We did not go there (to the U.N.) to seek arbitration but to complain about the aggression of another State, which was likely to lead to international complications and probably affect peace. Evidently the sponsors of the joint resolution before the Security Council have a short memory and have forgotten how the matter came before the Security Council and the history of the tragic event that had preceded it. The United Nations utilized the position of our having made a reference in the matter to widen the scope of their enquiry.”

Graham could not have landed on the sub-continent ‘at a worse time. Tension between Pakistan and India was at its height. There were cries of *jehad* in Pakistan. Addressing a tribal

gathering in Gilgit, Governor-General Nazimuddin had said: "The liberation of Kashmir is the cardinal belief of every Pakistani. It is an integral part of the Pakistan resolution and Pakistan would remain incomplete until the whole of Kashmir is liberated". The Prime Minister of Pakistan had raised his 'clenched fist' in a public meeting and declared it to be Pakistan's symbol. The Muslim nations gathered at Karachi in the World Muslim Conference passed a resolution declaring their solidarity with the people of Pakistan, which they said "no power on earth could break". Nehru was annoyed and in his New Year message of 1952, he warned Pakistan that if by any mistake she invaded Kashmir, there would be a full-scale war between the two countries.

The war propaganda by Pakistan, the concentration of both countries' troops on the frontier, the convening of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly and several other issues, had so vitiated the atmosphere that Graham could not convene a joint meeting of the two Prime Ministers or Commanders-in-Chief and he met them separately for informal consultations. In September 1951, Graham communicated his proposals to the two Governments. There was not much that was new in the proposals except for one vital innovation, namely that all differences on the plan of demilitarisation would be settled by the U.N. Representative whose decision would be final. India had all through been opposed to arbitration.

On the three issues, namely, the observance of the CFL, a curb on war propaganda, and

avoidance of the use of force for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute, there was agreement between India and Pakistan. On other issues they disagreed. India thought that the period of three months for demilitarisation and plebiscite would be too short; Pakistan said it was enough. India was not happy with the choice of Admiral Nimitz as the Plebiscite Administrator and opposed his immediate induction into office; Pakistan was insistent that he should take over at once. But before Graham's second report came up before the Security Council, Liaqat Ali Khan fell to the bullets of a Pathan fanatic at Rawalpindi on 16th October, 1951. Pakistan was left without strong leadership. This made the settlement more difficult.

Summarizing his Second Report to the Security Council, Graham defined the area of disagreement to be: "First, a definite period for demilitarisation; second, the scope of demilitarisation; third, the day for the formal induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator." The last two matters were important. Despite prolonged discussions, the two countries could not agree on the numbers of the forces. India said that she was responsible for the security of the Kashmir State, but Pakistan would not concede that the responsibility was solely hers. India emphasised the security aspect, while Pakistan highlighted the need for a free and fair plebiscite. Pakistan wanted equal status for the forces on either side. India refused to equate her stationing of lawful Indian forces with the rebel forces in the occupied area of the State. These basic differences in outlook stood in the way of reach-

ing agreement on principle. After five years of efforts by the Security Council, the UNCIP and U.N. representatives, the negotiations failed.

The United Nation's task was difficult, but it cannot escape a major share of responsibility for failure. The Council had procrastinated for months when India was crying for action to stop the fighting. When the UNCIP intervened, the Indian troops were advancing with their tails up. Even so India accepted the cease-fire. All nations are naturally reluctant to yield the gains of the battle-field at the negotiating table. The two representatives of the Security Council, Owen Dixon and Graham, were good and honest persons but the gulf of disbelief between India and Pakistan had grown too wide to be bridged. Nimitz never saw the day when he could take over. In the next phase, attempts were made to solve the dispute through mutual negotiations between India and Pakistan.

MY FIRST CONTACT WITH KASHMIR

SHEIKH Mohammad Abdullah was on fairly close terms with me as a member of the Constituent Assembly. We often met at **Rafi Ahmad Kidwai's** popular rendezvous for evening coffee and a tete-a-tete. Once in the mid-40s, when the Sheikh had come to my home town of Saharanpur to confer with **Maulana Husain Ahmad Madni** and other **Jamiat-ul-Ulema** leaders on political problems, I had invited him to lunch. But my official contacts with the Sheikh began about the middle of 1950, when I became the Relief and Rehabilitation Minister of India and the Sheikh was the Prime Minister of Kashmir.

The refugee problem in Kashmir was in some respects more complicated than that in India. The State had suffered from two exoduses, once about the time of Partition when the Hindus and Sikhs living in the Pakistan areas adjoining the State's border had been driven out by the communal holocaust and the second when the raiders and Pakistani nationals invaded the frontiers of Jammu Province on the west and south and the Hindus and Sikhs had to run for their lives. Jawaharlal after return from Kashmir wrote in May 1948 that "the refugee problem is a great drain. Indeed the Government is at its wits end how to meet the expenses of the refugees. **Sardar Budh Singh**, a very fine and up-

right man, is the Relief Minister and he was almost in tears when he spoke to me of his difficulties." The Maharaja had written to the Sardar that on the intensification of attacks by the raiders on the Kathua-Sialkot border, all the villages had been vacated and about 70,000 to 80,000 refugees had rushed to Jammu town.

By the time I took over as Minister, the main refugee camp at Nagrota some six miles up the Jammu-Srinagar road had been set up. Many refugees had settled on their own with their friends and relations. Some occupied houses vacated by the emigrant Muslims in Jammu town through the connivance of officials. About twenty thousand widows, lone women and their children were living in Women's Homes in the towns of Jammu and Poonch and nearly five thousand Sikh and Hindu refugees who had migrated from Muzaffarabad and its neighbouring areas were lodged at Srinagar.

The Sheikh had come to Delhi to ask for a grant for expenditure on the relief of Hindu and Sikh refugees who were being looked after by the State government. I asked my ministry to give me details about the Kashmir refugees, but nobody could tell me the exact numbers or the location of camps; how many women and children stood in need of support and what their support would cost. There was, however, no doubt about the meagreness of the State's resources and the need to give liberal help.

The Sheikh, if I remember correctly, wanted a sum of Rs. 20 lakhs, and I had no objection to giving it. What hurt me was his haughty and over-bearing attitude. He refused to give details

of items of expenditure. He would not give even an approximate idea. He would not allow officers of my ministry to supervise the expenditure. He would not have any auditing of accounts by the Auditor-General of India. It was of no concern to him that what he was asking for was against the principle of a Minister's accountability to Parliament.

I was in a predicament but in no position to defy the Sheikh. He was a trusted friend of Jawaharlal and had played a crucial role in Kashmir's accession to India. He commanded an unrivalled popularity in the Valley, and without the Sheikh's support, the plebiscite in Kashmir was as good as lost. The Sheikh was politically indispensable to India. I knew that in a tussle with him, I would come off second best.

We met in Gopalaswami Ayyangar's office in Parliament House. Gopalaswamy was a senior Minister, who had once been Prime Minister of the Kashmir State. He was a specialist and Jawaharlal's principal aide on Kashmir affairs. Gopalaswami discreetly advised me to hand over the money, and I accepted Abdullah's terms. Till today nobody in the Indian Government knows how the money was spent.

Shortly after this, another shock awaited me. Sialkot city of pre-Partition days was known for manufacturing quality sports goods—tennis and badminton rackets, cricket bats, hockey sticks, etc. The sports-goods manufacturer Uberoi's name was a byword in every corner of India where a school or college existed. Of the many Hindus and Sikhs of Sialkot engaged for generations in the trade, a sizable section had,

after migration, settled at Meerut, another centre in north India famous for its sports goods. When I visited Meerut, a deputation of the refugees told me that at Sialkot they used to get wood for sports goods from the Kashmir Valley and requested me to help them in getting willow and mulberry from there.

I thought it was the simplest of matters, but when one of my officers approached the Kashmir Government, to my chagrin he was told that wood in the Valley was scarce and would be needed for domestic heating in the coming winter. Winter in Kashmir is severe and the common people wear a string round the neck to hold up a small brazier, called a *kangri*, to keep their body warm. An alternative was offered by my officers. They suggested that trucks transporting the sports wood from Kashmir to India would carry, on their way back to Kashmir, an equal quantity of Indian fuel for burning. But for some unexplained reason this offer was also turned down.

Unruffled by rebuffs, I arranged a visit to the State to study the refugee problem. It was my first visit and on landing I felt as if I had come to fairy-land. The Kashmir Valley is full of torrential rivers in the high ranges, gentle springs below, the Wular, the biggest fresh water lake at that height in the world, towering snow-covered peaks. The mighty chinars sit like bulky elephants in the Valley, the sprightly firs climb up the hill slopes like light-footed ponies, and the willows and poplars stand guard along the roadsides and the fringes of the farmer's fields. They make an amazing blend of beauty.

The flat rolling *kerewas* of rich alluvium rising to fifty or a hundred feet above the river level are geologically unique in the world. More than half the Valley consists of *kerewas* extending all the way from Shópyan to Baramula. Composed of lacustrine deposits the *kerewas* are geological formations of the Ice Age, overlying the terminal moraines of the first glaciation. There is nothing like them even in Switzerland. They have surviving remnants of what must have once been a canal system. The *kerewas* are excellent orchards but they are dependent on the water supply. Modern advances in irrigation would make up the deficiency and the *kerewas* would add richly to the Valley's prosperity.

The city of Srinagar is pre-historic in origin. It is in the heart of the Valley and all Kashmir roads lead to the town. It has seen days of prosperity and of woe and destruction. A sprawling town along both banks of the Jhelum, its streets are connected by seven wooden bridges across the river. The town was the market for merchants from Central Asia, India and Tibet. For ages they had been exchanging carpets, pashmina wool, furs, skins of the north for rice, tea, jaggery and salt of India. Srinagar is dominated by hill features—Shankaracharya's temple, a symbol of the preacher's holy zeal, on a hill-top; the majestic Hari Parbat fort, a reminder of Mughal might on another, and Hazrat Bal on the Dal lake—together epitomising the tolerance and Kashmir's mixed culture.

The Kashmir Valley has many places of historical interest. The great ruins of the Martand

temple and the excavations of Avanti are testimony that ancient Kashmir was a part of India and Hinduism. At Maltan and Khu Bhawan, a Hindu from India can trace his geneology back to any of his ancestors who ever visited the Valley. The Pandas, who are custodians of the geneological records, are peculiar to the Hindu polity and are found at all places of pilgrimage. The accuracy of their records is remarkable.

Kashmir is a summer resort for tourists, who hire house-boats with attached canoes, where the boat-owner and his family live to do cooking, sweeping and scavenging for the guests. The boatman's daughter may be the prettiest of damsels but perhaps not the cleanest. The Kashmiri trader plying his wares in a *shikara* is often an expert cheat. He asks a fabulously high price and comes down so low that a buyer can never be sure that he has got his money's worth. He reminded me of what I had seen at Port Said, when our ship touched there. The captain of the ship would not allow any Arab merchant to come on deck, but the merchants would outwit him. They would throw the end of a rope to the deck. At the other end of the rope was tied a basket full of wares for sale. The passenger would pull up the rope and make a selection of wares, the rejected ones being returned. The trader would ask fantastic prices, but would be content with whatever was offered.

At Srinagar, I stayed in the State Guest House on the bank of the Jhelum. It was an aristocratic area in which the Maharaja had built his new palace. Across the river, was the sprawling town where the mass of the people lived and

worked. I went to the locality where the world-renowned Kashmiri artisans live and found that while the noon-day sun was brightening the streets, the rooms where the artisans worked were dark. The nimble-fingered craftsmen, carving walnut pieces, weaving carpets, threading embroidery or painting papier-mache, were sitting under the flickering light of a kerosene lamp. They often lose their eyesight, and hasten to an early death. It brought home to me the contrast at Zurich, where my host's daughter had taken me to the clean and well-lit cottages where the artisans made watches, clocks, and electrical and other goods.

I enjoyed rowing in a *shikara* and was impressed with the inter-locking device which lifts the boat into the Dal lake. The lake's level is higher than that of the Jhelum and when one wants to go to the lake, the boat is taken across the riverside gate which is then closed. The lakeside gate opens and the boat rises until it reaches the level of the lake. Then one may enter the lake, which is full of colourful houseboats and shikaras, painted in riotous colours which contrasted with the blue water and the green hills.

I drove to Baramula along a road bordered by poplars, by which raiders had travelled in the hope of bringing back rich booty from Srinagar and by which they retreated after a shattering defeat, leaving about many dead and wounded. Although three years had passed since the invasion, Baramula had not recovered from the effects. Many houses were lying in ruins. The Christian hospital and St. Joseph's Chapel

bore signs of the raiders' savagery. I was told that more than half of the pre-raid population had not returned to the town. The great patriot Maqbool Sherwani's name was on every lip and I went to the place of his crucifixion to offer my tribute. Then we proceeded towards Uri.

At the Uri gorge one could see a Pakistani outpost where soldiers stood with bayoneted rifles. The difficult terrain makes absolute defence impossible and little wonder that the CFL has proved vulnerable to violations. In the town Pir Maqbool Gilani, who later turned a Pakistani collaborator, served our party with corn cakes smeared with butter and honey and salted Kashmir green tea from a *samovar*. The Pir regaled our company with stories of how he and his followers had beguiled the raiders by false promises of loot and had delayed their progress. He said that he was looking forward to the day when he would take out and ride his ancestral palanquin to exhort the people to vote for India in a plebiscite.

On the return journey, I was shown the houses in Budgam village from where raiders, aided by local quislings, had fired on Indian soldiers from the rear, but the soldiers did not return the fire for fear that it might cost the lives of women and children. It was through acts like these that the Indian Jawans had won the heart of the local people.

The Director of Relief for the Valley was a Kashmiri Pandit, inherited from the Maharaja's services. He wore a slovenly turban, a long cloak reaching to his ankles, baggy pyjamas and country-made shoes. A relic of the Old Durbar,

he was probably not sought for by any government department. He took me round the refugee camps, five or six in number. The total number of inmates in all the camps may not have exceeded five thousand. The largest camp was located inside the high walls of an abandoned Hindu temple, which reminded me of the familiar jail walls behind which I had passed eight to ten years of my life. Inside the walls there were several dilapidated buildings unmistakably meant for the stay of pilgrims. Some tents had been pitched to lodge the refugees.

I wondered how they would survive the snow and bitter cold of the winter and enquired of the Director what was his future programme for them. He answered with a blank look. The refugees were not given any work and lived an ideal life. They felt frustrated in the extreme. I met the Sheikh and asked him whether the refugees would be settled in the Valley but he firmly said that the Valley was not meant for outsiders and the refugees would have to move down. If I liked, I could take them to India.

Some people blame Sheikh Abdullah for barring Indians from settling in the Valley. But they forget that since the days of the Maharajas, no outsider could reside permanently in the Valley without the Darbar's permission. I know of an exception made only in the case of an eye-specialist, the late Dr Mathura Das, who had cured the Maharaja of an eye disease. The ruler gifted him a whole hillside near the Palace. Three spacious houses built one above the other now exist there.

Critics of this policy ask: What does the integration of Kashmir mean when the citizens of India are not allowed to settle in Kashmir? Does not the Union Constitution guarantee its citizens the right to move about and settle at any place of their choice? These people ignore the fact that if the Valley is thrown open, land grabbers and land-speculators from all parts of India will not leave an inch of land with any Kashmiri family. The law of equality in its application to an unequal society breeds a higher degree of inequality.

The Sheikh had a deep-rooted grievance against the refugees. In this he was, I think, not quite unjustified. It so happened that late one evening a big group of refugees reached Jammu town. Their presence in the town it was feared, might provoke communal tension. But the Muslim tonga drivers were afraid to drive them to the refugee camp at that late hour. Sheikh Abdullah persuaded the drivers to take the refugees to the camp in some fifty or sixty tongas. On their arrival, the Hindu and Sikh refugees fell upon the Muslim drivers and killed several of them. The act was reprehensible, no doubt, but how long should the Sheikh have remembered it? Should the whole refugee community be damned for ever because of the misdemeanour of a few? But the Sheikh never forgot this episode and narrated it over and over again.

This was of a piece with what Lt. Gen. L. P. Sen has recorded about the accidental killing of two National Conference volunteers by a Sikh sentry at Badgam. One night when it was pitch-dark, a batch of National Conference volunteers

was returning after patrolling the Badgam area which had, a couple of days before, been a battle-ground. A sentry on duty challenged the volunteers, but instead of answering the challenge, they began to run. The sentry opened fire and two volunteers were killed.

When the news reached Abdullah the next morning his fury knew no bounds. He sent for the Brigade Commander, who regretted the incident and offered the Sheikh his deepest sympathy and an assurance that the incident was the result of a mistake. The Commander of the Indian Forces, General Kulwant Singh, too, went and offered apologies and joined the funeral procession. Abdullah was, no doubt, somewhat calmed down but never forgot the unfortunate incident. He would bring up the matter incessantly.

At last the Brigadier's patience was exhausted and he told Abdullah, to quote his own words:

"I asked him how many times he had demanded an apology from the tribals who had killed thousands of the people of Kashmir in their advance to the Valley. These killings had been deliberate murder without any semblance of an accident. I could see that he was taken aback and was searching for an answer. Without waiting for his reply, I pointed out that in defending the valley, 161 Infantry Brigade had never at any time either asked for, or used, a single man from the National Conference Volunteers to take up arms and assist it in battling against the tribals. . . . The battle had, therefore, been fought entirely by my weak Brigade. The Brigade had

suffered casualties in both officers and men in the various engagements that it had fought, but had accepted them willingly in order to save the Valley from the bloody massacres that had drenched Muzaffarabad and Baramula.... He had dwelt at length at my first meeting with him on the fate that had befallen Maqbool Sherwani, one of his most loyal and competent volunteers, at the hands of the tribal raiders. Sherwani had first been virtually crucified and then shot by the tribesmen: in short, he had been murdered. Yet, after the first meeting, he had mentioned Sherwani's name to me again."

An interesting lady staying in the same Guest House with me was Miss Mridula Sarabhai, the daughter of a Gujarati multi-millionaire. She had for some time served as a General Secretary of the Indian National Congress and was known for her social and humanitarian work. I had noticed the exceedingly commendable work done by her in the recovery of abducted women during the communal holocaust of 1947. She possessed rare courage and ran great physical risks in liberating abducted women from hideouts.

Miss Mridula was an equal admirer of Jawaharlal Nehru and Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and had for years worked as a liaison to keep the relations between them smooth. Mridula used to pluck a rose for Jawaharlal's button-hole almost daily early in the morning, and I remember that she came to my house several times to collect red roses. She used to spend considerable time in the Valley. When it came to a break between Nehru and the Sheikh, Mridula was for some time on the horns of a dilemma.

She did her best to heal the breach but failed. Then she made an outright choice and supported Abdullah. She has stood by her idol since.

Even after the production of voluminous evidence of unimpeachable credibility before the Magistrate in the conspiracy case, Mridula would not believe that the Sheikh could join an anti-Indian conspiracy. She would say that it had all been fabricated by the Indian Police. When the Sheikh smuggled out a letter addressed to the Security Council from the jail and the letter was given the widest publicity, Mridula stuck to her faith in the Sheikh's innocence. She wrote to the Sheikh to say that she did not believe the calumny, but was rudely told to mind her own business. Although the Sheikh has shown complete unconcern for the barbarities committed by the Pakistan Army on women in Bangladesh, the erstwhile champion of abducted women, Mridula remains unshaken in her loyalty to him.

After the Sheikh's arrest in 1953, Mridula became Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad's bitterest foe. She set up a centre at New Delhi for carrying on an unrelenting propaganda against the new Kashmir Government. Her house became a rendezvous of anti-Bakshi elements who would use her money, car and telephone. Mridula, it appears, is the victim of the Sheikh's hypnotic influence. To her the Sheikh was above reproach and could never err. Those who criticised him did so out of malice. They had hatched a conspiracy to bring about his fall. Mridula persisted in her propaganda with a unique tenacity and it looked at one time as if she would suc-

ceed. She won over a large number of M.Ps, including some who had earlier condemned the Sheikh, to sign a memorandum to the Prime Minister asking for the Sheikh's release.

The main problem of the relief and rehabilitation of the refugees lay in Jammu Province. The Hindu and Sikh migrants from Pakistan brought with them the communal virus, which disturbed the peace of the province and created feelings of bitter hatred between the communities. The Hindus and Sikhs had killed some local Muslims. Inflated reports of these killings spread by the Pakistani Press and Radio worsened the situation. On the border of Jammu Province, the State forces fought against raiders who had the support of the local Muslims.

The number of refugees at the peak was estimated to have swelled to 180,000 including not less than 20,000 widows and lone women and children, who needed accommodation in special homes. Besides, about 50,000 refugees were believed to have migrated to East Punjab and Delhi. For a small State like Kashmir with its economy disrupted and administration broken, this was no small burden. The refugee camp at Nagrota with over a hundred thousand inmates, was managed by the Army, but camps at Srinagar and the Women's and Children's Homes throughout Jammu Province were the State's responsibility.

I visited a number of women's and children's homes located in *dharamshalas* and abandoned houses in Jammu. Mostly they were in the heart of the town and could only be reached through narrow lanes. Some sort of handicraft training,

sewing, stitching, embroidery, etc. was arranged. But the atmosphere inside the camps was gloomy, for the inmates did not know what fate awaited them. In the four years of my stewardship of the Union Ministry of Relief and Rehabilitation, I travelled the country over and saw the worst of suffering and misery, but the depressing sight I saw in Jammu town and later at Poonch surpassed anything I saw before or after. Near the town of Jammu there was a fair-sized lumber factory, whose Muslim owner had migrated to Pakistan. For three years it was kept closed. From what I saw, it must have been a prosperous concern. When I enquired whether there was a proposal to restart it, I got no reply.

Uncertainty about the status of property left in the State by the migrating Muslims was one of the major hurdles in the way of settling the refugees. For northwest India, we had passed an Evacuee Property Law which appointed custodians to take possession of property left behind by Muslim migrants to Pakistan. The properties were allotted on rent to Hindu and Sikh refugees migrating from West Pakistan. Later the property was acquired by the Union Government and distributed among refugees in proprietorship. The Evacuee Property Law of the Indian Union did not apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir and no custodians were appointed there. Some Muslims of the State had migrated to the area of Kashmir occupied by Pakistan, which we continued to claim as our lawful territory. These and other complications would not allow the State authorities to make a systematic utilisation of abandoned pro-

perties for the benefit of refugees. Some of them were, however, occupied by force, others by greasing the palms of corrupt officials.

Towards evening I was taken to the main refugee camp at Nagrota. It was a huge tented city, well laid out, hygienically kept and efficiently run. There were arrangements for sanitation and medical care. Some refugees were employed to help in running the camp's services but there was employment only for a smaller number. A deputation of refugees visited me. They wanted to know if I had any scheme for permanently settling them. They were hard-working people, but years of idle life in the camp had sapped their initiative. Their final fate had been hanging in the air and it would depend on the way the plebiscite went. What they said, however, set me thinking, and I asked the Commander-in-charge whether land for a refugee township could be made available. He said that a stretch of land by the side of the Ranbirsingpura canal would be suitable, but the scheme could make no headway until Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad became the Prime Minister of the State.

The next day I left Jammu for Poonch in military jeeps with a group of officers. At Akhnoor we stopped, went inside a mud-built watch tower, and had a look at the Chicken's Neck, a Pakistan enclave jutting into the Indian territory, which had to be captured in 1965 and 1971 to make the rear of the Indian forces at Chamb safe. Across the border through binoculars I could see men and women going about and working in the fields. They were the same race as the people on our side of the border.

Till the other day they had both been living as neighbours and citizens of a common State. What a barrier political events can raise in men's lives!

Crossing the Chenab bridge, we entered Chamb-Jaurian, an area which a decade and half later, played a critical role in the Indo-Pakistan war of 1949. Later in 1949, Chamb was again the scene of the most savagely fought battles between India and Pakistan, though this time it did not offer the same perils to the Indian forces as it did before. We took to the ancient caravan route, which the Great Mughals had developed into a highway to the Valley. With their growing love for the Valley, the Mughal Emperors encouraged handicrafts—carpet, shawl, silk, wool and papier mache—and the route grew in popularity. A number of townships sprung up along it. The Mughals had constructed rest buildings *en route* for rest after a tiring journey at noon and at night. Two of these rest houses, one at Bhimber and the other at Rajouri, have survived the ravages of rain and snow over four hundred years. The Rajouri rest house was well preserved for its age.

We halted for the night in the Army camp at Rajouri, about a hundred miles from Jammu town. Once a prosperous town, Rajouri was inhabited by about five thousand people. The Hindu *sahukars* there held a monopoly of the prosperous business of money-lending and trading in merchandise. The nature of their business did not endear them to the local people and they were the first victims of the insurgents' fury.

The next morning after breakfast, we crossed a rope bridge and reached a flat stretch of land on the other side of the river. There was a heap of human bones and skulls—those of the massacred Hindus of Rajouri. It looked as if nobody had thought it worthwhile to clear it, although years had passed. A miniature Mughal palace overlooked the site. An old bearded Muslim gentleman, the caretaker, took us there. There was the Turkish *hamam* and floral paintings on the walls and ceilings of rooms. This rest-house was a mini replica of the grand Mughal palaces of Delhi and Agra. The caretaker was extremely voluble. He said that the palace was haunted and on a pitch-dark night, one could see the Emperor Jehangir, and his consort the Empress Nur Jehan, the beauty of the world, drinking wine from ruby cups.

The next day at noon we arrived at our destination, the town of Poonch. It was a ghost city. First the raiders and insurgents had driven out the Hindus. Later the Maharaja's army massacred the Muslims. Poonch was full of soldiers in uniform. The Jagirdar's palace, once the centre of dance, music, fun and frivolity, had been made Brigade Headquarters. Its glass and wooden panels, paintings and chandeliers were either broken or missing. I was taken to the women's and children's home with some four hundred inmates, a sight unsurpassed in misery.

Our journey to Poonch after Naushera had for the most part been a rough and bumpy one on a rubble road dotted with stones. On our return, we flew in tiny two-seater planes. The route was through a valley flanked on both

sides by high mountains. It took us a little more than an hour to cover a journey which had taken the best part of two days by jeep.

Visits to refugee camps and homes in Jammu Province depressed me severely. In West Bengal, when similar conditions prevailed in camps before I took over, I had put an end to the feeling of suspense by taking the responsibility to rehabilitate the refugees from East Bengal. In Kashmir the fate of refugees hung on a political decision over which I had no control. A purely humanitarian problem had got involved in politics.

In contrast to what was happening in Jammu and Kashmir, Kashmiri refugees who had trickled into East Punjab or Delhi were no problem. I had extended to them the same status and facilities as to the refugees from West Pakistan. They were a good, hardy people and were soon assimilated into Indian society. They did well in the fruit trade and grocery.

Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad's approach towards the refugees was liberal to a fault. After he assumed charge as Prime Minister, we discussed the refugee problem and agreed that its settlement need not be delayed pending a political solution. It was this change in outlook which made possible the construction of the township, which I had thought of during my first visit to the refugee camp. Refugees in Jammu are now settled and share in full the life of the local people.

In the summer of 1954, at Bakshi's invitation, the All India Refugee Conference, attended by Ministers from the States, was held at Srinagar.

I presided over it. In my opening remarks I claimed that the hard core of the Rehabilitation Ministry's work at Delhi was completed and the time had come when we could hand over the remaining work to other Central Ministries and State Governments. It caused a furore among the Ministers. And Bakshi cracked down on me. As a matter of fact, the progress of rehabilitation in different States stood at different levels. Some had done much in housing, allotment of lands, education, training, jobs and trade, while others had lagged behind. In Kashmir the work of rehabilitation had slackened during Abdullah's regime, when hardly anything was done. Bakshi only knew Kashmir and his anger was justified.

If I was over-optimistic, the States had developed vested interests. All funds for the relief and rehabilitation works were provided by the Union Government, whether the work was handled by a Central agency or by a State agency. If the residual work was handed over to regular Ministries at the Centre and to the States and grants sanctioned by the Centre, the quantum of grants might not be the same as the full expenditure. Whatever be its merits, the episode was forgotten and my relations with the State Ministers, specially with Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, remained friendly and cordial.

CLASH OF AMBITIONS

HIS Highness Sir Hari Singh and Sheikh Moham-mad Abdullah were two wayward persons, both vain-glorious and full of personal ambitions. Hari Singh based his right on heredity as a successor of the great warrior Maharaja Gulab Singh, and Sheikh Abdullah on the people's support. Although reduced to a mere shadow of the former rulers of Kashmir, Hari Singh asked for a gun salute on his birthday. Kashmir was the smallest State of India, less populous than the city of Calcutta or Bombay, but the Sheikh would call himself a Prime Minister. Son of a shawl weaver and brought up in poverty, the Sheikh drove in a specially imported Cadillac at the expense of the poverty-ridden Kashmiris, whose cause he championed. The Maharaja and the Sheikh were so absorbed in power-hunger that the danger to the Valley mattered little to them. They did not see that if the State was lost neither of them would survive.

In September 1947, the Sheikh, who was serving a three-year term of imprisonment on a charge of sedition, sought his release. He wrote: "I beg to assure Your Highness once again of my steadfast loyalty and pray that God may grant me opportunity enough to let this country attain under Your Highness's aegis such an era of peace, prosperity and good government." It did not take the Sheikh long to show his true colours. The two contenders started a game of wits. Abdullah was appointed the Head of the

Emergency Government but his powers were limited to work as the commissariat for the Indian Army, to collect intelligence for it and do the policing of Srinagar. The normal governmental powers continued to be exercised by the Maharaja through his Dewan. Such an arrangement was difficult to work in any circumstance; when there were rival contenders for power, it was doomed.

The Sheikh had realised early that so long as Sir Hari Singh remained the Maharaja, his dream of wielding absolute power in an independent Kashmir could not come true. Sir Hari Singh knew that Abdullah's entry into the citadel of power would be catastrophic for him. Sardar Patel tried to strike a balance: the Maharaja would function as the constitutional head of the State and the Sheikh as his Prime Minister would aid and advise the ruler. In return the Sheikh would guarantee the continuance of the Maharaja's dynasty. But neither of the two would accept the formula without reservations. The Maharaja insisted that his Dewan should preside over the Cabinet called into office on the advice of the Prime Minister, and the Sheikh would give the Maharaja's Dewan only the status of an observer at Cabinet meetings.

The odds were against the Maharaja. His army had been liquidated and the bulk of his subjects hated him. India was already committed to the policy that the final decision on Kashmir's accession would be decided by the will of the people of Kashmir. Abdullah undoubtedly had a big following in the Valley, and if he withdrew his support from India, she would lose

the plebiscite. The Sheikh was not sure of India. He was suspicious of the Maharaja. Whenever he wanted to pressurise the Union Government, he would take shelter under the plea that he owed a responsibility to his people. The Sheikh had to keep his followers in good humour, no doubt, but by assuming the role of the only judge of the people's will, he had become a dictator.

The wrangle between that 'mad man' as the mild-tongued Gopalaswami Ayyangar, once called the Maharaja, and the 'spoilt child', Sheikh Abdullah, had become almost insoluble. Abdullah called for the trial of the Maharaja on a charge of complicity in the murder of the Muslims of Jammu. He accused the Maharaja of showing cowardice, when he had gone from Srinagar to Jammu on the advice of V. P. Menon. The Maharaja enumerated a long list of arbitrary acts done by Abdullah in violation of the rules of procedure. When the Hindu and Sikh refugees were to be settled, Abdullah singled out one of the Maharaja's gardens for acquisition. The Maharaja wanted his orchards and agricultural lands, some 3000 acres in area, to be exempted from the ceiling on land, but the Sheikh would not exempt his agricultural lands. All this in-fighting was damaging the working of the administration. India's option to choose between the Maharaja with little support and the Sheikh with his massive following was fore-closed.

The Union Government advised the Maharaja to leave the State and nominate his son, Yuvraj Karan Singh, to be his regent in the

State. That was not enough for Abdullah and he persuaded the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir to take a formal decision to abolish the dynastic rule. The Head of State to be known as Sadr-i-Riyasat, would be elected by the State legislature and appointed formally by the President of India. The prolonged battle thus ended in the Maharaja's complete defeat.

Abdullah next turned his attention to India. He pressed the Union Government to accord a special status to Kashmir because a war was raging within the State, a part of the State was in the hands of rebels and enemies and life in Kashmir was not normal. India readily accepted the proposal and agreed to add a new clause 306A which finally became the celebrated Article 370 of the Union Constitution.

A draft of Clause 306(A) gave Indian Parliament the power to legislate on the three acceded branches of government—Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications. The President would declare what items of the Union and Concurrent Lists would be covered by these subjects. Provisions relating to Fundamental Rights, Citizenship and Directive Principles, that is Parts II, III and IV of the Constitution would also apply to Kashmir. The draft was approved by the Sheikh and his colleagues. The Congress Party passed it. The Sheikh, however, went back upon his commitment on the ground that the Working Committee of the Kashmir National Conference was not agreeable to the application of Parts II, III and IV of the Constitution to Kashmir. Such an application would throw open properties in Kashmir for purchase by non-Kash-

miris. The Punjabis would usurp the whole of Kashmir. It is beyond comprehension how Parts II (Citizenship) and IV (Directive Principles) could have any bearing on transfers of property. Another of Abdullah's objections was that the power to advise on constitutional changes should be limited to his Council of Ministers and not to others which might come into office later. In other words, the relations between India and Kashmir would be frozen for ever and no subsequent Cabinet would have the power to advise a change.

The Sheikh and his colleagues threatened to resign from the membership of the Constituent Assembly. They had their way. The Fundamental Rights, Citizenship and Directive Principles contained in the Union Constitution were not extended to Kashmir but the successor Council of Ministers was given the same power to advise the Head of the State on constitutional changes in Kashmir's relationship with India as Sheikh Abdullah's Cabinet.

In moving Clause 306(A) in the Indian Constituent Assembly, Gopalaswami Ayyangar asserted that the State of Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part of the Indian Union. It was specifically included in the Schedule containing a list of the States and Union Territories of India. The power of the Union to legislate for Kashmir was derived from the Instrument of Accession signed by the Maharaja of Kashmir. The accession was confined to three groups of subjects, namely, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications. In fact these three groups covered some twenty or twenty-five items of the

Union and Concurrent Lists. The power of the President to notify the items was absolute, but it was necessary for him to consult the State Government before issuing the note paper. The President was also enabled after obtaining the concurrence of the State Government to notify any other subjects on which the Union Parliament would have the power to legislate.

Article 370 is contained in Part XXI of the Constitution designated as "Temporary, Transitional and Special Provisions." The exemption was intended to be temporary until the Constituent Assembly of the State took a final decision on the scope of federal jurisdiction. Gopalaswami Ayyangar made it clear that "When it (the Kashmir Constituent Assembly) has come to a decision on different matters, it will make a recommendation to the President, who will either abrogate Article 306(A)-(370) or direct that it shall apply with such modifications as the Constituent Assembly may recommend". The Members of the Indian Constituent Assembly, who normally spared no occasion to make a speech, realised the sensitiveness of the situation and kept silent. The Article was incorporated in the Union Constitution without dissent.

On the day of the commencement of the Union Constitution, that is 26th January 1950, the President issued an Order under Article 370 declaring that 35 entries in the Union List of the Seventh Schedule enumerated in the First Schedule to the Order would correspond to the three matters—External Affairs, Defence and Communications—specified in the Instrument of Accession of the State of Kashmir to India.

The Order laid down that the Union Parliament would have no power to legislate on any other matter allocated to the Union or a State.

The scheme as envisaged by the Order was that only Articles 1 and 370 of the Union Constitution would apply to the State of Kashmir. Other portions of the Constitution would apply to that State only if they were included in the Second Schedule to the Order. Accordingly Part II of the Constitution dealing with Citizenship, Part III with Fundamental Rights, Part IV with Directive Principles of State Policy and Part XVIII with Emergency Provisions were completely excluded from application to Kashmir.

The President's powers to grant pardons, reprieves, remissions etc. of punishments and sentences were limited to orders passed by a Court Martial and in offences against parliamentary laws. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in civil and criminal cases relating to Kashmir was barred. The Election Commission's jurisdiction was confined only to the election of the Members of Parliament and to the offices of the President and Vice-President. The Comptroller and Auditor-General of India had no powers over the accounts of the Kashmir State.

The 1950 Order was replaced by another Presidential Order in 1954 which has undergone several amendments since then. The net result of these changes is that the whole of the Union Constitution now applies to the Kashmir State, unless its application is expressly excluded. Parts II, III and IV are now applicable to Kashmir with minor exceptions. Article 352 of Part

XVIII dealing with the Proclamation of an Emergency is now applicable to the State, provided that if the emergency arises from internal disturbances the proclamation of emergency would require the consent of the Government of the State. The provisions for the supersession of the State Government under Article 356 and the power to issue directions in case of financial emergency under Article 360 still do not apply to the State of Kashmir.

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in civil and criminal cases has been restored. The Comptroller and Auditor-General of India can now audit the accounts of the Kashmir State and submit a report to the Governor. The President has the power to grant pardons, reprieves and remissions in all cases relating to Kashmir as in the other States of the Indian Union. Though formally Article 375 remains on the Statute, its irritability is gone.

Sheikh Abdullah's opposition to the extension of provisions relating to citizenship can be appropriately appreciated by the subsequent events of 1965. When he wanted to go abroad and applied for a passport, the Sheikh showed an ambivalence unworthy of a leader of the people. In the application for a passport, he described himself as a first class subject of Jammu and Kashmir State. Did Kashmir have a separate citizenship? Who were the second and third class citizens of the State? Later when newspaper reporters pushed the Sheikh into a tight corner, he equivocated and called himself a 'provisional' citizen of India. A person can either be a citizen

or an alien', but there is no intermediate category known to our law.

Likewise the Sheikh's opposition to the Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles must be focussed in the light of what he told correspondent Michael Davidson, in an interview published in 'The Scotsman' of April 14, 1949. He brought up the idea of an independent Kashmir and made threats to India and the Indian Press in a public speech at Ranbirsingpura.

Before the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir met in August 1952, there was no popular Assembly in the State to which the Sheikh was answerable. But the Maharaja's powers had been circumscribed to those of a constitutional ruler. The Sheikh was no stickler for the rules of procedure. When he chose to he would act arbitrarily. He ignored the fact that he was a nominee of the ruler and not an elected leader of the legislature. The Sheikh became a law unto himself. Like King Louis XIV of France, he believed that he was the State.

Encouraged by one victory after another, the Sheikh became more presumptuous. He had humbled his arch enemy, Sir Hari Singh, abolished the Dogra dynasty and bullied the Union Government. His next task was to do away with the stalwart freedom fighters—Bakshi, Dogra, Sadiq and others—who, as Members of the Cabinet, could have acted as a check on the exercise of his arbitrary powers.

The Sheikh's remarks to Davidson were in the nature of a probe to test India's limit of tolerance. If India reacted strongly, the Sheikh would deny what he had said. "We want to live

in friendship with both Dominions. Perhaps a middle path between them, with economic co-operation with each, will be the only way of doing it. But an Independent Kashmir must be guaranteed not only by India and Pakistan, but also by Britain, the United States and other Members of the United Nations", said Abdullah to Davidson. When a clarification was sought, the Sheikh added, "Yes, independence—guaranteed by the United Nations—may be the only solution. But why do you talk of partition?" The interview sent a wave of anger throughout India and the Sheikh conveniently availed himself of the main weapon open to glib politicians. He issued a contradiction. Even those who would not accept the truth of the contradiction, thought it discreet to say nothing.

The Sheikh had constituted himself the sole arbiter of what was communal and what was secular. He would use Hazrat Bal, the abode of the Holy Relic, for making his political announcements. Originally built by Emperor Shahjehan and named Bagh-e-Sadiq, the place was rechristened Hazrat Bal when the Prophet's hair was moved to that place. It was a place of worship for Muslims. After Friday prayers the Sheikh would address political meetings at Hazrat Bal to an overwhelming Muslim audience. It mattered little to him that he was the leader of a composite State, the home of Muslims, Hindus and Buddhists.

When there was a danger that the Sheikh might meet the fate of Maqbool Sherwani if raiders entered Srinagar, he dashed to Delhi, stayed with Nehru, and passed on a message

recommending the acceptance of accession, during crucial talks between the Indian and Kashmiri delegates. North India was then in the grip of communal frenzy—the Hindus and Sikhs were killing Indian Muslims in North-west India as the Muslims were slaughtering the Hindus and Sikhs in Pakistan. Since it suited the Sheikh's own interests, the India of those days was declared by him to be secular. Six years later when the embers of communalism had burnt out and Congress was well entrenched at the Centre and in the States, India became the land of the Jan Sangh because the Sheikh wanted to be the chief of an independent Kashmir. Jawaharlal was eulogised by the Sheikh as a symbol of Hindu-Muslim unity when Kashmir acceded to India, but when Abdullah wanted to undo the accession, he said that there was no difference between Nehru and the Jan Sangh leader, Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, save that the latter was forthright and held out a mailed fist, while Nehru was a hypocrite who wore a velvet glove.

Discontent against the Sheikh was on the increase, particularly in Jammu and Ladakh. But instead of alleviating the genuine grievances of those areas, the Sheikh became more irritable. A trivial incident when the State flag was hoisted in a college at Jammu infuriated the Sheikh. He ordered the arrest of several leaders of the Praja Parishad. The Praja Parishad was communal no doubt, and had started on agitation against the State flag but the arrested persons had no hand in the incident. When Gopalswami Ayyangar asked for the release of arrested persons, the Sheikh took it as a flagrant act of

interference in the internal matters of the State. He went to Ranbirsingpura and made a highly provocative speech on 10th April.

Ranbirsingpura saw the climax of Abdullah's transformation. The Sheikh's emotional breach with India was complete. He had only to choose a time for announcing the alienation plan. He charged India with communalism. He denounced the full application of the Indian Constitution to Kashmir as 'unrealistic, childish and savouring of lunacy'. Pointing an accusing finger at the Indian Press, the Sheikh said, "They do not tell us what will happen to Kashmir if there was (sic) resurgence of communalism in India and how in those circumstances, we are to convince the Muslims of Kashmir that India does not intend to swallow Kashmir." The Sheikh went on to say, "If these papers and journalists think that they are doing a service to India or Kashmir, they are mistaken. They are only breaking the bonds of friendship between India and Kashmir. If they do not heed my warning in time they may destroy the unity of Kashmir and India."

True, communalism in India was not dead, but why did the Sheikh support the State's accession to India, to quote his own words, "at a time when the whole sub-continent was torn with communal strife"? Did the danger of communalism increase when the Indian National Congress had dealt a crushing blow to the communal elements in India and won overwhelming majorities in the Lok Sabha and State Assemblies in the general elections, and when commu-

nal rioting in India had become a rare occurrence?

The furious reactions produced in India and among a section of the people of the State made the Sheikh rescind what he had said at Ranbir-singpura. He issued a contradiction which satisfied him but not many others. However the Sheikh was temporarily chastened and during his speech in the Kashmir Constituent Assembly, which met in August nine months after it had been elected, he made a thorough exposition of the various choices open to the State and ended by favouring the State's accession to India. Extracts from the Sheikh's speech would bear reproduction. The Sheikh said:

....it is the kinship of ideals which determines the strength of ties between two States. The Indian National Congress has consistently supported the cause of the States' people's freedom. The autocratic rule of the princes has been done away with and representative governments have been entrusted with the administration. Steps towards democratisation have been taken and these have raised the people's standard of living, brought about much-needed social reconstruction, and, above all, built up their very independence of spirit. Naturally, if we accede to India there is no danger of a revival of feudalism and autocracy. Moreover, during the last four years, the Government of India has never tried to interfere in our internal autonomy. This experience has strengthened our confidence in them as a democratic State.

“The real character of a State is revealed in its Constitution. The Indian Constitution has set before the country the goal of (a) secular democracy based upon justice, freedom and equality for all without distinction. This is the bed-rock of modern democracy. This should meet the argument that the Muslims of Kashmir cannot have security in India, where the large majority of the population are Hindus. Any unnatural cleavage between religious groups is the legacy of Imperialism, and no modern State can afford to encourage artificial divisions if it is to achieve progress and prosperity. The Indian Constitution has amply and finally repudiated the concept of a religious State, which is a throwback to medievalism, by guaranteeing the equality of rights of all citizens irrespective of their religion, colour, caste and class.

The Sheikh proceeded to remind the Assembly that political ideals usually become meaningless when not linked to economic plans. Kashmir had already put through a ‘land to the tiller’ programme. The welfare of Kashmir depended upon her arts and crafts and the traditional market for those goods had, for long, centred in India. India had more resources and industrial expertise than Pakistan and could help Kashmir in the development of her vast mineral and raw material resources. No all-weather road linking Kashmir with India existed, but with advances in modern engineering, an all-weather system of communications with India was possible and easy. Now, with the construction of two tunnels

at Banihal, the Valley has been joined to Jammu by an all-weather road and the Sheikh's dream realised.

The Sheikh squarely met the charge that the secular ideals of the Indian National Congress might be overwhelmed by communal organisations, but then, he argued, the association of Kashmir with India should help to defeat the communal tendencies. The presence of Kashmir in the Indian Union during the last four years had already helped to achieve that objective. He reminded the Constituent Assembly of Gandhiji's words: "I lift up mine eyes into the hills from whence cometh my help".

The Sheikh proceeded to examine factors favouring accession with Pakistan as follows:

The most powerful argument which can be advanced in her favour is that Pakistan is a Muslim State, and, a big majority of our people being Muslims, the State must accede to Pakistan. This claim of being a Muslim State is of course only a camouflage. It is a screen to dupe the common man, so that he may not see clearly that Pakistan is a feudal State in which a clique is trying by these methods to maintain itself in power.

In addition to this, the appeal to religion constitutes a sentimental and a wrong approach to the question. Sentiment has its own place in life, but often it leads to irrational action. Some argue, as a supposedly natural corollary to this, that on our acceding to Pakistan our annihilation or survival depends. Facts have disproved this. Right-thinking men would

point out that Pakistan is not an organic unity of all the Muslims on this sub-continent. It has, on the contrary caused the dispersion of the Indian Muslims for whose benefit it was claimed to have been created. There are two Pakistans at least a thousand miles apart from each other.

He argued that religious affinity alone is not sufficient to determine political alliances between States. In a modern State, economic interests and political ideals constitute the real link. He asked: "What would be the fate of the non-Muslims of Kashmir if she opted for Pakistan? Would they have any place in Pakistan as it was?"

The Sheikh finally directed his attention to the last alternative—of Kashmir becoming an independent State—and said:

We have to consider the alternative of making ourselves an Eastern Switzerland, of keeping aloof from both States but having friendly relations with them. This might seem attractive in that it would appear to pave the way out of the present deadlock. To us as a tourist country it would also give obvious advantages. But in considering independence we must not ignore practical considerations.

Firstly, it is not easy to protect our sovereignty and independence in a small country which has not the sufficient strength to defend itself on our long and difficult frontiers bordering on many countries.

Secondly, we must have the goodwill of all our neighbours. Can we find powerful guar-

antors among them to pull together always in assuring us freedom from aggression? I would like to remind you that from August 25 to October 22 of 1947 our State was independent and the result was that our weakness was exploited by our neighbour, with whom we had a valid Standstill Agreement. The State was invaded. What is the guarantee that, in future too, we may not be the victims of similar aggression?

Could there be a more convincing case for Kashmir's accession to India? One wonders how the Sheikh forgot what amounted to a declaration of faith, and later performed a *volte face*.

There were four major issues before the Constituent Assembly, namely, the future of the ruling dynasty, the payment of compensation for lands acquired under the Big Landed Estates Act, the ratification of accession and the framing of a Constitution for Kashmir. Before the Assembly met, a delegation under Afzal Beg's leadership had gone to New Delhi and negotiated with the Union Government on important matters about to come up before it. The Sheikh himself had, at one stage, joined in the discussions of the delegation with the Union Government. The agreement reached was enshrined in the Delhi Pact.

The gist of the Delhi Pact was that unlike in the rest of India, the residual powers in Kashmir would vest in the State. The Union flag would occupy a supremely distinctive position within the State, but the State would have a flag of its

own. It would be the flag of the Kashmir National Conference. The Indian President would have the power to grant reprieves and commute death sentences. Article 356 of the Union Constitution which authorises the Union Government to take over the governance of a State when the State machinery breaks down, and Article 360 which authorises the Union Government to issue directions to a State, would not apply to Kashmir. The emergency Article 352 would extend to the State but in cases of internal disturbances, it could be applied only with the concurrence of the State Government. The jurisdiction of the Election Commission would extend only to elections to Parliament and to the offices of the Vice-President and the President of India. The issues involved in financial integration were intricate and would need detailed examination. The ruling dynasty of Kashmir would be abolished and the Head of the State of Jammu and Kashmir would be a person recognised by the President of India on the recommendation of the legislature of the State.

After two items, namely, the abolition of the ruling dynasty and the acquisition of estates without payment of compensation had been approved, the Sheikh began to procrastinate. The ratification of Kashmir's accession to India and the framing of a constitution for Kashmir were postponed. Many Kashmir leaders including Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and Mohammad Sadiq felt hurt, and a meeting of the Working Committee of the National Conference was convened to take a decision on the accession of the State of Kashmir and other matters covered

by the Delhi Pact. Opinions in the committee differed and heated arguments went on in May for fully three weeks. Sheikh Abdullah found himself in the minority and finally a resolution approving the accession of the State to India and ratification of the Delhi Pact was adopted by a majority of fifteen against four.

The Sheikh had been using the National Conference as a platform for the fulfilment of his personal ambitions. When he found himself in the minority, he discarded the Conference. His attitude towards the Constituent Assembly was similar. During the rest of his term—more than a year yet—the Sheikh never called a meeting of the Assembly. Abdullah had called the Assembly a 'Sovereign Body'. He thought it fully representative of the people, when it voted for the abolition of the Dogra dynasty and acquisition of land without compensation, but the same Assembly with the same membership lost in validity for him when it voted for accession to India in 1954.

The Valley was simmering with suppressed rumours that the Sheikh was out for some surprising political move. He might call for the withdrawal of the Indian Army from Kashmir or place Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and his supporters under arrest and then accede to Pakistan or declare independence. The crisis came in early August 1953, when the Sheikh asked Minister Shyam Lal Saraf to resign, but Saraf was in no mood to oblige him.

A SOCIO-ECONOMIC SIDELIGHT

THERE exists a strange misconception about the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Although the Valley constitutes just ten per cent of the whole State in area, in the popular mind it is the State. Another complication is the forcible occupation on the west and north-west by Pakistan and on the north-east by China, which together form as much as 55 per cent of the State's total area.

Aside from the mountainous tracts of the Karakoram, the Pir Panjal and the Greater Himalayan Ranges, the State falls into three distinct natural divisions—Jammu Province, the Ladakh plateau and the Valley of Kashmir. The regions have little in common in their history, culture, language or religion. Ladakh is connected with the Valley by only one road via Kargil which passes through the Zojila Pass in the Greater Himalayas. The pass is snow-bound throughout the winter and spring seasons.

The only all-weather road from the Valley was the Srinagar-Rawalpindi highway, which since the 1947 raids has been denied to Kashmir. The Pir Panjal gives access to the Valley through three other passes—the Banihal, the Haji Pir and the Golab Garh, all impassable during the four winter months. The Haji Pir Pass was in past the most widely used. The White Huns entered the Valley and the Mughals took the Imperial road through it. Bernier who visited Kashmir during Aurangzeb's reign, reached the Valley through this pass. With the

loss of the Haji Pir Pass to Pakistan, the Valley is approachable from India only through the Jammu-Srinagar road which crosses the Banihal Pass.

The Valley undoubtedly is the most important of the three regions. About ten times as thickly populated as the Ladakh plateau, it forms the heart of the State. Three out of every four persons in the Valley live in villages and derive their livelihood from the land. The Valley of Kashmir is virtually the basin of the Jhelum, traditionally called the Vitasta. It is navigable throughout its length and provides a cheap means of transport. Its waters feed the irrigation system of Kashmir.

The Jhelum river is both the blessing and the scourge of the Valley. Its water, carried through Zamindari kuhls (guls) has always sustained the crops. The great chronicler Kalhana wrote that since times immemorial, the contribution of the kuhls to Kashmir's agricultural economy had been notable. The Suvarnamankalya kuhl, built by King Suvarna still irrigates the area which was once his domain. King Lalitaditya is credited with having carried irrigation to villages near Sahadar. King Avantivarman's engineers regulated a number of the Jhelum's tributaries and built kuhls for irrigation. In all probability, Kashmir has the distinction of being the first to lift water through water-wheels for irrigation.

Surrounded by steep mountains, the Valley is like a tilted saucer sloping towards the Wular lake. According to an old legend, the Valley was a vast lake called 'Sati Saras' or the Lake of Sati, which was drained by the sage Kashyap

after whom Kashmir is named, by cutting an outlet through the mountains of Khalanyar. Geologically the Valley must have once been a great lake, which has left surviving swampy 'nambals' and water-logged low lands as prominent features.

The outlet for the Jhelum waters at Khalanyar is too inadequate to carry the full discharge and during the monsoons the river swells and becomes a scourge causing heavier losses than any other Indian river. The devastating floods of 1893 and 1959, when the whole Valley virtually became a lake, are still remembered by the people. During the flood the nambals are inundated with water, the flow of water in the kuhls is reversed and they carry huge quantities of flood water from the Jhelum, destroying the crops in the fields.

Srinagar is protected by a number of embankments and other anti-flood measures in the upper reaches of the river, but in high floods, sometimes the embankments have to be cut to divert a part of the flood waters to save the town. Floods in the Valley seem to have worried the benign King Avantivarman, whose engineer Suyya is said to have changed the entire course of the Jhelum from its confluence with the Sindh to the Wular lake. He also improved the drainage system of the land extending to the Khalanyar gorge.

The bleak and arid plain of Ladakh form the highest plateau in India. It is drained by one of the mightiest rivers of the world, the Indus, but the river water is not of much use in the Ladakh region. It is the driest part of the coun-

try. The short summer of Ladakh permits only the raising of low value crops like ragi and buckwheat. The plateau is of little consequence agriculturally. Jammu Province is the extension of the Indus plains with fairly good summer and winter rainfall, high temperatures in summer and low temperatures in winter. The river Ravi, and the Chandra Bhaga which, on entering Jammu Province, assumes the name of the Chenab, supply water for irrigation canals. The Dogra rulers had built a number of canals such as the Ranbir, Pratap, Ujh and Basantpur. Jammu produces all the crops of the plains.

In the days of the Maharajas, fruit orchards and agricultural lands were held almost wholly by the Darbar, the Jagirdars, the ruler's relations and a special class of landowners known as Chakladars. They were mostly either Kashmiri Pundits or Dogra Rajputs. The tenants were generally poor Muslims who held lands on the basis of crop-sharing. The rate of sharing was half and half. The first land reforms introduced by the Sheikh raised the tenant's share to two-thirds.

The Sheikh set up a Land Reforms Committee to prepare a programme for abolishing landed estates. But before the report was ready, he announced that no land-owning family would in future hold more than a total land area of twenty-two and three-fourths acres for raising crops, vegetables, orchards and for housing. Surplus lands were vested in the Government for distribution among the landless workers and for organising collective farms. No decision was taken on the payment of compensation for lands

acquired and the issue was left for decision to the Kashmir Constituent Assembly when it met. In India, proprietary rights in land had been acquired on payment of compensation; and the Union Constitution carries a provision that for any land within the ceiling acquired by the State, compensation at the market rate has to be paid.

When the time arrived for taking possession of the land, it was found that as a result of a scramble in collusion with that notorious official, the patwari, surplus lands had been transferred to the relatives of the land-owners. No land was available for distribution to landless labourers or for organising collective farms. In terms of social gain, the result was nil. The zamindari kuhls, which were formerly looked after by the land-owners, after the imposition of the ceiling became nobody's concern. The new cultivators would not cooperate in maintaining them. The kuhls fell into disrepair and the productivity of land suffered. The two years 1949-51 were years of severe drought in the Valley. India supplied subsidised rice but this depressed the price of local rice, and the economy of the countryside suffered the severest shock.

Some relief did come from the Conciliation Boards set up to scale down debts which weighed heavily on the peasantry. In many cases the scaling down was by as much as 80 per cent of the debt. Some new lands were reclaimed and cultivation extended over them to reduce the State's food shortage. The old feudal system of compulsory purchase of a part of the farmer's produce was abolished. But the economic dis-

tress among the people was so great that these small gains were forgotten.

Over the centuries the Valley's urban economy had been built on tourism. Unlike the hill stations of Simla and Darjeeling which are the creations of the British, the Valley has a history, culture and tradition of its own. In some respects these are dissimilar to those of the rest of the sub-continent. The Great Himalayan Ranges on the north have protected the Valley from the rugged civilisation of Central Asia and the Pir Panjal from the exuberant living of India.

There had always been some trading between the Valley and north India, specially Lahore and Delhi, but the credit for throwing open the Valley to India goes to the two Mughal Emperors, Jahangir and Shahjehan. Fascinated by its climate and beauty, they made Srinagar their summer capital, and at the beginning of summer every year a whole caravan of courtiers and officials would move to that city. There the Mughals built some beautiful terraced gardens, like Shalimar and Nishat. By stemming the springs, they developed the Chashma-i-Shahi and structurally controlled the Jhelum's source at Verinag. These are outstanding examples of the Mughals' architectural skill and love of nature. The chinar which had been imported from Iran, was planted all over the Valley. It now inspires much of the art of Kashmir, appearing in designs of wood carvings, embroidery, papier mache paintings, carpets and the like. The Mughals developed the wool, silk, wood, papier mache and leather industries and now an inexhaustible va-

riety of carpets, namdas, embroidery, papier-mache, stoles, capes, coats, shahtush*, pashmina*, woollen cloth, silk, jewellery, fur and leather goods have found a big market within Kashmir and in India.

The Valley is full of places of interest for tourists. The golf course at Gulmarg, skating, skiing and winter sports on the snows of Sonamarg are great attractions. The Dal Lake at Srinagar and the Wular Lake near Baramulla are popular water resorts. Camping at Pahalgam on the bank of the Liddar has its charms. Nowhere in India does the tourist receive such lavish hospitality as in the Kashmir Valley. The Kashmir rulers had built comfortable traveller's bungalows throughout the State. With the increase in popular demand, the State has put up wooden cottages at all important tourist places for middle-income visitors.

The handicrafts of Kashmir are intertwined with the tourist trade. One shares the prosperity and woes of the other. There is hardly a tourist who does not buy some Kashmiri wares. Tourists are the biggest unpaid advertising agents for Kashmiri goods. When a tourist carries home some specialities from the Valley, his friends and relatives are introduced to Kashmiri goods. The Valley grows excellent fruits—apples, peaches, apricots, almonds, walnuts, chestnuts and cherries which have a ready export market.

With the invasion of the tribesmen the tourist trade of Kashmir came to a near-standstill and the sales of goods declined. Efforts made to

* Two kinds of fine wool.

transport handicrafts and fruit through Army aeroplanes returning to Delhi after unloading soldiers and weapons met with little success. After the CFL was finalised, the Sheikh's ambivalent attitude on the question of accession and rumours that he would declare an independent Kashmir acted as a damper on tourism. Handicrafts goods accumulated and the Kashmir fruits began to perish. The Kashmiris are dependent for supplies of cotton textiles, rice, kerosene, sugar, salt, tea, etc. on imports and the lengthening of the trade-route raised the prices of all these commodities. Sometimes shortages were created by delayed supplies or because they were cornered by greedy traders. The distress in the cities and towns was worse than that in the countryside.

The Sheikh organised consumer's cooperatives for the sale at fair prices of the necessities of life, but these societies were soon the scene of a scramble for power and money. Similar societies organised later for the distribution of imported rice and sugar became instruments for sustaining the power and finances of politicians including a large number of M.L.As. Black-marketing and illegally raised prices became commonplaces. An enquiry set up in 1952-53 by the Kashmir Government revealed that the cooperatives had collapsed because of the corruption and malpractices of their directors and employees.

The administrative machinery of the Maharaja's time had also collapsed. The Sheikh was wholly involved in power politics and he had little time to rebuild the administration. The

State's sources of revenue had virtually dried up. Its expenses were mounting. Its budget had to be financed by India. The Sheikh was suspicious of India and would not accept the loan of Indian officers, though trained and experienced personnel in the State were not available. A complete administrative dead-lock ensued. Among the leaders of the National Conference, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad was personally efficient, but he had scant regard for the rules and procedures which are essential for sustaining any official machinery.

The Ladakhis had been neglected during the Maharaja's regime. They did not get any worthwhile relief even after the advent of Sheikh Abdullah. Ladakh threatened to break away from the State and establish a direct link with India. The Maharaja had the full support of the Hindus of Jammu. Especially of the Dogras. The communal-minded Praja Parishad was carrying on an incessant propaganda against the Sheikh, and encouraging separatist tendencies. Those who had suffered from the new land reforms joined the ranks of malcontents. But the arrogant Sheikh made no effort to meet the peoples' genuine grievances. Infuriated, he threatened to separate the Valley from Ladakh and Jammu.

The people's suffering was further aggravated by the infighting between the politicians—with the Sheikh and his supporter Mirza Afzal Beg on the one side, and Bakshi and his supporters Dogra and Saraf on the other. It had created an atmosphere of universal depression. The Sheikh had lost his earlier popularity. While India was going ahead with developmental pro-

grammes, Kashmir's economy was stagnant and its politics uncertain. In terms of developmental activities, the six years of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah's rule were a complete blank.

FACT AND FICTION

THIS chapter provides a key to the reason for my writing this book.

I had kept the story of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah's arrest in 1953 a close secret. In the preface to my book "Rafi Ahmad Kidwai—A Memoir of His Life and Times", I wrote: "There are some affairs of national and international importance in which Rafi was deeply involved, but which do not find place in the book. Kashmir was one of them".

In January 1949 when I was kept fully occupied by the general election as a candidate for the Lok Sabha, my attention was drawn to the publication in 'The Statesman' of an extract from General B. M. Kaul's "The Untold Story". I issued an immediate correction, of a general character, which was published in the same newspaper.

Mr B. N. Mullik's "My Years with Nehru—Kashmir" published last year referred to me by name and repeated some of the inaccuracies of the 'Untold Story'. It broke the back of my patience, and I wrote an article "Kashmir—Fact and Fiction" which was published in "The Times of India" and later reproduced by special arrangements in the magazine 'Imprint'.

The article attracted wide attention and some rabid denunciation. Many friends requested me to write a full length book on Kashmir, and hence this volume. General Kaul accused me of bragging, and virtually, of prevarication. The

letter of General Kaul and my rejoinder published in "The Times of India" are reproduced in full:

General Kaul's letter published in "The Times of India" dated August 22, 1949.

"I read with astonishment two articles by Ajit Prasad Jain, M.P. in your esteemed columns titled 'Kashmir: Fact and Fiction' on August 1. In one of them he has given a long and inflated account of the supposed part he played in Sheikh Abdullah's arrest in 1953 and has implied that he was in Kashmir just before and at the time of Abdullah's arrest. This is a total fabrication. As a matter of fact Rafi Ahmad Kidwai, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and D. P. Dhar were the main architects of Abdullah's arrest. I only related in my book the assistance I gave to Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and D. P. Dhar in this episode (which they will vouch for even today), in which Jain could have played the part of no more than a distant spectator. If, therefore, anyone is bragging, it is A. P. Jain himself. It needed strong and determined men to organise the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah which Kidwai, Bakshi and Dhar were. Jain may be 'strong' in his own estimate but no one who knows him could ever accuse him of being one!

I never said in the Untold Story as stated by A. P. Jain that there was any junta* (including me) who was responsible for arresting Abdullah. All I said in pages 139 to 146 was that Kidwai, Bakshi and Dhar had played a major part in organising the arrest of Abdullah in which I gave them whatever assistance I could.

These three gentlemen knew that Nehru had sent me to Kashmir on this occasion.

• Yuvaraj, Bakshi and D. P. Dhar knew Nehru's stand on this point. But Abdullah had to be arrested because Kidwai, Yuvaraj Karan Singh, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and D. P. Dhar were convinced at the time that if he was kept at large, he would harm the security and general interests of India. I reiterate that Abdullah was arrested without Nehru's approval. Nehru was reconciled to his dismissal but not to his arrest.

I will further state that A. P. Jain was not present anywhere near Kashmir during the crucial period (1 to 8 August 1953) when Abdullah's arrest was planned and on 9 August when he was arrested, though he cleverly tries to give such an impression in this article. It is he, therefore, who is turning fact into fiction.

—B. M. Kaul, Delhi."

A. P. Jain's letter published in "The Times of India" dated September 12, 1949:

"I wish to clarify what Gen. B. M. Kaul says in his letter of August 22 relating to the first portion of my article 'Kashmir: Fact and Fiction'.

Gen. Kaul says that I was not anywhere near Kashmir during the crucial period from 1st to 8th August. I am quoting from page 146 of the General's Untold Story—'on 9th August when Nehru rang up Yuvaraj Karan Singh and blew him up for allowing Abdullah to be arrested, the latter, after hearing a part of the outburst and being shaken by Nehru's blasting, handed over the telephone to A. P. Jain who had reach-

ed Srinagar by then. Jain not being able to take the tirade all by himself passed the telephone over to....'

Was it out of nothing that I appeared in Kashmir on August 9? Why was I tiraded, if I was a distant spectator? There are several people alive who are prepared to testify to my visit during the crucial period.

I have clearly stated my role in my article. But I might repeat that I was to intervene only when I thought that India's interests would suffer. Does this amount to claiming an active role in Abdullah's arrest?

The General has reiterated that Abdullah was arrested without Nehru's approval. Unless he claims to be omniscient he would not know what had transpired between Nehru and me. Jawaharlal knew of the eventuality of arrest, and was prepared not to resist it.

The reader is free to draw his own conclusions."

I realise that a composite article written for a newspaper or magazine is different in composition and presentation from a chapter which forms part of a larger narrative. However, in the special circumstances of the case, it is better to reproduce the original article published in the newspaper. The reader will find some annoying repetitions for which I crave his indulgence.

The article "Fact and Fiction" read as follows:

"The story of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah's arrest on August (9), 1953 deserves wide publicity but the divergent versions of the event which have appeared in newspapers and books have caused much confusion.

The two books which have received fairly wide circulation—The Untold Story by Lieutenant-General B. M. Kaul, and My Years with Nehru: Kashmir by B. N. Mullik, the former Chief of the Intelligence Bureau, are obviously based on personal knowledge and should normally be credible. General Kaul's anxiety to write is understandable, but why should an officer like Mullik, who had won a reputation for preserving state secrets, burst out after retirement, and indeed display a craze for publicity? Perhaps 'Time' magazine's recent statement about retired civil servants is relevant to this case. 'Once they leave government service', said 'Time', 'innumerable officials bring out memoirs bristling with once classified material intended to put the author in the best possible light'.

After reading Mullik it is hard to escape the feeling that he and Nehru were the two running India!

Both Kaul and Mullik have referred to me by name in connection with some important events in Kashmir but I have so far remained reticent. My difficulty now is that if I allow parts of the story which are incorrect, to remain unchallenged, these errors may sooner or later be accepted as historical facts. After considerable thought, I have decided to come out with such facts as, to my mind, can now be revealed.

One evening, perhaps the last day of July or the first day of August, 1953, Rafi Ahmed Kidwai rang me up to ask if I could see him. When I met him, he handed over to me a bundle of papers, type-scripts of the correspondence exchanged between Sheikh Abdullah on the one

hand and Jawaharlal Nehru, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Rafi Ahmed Kidwai on the other, and asked me to study them and meet him the next morning. He added, I might have to go to Kashmir on an important mission. I went through the correspondence carefully that night. Next morning, Rafi—who unlike most of us was always brief and to the point, said that I was ‘to do the job’, including the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah, if it came to that.

I told Rafi that since the matter had not only national but also international ramifications, I would like to have a clearance from Jawaharlal Nehru before leaving for Kashmir. Rafi Ahmed was visibly annoyed and said that I could please myself.

I met Jawaharlal and gave him a resume of what Rafi Ahmed had told me. Jawaharlal was in a thoughtful mood, all through his eyes were rivetted on the roof of his office. He was grim and uncommunicative, perhaps in two minds, but finally he said that I could go to Srinagar.

With my wife, I left for Saharanpur to pick up a friend’s family from there so as to pretend that the trip to Kashmir was a holiday visit. But I received a phone call from Nehru to come back and meet him in Delhi. I thought that he had changed his mind and the matter had been dropped. I cancelled the railway reservations and returned to New Delhi.

To my surprise, however, I found that the change in Nehru’s mood was entirely different from what I had expected. He was open and candid and talked without reservation. He had jotted down some points on a piece of paper

and gave me detailed instructions about what I was to do and how to proceed in the matter. I felt almost like a daughter about to be wedded and told by the mother how she should behave in the father-in-law's family.

Jawaharlal said that I would be surrounded by informers and spies, and should observe extreme caution in my talk and behaviour. If I telephoned anyone, it was sure to be tapped and reported. Abdullah was inimical to the Sadar-i-Riyasat. The Kashmir politicians were divided—Abdullah and Afzal Beg on one side, and Bakshi, Dogra and Shamlal Saraf on the other. For months there had been wrangling between them. Besides personal dislike, there were differences in their outlook towards India. Abdullah's group had grown anti-Indian and Bakshi's was pro-Indian. Nehru doubted whether Abdullah wanted Kashmir to go over to Pakistan but there were authentic reports that he was averse to India; perhaps he wanted to be the Sheikh of an independent Kashmir. In fact, there was some evidence, not conclusive, that some foreign power had nursed Abdullah's ambitions.

Jawaharlal asked me to meet Abdullah, Bakshi and others before making up my mind. He warned me against any hasty action. The main responsibility for the decision and action should rest with the leaders of Kashmir. I was to intervene only when I thought that India's interests would suffer. He strongly felt that in no case should the Indian Army be involved in any action. The Ministers had till then outwardly worked in harmony and the public was not

prepared for news of their in-fighting. He gave me authority to act on my best judgement. However, I could not escape the feeling that Nehru had a lurking sympathy for Abdullah and unless the latter was completely beyond redemption, he would not like anyone to touch him.

I had some first-hand knowledge of Abdullah's attitude towards India. One day in early January 1953, when I was sitting in the Prime Minister's office, there was a telephone conversation between him and the Sheikh. That was a few days before the annual session of the Indian National Congress at Hyderabad. Jawaharlal spoke to Abdullah tenderly and affectionately and said: "Sheikh Saheb apki intzaar mein hamari ankey to pathrai ja rahin hain—ap kab aiyengai?" (My eyes are turning to stone waiting for you. When are you coming?). Abdullah curtly replied that he was too busy and could not come. Jawaharlal felt humiliated and insulted and said that the Congress session at Hyderabad would be a great political event and people would love to see him there. Abdullah again declined and brusquely said that Nehru could come to the Valley, if there was any matter of importance to talk about. Jawaharlal felt humiliated and insulted but, contrary to his habit, did not lose his temper.

Sheikh Abdullah had delivered a speech at Ranbirsinghpura a little earlier, which reflected his feeling towards India—highly vituperative and hostile. When asked about it, Abdullah made the politician's familiar excuse that he had not been reported correctly. That was considered enough, for nobody was eager to make

an issue of it. On the preceding Id day, Abdullah's followers had deliberately insulted Maulana Abul Kalam Azad at Hazrat Bal by leaving the meeting when the Maulana rose to speak. These were the people who had heard Sheikh Abdullah's tirade against India in pin-drop silence. Abdullah's letters, to which I have referred already, also gave a clear idea of how his mind was working.

After reaching Srinagar, it took me no time to realise that a crisis was on. Suspicion and the fear of something unknown hung in the air. My wife and I stayed at the state guest house and my friend's family was lodged in a houseboat nearby. My visit had excited deep curiosity and few would believe, despite the large size and homely make-up of my party, that I was there on a holiday. I had stayed at the guest house before, but this time there were a large number of unknown persons hanging round. Cooks, servants, and employees watched my movements and it did not require much insight to discern that they included intelligence men. Midhat Kamil Kidwai, Rafi Ahmed's first cousin, was Chief Secretary of the Kashmir Government at the time and a confidant of the Sheikh those days. He bestowed more attention on me than ever before. He would come and sit and talk idly about Kashmir and India, but all through there was eagerness to know my mind and the purpose of my visit. There was little to suspect that Midhat had been planted on me; his interest arose purely from my intimate relations with Rafi Ahmed.

I made appointments with Sheikh Abdullah, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and Yuvaraj Karan Singh, the Sadar-i-Riyasat. Other Ministers, Dogra, Saraf and Dhar, met me. My meeting with Bakshi preceded that with Abdullah. Bakshi told me that the Sheikh had called for the resignation of Shamlal Saraf, but Saraf had refused to oblige him. The Sheikh's next move might be to ask the Sadar-i-Riyasat to dismiss Saraf. He might come down then with a heavier hand and order the arrest of Bakshi, Dogra, Saraf and Dhar. He could be desperate enough to make an attempt to depose the Sadar-i-Riyasat. Once this was done, the deck would be cleared for the Sheikh to declare independence for the Valley and call for the withdrawal of the Indian Army from there. "

Bakshi was perhaps aware of Jawaharlal's tenderness for the Sheikh and was feeling rather jittery. He knew that it was a question of now or never, but he was not prepared to act on his own or defy the Government of India. I told him that I had come with full authority from the Indian Government and would advise him shortly. What Bakshi had said was by and large confirmed by the Sadar-i-Riyasat, Dogra, Saraf and Dhar.

On the day following my talk with Bakshi, I met Sheikh Abdullah. He was garrulous and talkative, and harangued me for full two hours. He was angry with India and bitter against the Praja Parishad and the Jana Sangh's onslaught on him after Shyama Prasad Mookerjee's death in detention at Srinagar. He spouted venom against the Dogras as a community and against

Maharaja Hari Singh in particular. When I pointed out that the Yuvaraj was unlike his father, he said that a snake's progeny could be no different from the stock. He made no attempt to conceal his hatred for India which, he thought, had turned communal. The Sheikh had lost faith in Jawaharlal. All through he uttered not a word against Pakistan or the tribal raiders of 1947 led by the Pakistan regulars, or against the rape, killing, atrocities and arson of which they had been guilty.

When I was about to leave, the Sheikh clasped both my hands and asked me what would be my advice to him. I was flabbergasted but soon composed myself and said that thus far he had talked like an honest man, and he deserved respect for his frankness. But it was hypocritical to seek my advice when he had no faith in my country and my leader.

I was left with no doubt that the hazards of inaction were greater than of wrong action. If we missed the opportunity, Kashmir would be lost. Maybe, the Sheikh would not accede to Pakistan, but if he declared independence for Kashmir, would he be able to preserve its freedom? Those who drew a parallel between Switzerland and Kashmir were, in my opinion, fanciful. Mid-Asia was not mid-Europe, and Switzerland's neutrality had been built over centuries. Could we ignore the example of Belgium, a small country which would not throw in its lot with the big European powers, but was overrun in both the World Wars? Kashmir would soon become a colony of one or other of the big powers. It was possible that Pakistan or China

or some other power would invade the land. There was no choice but to give up the self-imposed restraint against drastic action.

The Bakshi group was at liberty to decide its course of action. It worked out the strategy for action and I was kept informed of it. The pro-Bakshi Ministers would tender a joint resignation, which was to be accompanied by a memorandum of events leading to the breakdown of the government. The Sheikh had lost the majority in the Cabinet, in the legislature party and in the National Conference. His attitude had become irresponsible and dictatorial. He was guilty of misrule, nepotism and corruption. It was impossible to work with him. The Ministers would press for the dismissal of the Sheikh and after his dismissal, the Sadar-i-Riyasat would install Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad as the Prime Minister of Kashmir. Bakshi would then order the arrest of Abdullah.

The memorandum submitted to the Sadar-i-Riyasat over the signatures of the three Ministers—Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, Girdharilal Dogra and Shamlal Saraf—was a mighty indictment of the Sheikh. It drew attention to Kashmir's invasion by Pakistani tribesmen, its request to India for help, the offer of unconditional accession to India, India's acceptance of the offer with the unilateral assurance of the right of self-determination to the people of Kashmir, the Delhi Agreement, and Sheikh's own public statements that Kashmir had finally acceded to India. It accused Mohammad Afzal Beg of communalism and Abdullah of disruption and of *volte*

face from the basic values to which he was pledged.

I am afraid, General Kaul's story stating that the Sheikh was arrested on the authority of a junta made up of him and some Kashmiri Ministers on their own is no more than unfounded bragging. Nehru certainly wanted the responsibility for the action against the Sheikh to rest with Kashmir's leaders, but he would not resist any action, including Abdullah's arrest, which they considered necessary. Gen. Kaul's observation that "on August 9, when Nehru rang up Yuvaraj Karan Singh and blew him up for allowing Abdullah to be arrested, the latter, after hearing only a part of the outburst and being shaken by Nehru's blasting, handed over the telephone to A. P. Jain who had reached Srinagar by then. Jain not being able to take in the tirade all by himself, passed the phone over to D. P. Dhar", is a complete fabrication.

There was no talk on the telephone between me and Nehru or between Yuvaraj Karan Singh and Nehru in my presence during the eventful days of Sheikh Abdullah's arrest. What Kaul seems to have mixed up is some vague report he might have had of a subsequent telephone talk, about a fortnight later, between me and Nehru, when I was deputed to Kashmir a second time to explain the implications of the Indo-Pakistani agreement between Jawaharlal and Mohammad Ali (Prime Minister of Pakistan), and to obtain Bakshi's consent to it. Mullik seems to have fallen into the same error. Maybe the passage of time has had its inevitable impact on their memories.

Under instructions from Delhi I motored down to Jammu before the Sheikh's arrest, where an IAF Dakota was waiting for me. I flew to Delhi and found Mahavir Tyagi, then Minister of State for Defence Organisation, waiting at Palam Airport with a message from Nehru that I should drive straight to his office. Tyagi told me he had kept in touch with crucial developments in Kashmir through army sources. He later told me that he had sought the help of the Meteorological Department to get commercial air services to Kashmir suspended. This stopped Mridula Sarabhai in her tracks and prevented her from getting to Kashmir.

I gave Nehru my assessment of the Kashmir situation and of the plan of action. When I started to report my talk with Sheikh Abdullah, Nehru seemed to be bored and said that there was nothing new in it. Then I asked him whether he would like to hear what the Sheikh thought of him. Nehru's interest revived. I told him that the Sheikh had said that there was no difference between Shyama Prasad Mookerjee's and Jawaharlal Nehru's communal professions. Both were Jan Sanghis with the only difference that Shyama Prasad was honest and showed the iron fist, while Nehru covered it with a velvet glove. I also told him that the Sheikh had said that Nehru was an undependable friend. Nehru felt hurt and I remonstrated that I was just repeating what Abdullah had said. The Sheikh had referred to the Nehru-Tandon dispute and complained that Nehru had dismissed Kidwai, although Kidwai had been fighting Nehru's battle

against Tandon. What I said was no doubt unpleasant but Nehru took it sportingly.

•The Kashmir plan went perfectly. The majority of the Ministers resigned and pressed for Abdullah's dismissal. Their indictment of Abdullah was mighty and powerful which Jawaharlal appreciated. Sheikh Abdullah was dismissed, Bakshi installed as the Prime Minister of Kashmir, followed by Sheikh Abdullah's arrest and detention at Udhampur.

Sheikh Abdullah's arrest proved to be a relatively tame affair in the Valley. There were demonstrations at Srinagar but no mass uprising; in some places where the followers of the Sheikh created violent disturbances, they were effectively dealt with by the Kashmir police and militia which had to resort to firing causing loss of some lives. At no stage was the Indian Army called upon to act.

The Pakistan Press and public, however, were in a frenzy. Sheikh Abdullah, who had for years been dubbed a quisling and stooge of India, overnight became Pakistan's hero. There were protest meetings and demonstrations all over Pakistan against his arrest. Highly inventive stories of the genocide of pro-Pakistan elements in Kashmir were circulated. There were threats of jihad, and top politicians such as Shuaib Qureshi and Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan talked of moving the Pakistani Army into Kashmir "for ensuring the right of self-determination to their Kashmiri brethren." As time went, the anti-Indian campaign became more rabid.

Two days after Abdullah's arrest the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali, telegraph-

ed to Jawaharlal saying that the whole of Pakistan was greatly perturbed by the developments in Kashmir. He asked for an early meeting between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan, in any case before August 17. After some arguments Jawaharlal agreed to it.

During the preceding few months, there had occurred a welcome change in the approach of both India and Pakistan to Indo-Pakistani disputes including Kashmir. The UN Representative, Dr Graham, had recommended to the Security Council that the leaders of the two countries might negotiate and conclude an agreement on Kashmir between themselves. In June 1953, during the session of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London, Jawaharlal Nehru and the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Khwaja Nazimuddin, met and agreed to have direct talks. The talks in London were followed by a meeting at Karachi in late July between Jawaharlal Nehru and Mohammad Ali, who had meanwhile succeeded Khwaja Nazimuddin. At Karachi, Kashmir was referred to in a general way; detailed discussions were left for Delhi. The mid-August meeting was a continuation of the previous efforts.

The Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan discussed the Kashmir problem in depth for five or six days, and the joint communique issued on August 21 was a masterpiece of goodwill and restraint. It declared that the Plebiscite Administrator would be inducted into Kashmir by the end of April 1954. Prior to that, however, agreement on preliminary issues and how to enforce them was to be reached. For that purpose com-

mittees of military and other experts were to be appointed to advise the Prime Ministers. On the Plebiscite Administrator's formal appointment by the Jammu & Kashmir Government, he would examine the situation and report on it.

The selection of the Plebiscite Administrator would have the approval of India and Pakistan, but his formal appointment would be made by the Jammu & Kashmir Government. The Administrator would act independently of the Kashmir Government but under the general supervision of the UN. He would make such proposals as he thought proper for holding a fair and impartial plebiscite in the entire State and take such steps as may be considered necessary for the purpose.

I was deputed by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, to proceed to Srinagar and obtain general approval of the terms of the agreement from the Jammu & Kashmir Government. When I met Bakshi, I explained to him that since the day the Kashmir dispute was referred to the UN, it had got bogged down into the power politics of the big powers. The U.S.A. and U.K. had both shown unrelenting hostility to India.

The U.S.A. believed those who were not with it were against it. India's policy of non-alignment was interpreted as anti-American. It would, therefore, be of advantage to India to pull the Kashmir dispute out of the UN forum and settle it independently with Pakistan. I told Bakshi that although the communique was silent on the point, it had been agreed that Admiral Nimitz would be replaced by a Plebiscite Administrator

hailing from a small country, possibly in Asia, That would be no small gain to India.

Further, India had not given up its stand on maintaining the status of the Kashmir Government as the only lawfully constituted authority in the State. There was no giving in on the demand for the replacement of the Kashmir Government by a neutral or joint administration of India and Pakistan. About demilitarisation, the Pakistani forces in Kashmir could not be treated on a par with the Indian forces. Pakistan had no *locus standi* in any part of Kashmir, while Indian soldiers were there by virtue of the accession of the State to India.

Only after the withdrawal of all Pakistani forces from the occupied Kashmir, would the Indian forces be reduced to the minimum necessary for defence and maintenance of internal order of Jammu & Kashmir on the Indian side of the cease-fire line. I urged that all agreements should draw their authority from the consent of the negotiating parties and no agreement could be a one-sided affair. It had to be a compromise. While the time-limit for the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator was to the advantage of Pakistan, the agreement had the virtue of avoiding power pulls and hostility of big powers.

Bakshi remained totally unconvinced. He shouted at me and was terribly upset and angry. He told me that he would immediately tender his resignation to the Sadar-i-Riyasat and that the pro-Indian elements should pack up and move down through the Banihal Pass the next day. No amount of persuasion on my part

could prevail on Bakshi and later in the evening he tendered his resignation in writing to the Sadar-i-Riyasat.

We assembled that night at the Sadar-i-Riyasat's palace. Besides Bakshi and myself, so far as I remember, there were Vishnu Sahay, G. L. Dogra and D. P. Dhar. Our efforts to make Bakshi desist from resigning were unavailing and he left the palace after a little while. The rest of us started discussing what should be done. If Bakshi could not be persuaded to withdraw his resignation, it was impossible for us to install any popular government overnight. Inevitably the Sadar-i-Riyasat would have to take the State under his direct rule. What might happen if the normal administration collapsed the next day? We sent for the General commanding the troops in Srinagar and asked him if he could take the responsibility for maintaining law and order if required to do so the next day. He said that he could do it.

It was at this stage that I rang up Jawaharlal Nehru to apprise him of the situation. Jawaharlal Nehru blew up and said that either I had bungled or Bakshi was a dunderhead who could not correctly appreciate the agreement. When I told him that we had made arrangements for the take-over next morning in case the Bakshi government ceased to exist in the Valley, he was a little calmed. Rafi Ahmed Kidwai, who was then standing by the side of Nehru in New Delhi took the telephone receiver and told me that it was all right and we should do our best. I then passed on the telephone to D. P. Dhar. It is this event which Gen. Kaul, in his excessive

zeal, has mixed up with Abdullah's arrest. Mullick is nearer the truth when he says that there was a call from me to Jawaharlal Nehru, though in fact it was later and on a different occasion.

The news that we had decided to take over in the event of the collapse of the normal administrative machinery leaked out or was made to leak out to Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad. It is possible that it had a sobering effect on him, but it may be that meanwhile he had given a second thought to the situation and, for other reasons, decided to withdraw the resignation. The fact remains that Bakshi withdrew his resignation early next morning. He made a statement that "the declaration finalised on behalf of the Government of India with our concurrence has our unqualified support". Thus ended happily what might well have proved a disaster.

Meanwhile negotiations between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan dragged on but every exchange of letters between them widened the gap between their view points. After Pakistan had given in on the issue of Plebiscite Administrator, another more serious hurdle cropped up. The United States had come to an understanding with Pakistan to give arms aid. Jawaharlal took a serious view of it and wrote to Mohammad Ali that "the effect of it is that she (Pakistan) becomes a pre-determined party as well as a theatre, base or arsenal, or all these, in the present conflicts or in a possible war between the two parties." The demilitarisation of Kashmir and the militarisation of Pakistan were obviously incompatible. The arms aid had

brought about a material change in the relations of India and Pakistan.

The correspondence between the two Prime Ministers makes dreary reading. Finally the Prime Minister of Pakistan wrote on September 21, 1954, that direct negotiations between the two Prime Ministers for the settlement of the Kashmir dispute had failed. He had, therefore, decided that the matter must revert to the Security Council. But the then Governor-General to Pakistan, Ghulam Mohammad, the man who took the initiative to start direct negotiations, was not, however, prepared to admit defeat.

During the annual session of the Indian National Congress at Avadi on January 21, 1955, Mr Chandrakant S. Desai, Chairman of the Premier Tyres Ltd., who had built up some useful contacts in both countries flew to Madras to meet me. He told me that Wajid Ali, a leading businessman of Pakistan and brother of Amjad Ali, Pakistan's Ambassador at Washington, had conveyed to him a message asking whether it would be possible to arrange from India an invitation to Ghulam Mohammad who wanted to suggest a new approach to the Kashmir problem.

I talked to Maulana Azad and Jawaharlal Nehru and both of them welcomed the proposal, but warned me to proceed cautiously and be sure of my ground. I asked Chandrakant to call Wajid Ali, who immediately flew to India and met me in New Delhi. He told me that Ghulam Mohammad was suffering from cancer of the throat and he had only one desire—that India and Pakistan should become friends in his

lifetime. He wanted to make a last bid. An invitation was issued by the President of India, Rajendra Prasad, to Ghulam Mohammad to come to New Delhi and watch the Independence Day Parade on January 26. Ghulam Mohammad was accompanied by a team of powerful aides including three Ministers, Dr Khan Saheb, Maj-Gen. Iskander Mirza and Choudhry Mohammad Ali. They landed at Palam Airport on the 25th January and were given a warm reception.

During their stay, there were some formal talks on the Kashmir problem between Ghulam Mohammad on the one side and Jawaharlal Nehru and Azad on the other, but the detailed talks were left to me. These were all off the record, mostly through Wajid Ali and Aftab Ahmad Khan, Adviser on Kashmir Affairs to the Pakistan Government. Both of them visited me frequently. It was realised that any plebiscite or referendum would be a prolonged affair and leave a legacy of bitterness. An *ad hoc* settlement on the basis of the ceasefire line was the most feasible solution. We took a map of Kashmir and drew a line making territorial concessions to Pakistan. The line generally followed the cease-fire line but two major concessions—some areas of Poonch and a portion of Rajouri in the south-west—were offered. Ghulam Mohammad could hardly speak, but during a talk with Maulana he blurted out something which created confusion. The Maulana rang me up to know the correct situation, and when I gave him details of the proposal he was satisfied.

All through I had kept Nehru informed of the talks. Ghulam Mohammad discussed the line drawn by us—myself, Wajid and Aftab—on the night preceding his departure from Delhi. On the morning of January 28, I was informed that the Pakistani Governor-General's aides feared that a settlement on the lines proposed would cost Ghulam Mohammad his head. Thus ended the fateful mission, and the team flew back to Pakistan.

That Ghulam Mohammad was dead earnest in his efforts for settlement would be borne out by the following extracts from his speech in reply to the toast at the state banquet proposed by Dr Rajendra Prasad at Rashtrapati Bhavan, New Delhi. He said: "The ideal time has now come to prove, and sincerely prove, that the basic and major points of dispute can be mutually solved without delay. Otherwise, our people will laugh at our insincerity and lack of leadership. Time of action is now; people will not wait." He continued, "You have men of goodwill and good sense. So have we. Our two governments have common objectives—we seek international peace and amity, we seek to secure the uplift of the common man."

He stated further "Let us put an end to our disputes. We owe this as a duty to posterity and not to leave for them a legacy of misunderstanding and bitterness."

Noble words! But Ghulam Mohammad did not live to see his dream fulfilled. Many would doubt, though, whether the tide of events could have been turned, even if he had lived longer.

THE SOVIET VETO

By the end of 1956, the power complex in South Asia had changed. Pakistan had joined the SEATO and Baghdad Pacts and had become an ally of the western powers and an upholder of their cause in Asia. Non-aligned India was not of much use to an America determined to settle its scores with the Soviets. The first trial came on the issue of Hungary, and Pakistan stood steadfast by America. Since Egypt was a Muslim country, the Suez Canal issue was a harder nut to crack. But the Islamic State of Pakistan gave precedence to its national interests over pan-Islamism. Pakistan emphasised the international character of the Suez Canal, while India pressed for Egypt's sovereignty over it. In human affairs there is a reaction to every action. The closer America was tied to Pakistan, the greater was Soviet Russia's leaning towards India. When Jawaharlal protested against military aid to Pakistan, President Eisenhower offered to supply arms to India as well, but our Prime Minister declined.

The situation inside Pakistan was bad. It was full of political uncertainty. Greedy politicians, hungry for power and money, had complete sway over affairs. In the four years that followed the resignation of Mohammad Ali Bogra, there were no less than three Prime Ministers in Pakistan. Both the ruling party and the opposition vied with one another in raising the slogan of *jehad* against India. India was Pakistan's

enemy number one. Kashmir belonged to Pakistan by right, said the Pakistanis. Pickwick, when asked which of two crowds he would join, replied 'the bigger of the two'. Likewise the Pakistani leaders rode the band wagon of whichever party shouted most loudly against India.

There was only one exception, when Pakistan's Prime Minister, Sir Feroze Khan Noon mustered the courage to say: "So long as I am the Prime Minister, there is not going to be any war. I want Pakistan to be surrounded by friends". He avowed that "war is not a solution of the Kashmir problem". Next month in September 1958, Noon had a dialogue with Nehru in New Delhi. The two Prime Ministers decided to make a start towards friendship by exchanging Indian and Pakistani enclaves in the east, which happened to be on the wrong side of the international boundary. However India had its own hawks, specially in West Bengal, who scotched these efforts. In early October Feroze Khan Noon was dismissed from office, Pakistan's constitution was abrogated and General Mohammad Ayub Khan was installed by President Iskander Mirza as the Military Administrator of Pakistan. Ayub Khan soon eased out his benefactor Iskander Mirza and assumed the powers of a military dictator. For the next twelve years Pakistan remained under military dictatorship.

The Government of Pakistan had reached the conclusion that conditions were ripe for its mentors, America and the United Kingdom, who wielded an overwhelming influence over UN affairs, to get a favourable verdict for Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute through a Security Coun-

cil. The immediate provocation to act was provided by the formulation of a constitution for Kashmir by its Constituent Assembly which provided for the finalisation of the State's accession to India. The date fixed for the formal inauguration of the Constitution was the anniversary of India's Republic Day—26 January 1957.

On 2 January, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Feroze Khan Noon wrote to the Security Council that direct negotiations between Pakistan and India had failed. He alleged that the Prime Minister of India had gone back on his commitment to hold a plebiscite and the Kashmir Constituent Assembly had taken a decision to integrate the State with India. He questioned the powers and representative character of the Constituent Assembly and accused India of creating a reign of terror in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Leaders who asked for the right of self-determination for the Kashmir people were allegedly being crushed and put behind bars. An explosive situation had developed which might disturb the peace of South Asia.

Feroze Khan Noon invoked the provisions of the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948, and 5 January 1949. His specific demands were:

(1) calling upon India to refrain from accepting the change envisaged in the new constitution adopted by the Kashmir Constituent Assembly;

(2) spelling out obligations of the parties under Article 307 of the UN Charter; and

(3) arranging the withdrawal of troops and surrender of the functions of protecting the State to a UN force.

India accepted the validity of the Security Council resolution of 17 January 1948, the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948, and 5 January 1949, but accused Pakistan of failure to fulfil two vital conditions laid down in Part I of the 13 August resolution; namely that it would "refrain from taking any measure that might augment the military potential of forces" under its control and "to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations". Pakistan had increased the strength of the A.K.P. forces and had constructed air strips in Gilgit, Chitral and Baltistan. It had organised anti-India propaganda and raised threats of jihad.

During the Security Council sittings in 1957 and 1958 India was represented by V. K. Krishna Menon, the Defence Minister, who was an aggressive speaker but also repetitive and boring. He would speak for days at a time forgetting that the body he was addressing was not open to conviction and that its members stood by their political commitments. Nothing new was argued either on behalf of India or Pakistan. Pakistan counted upon the overwhelming support of the Anglo-American bloc. India's big power support was limited to Soviet Russia. The Soviet delegate spoke against the resolution but did not exercise his veto.

The resolution passed by the Council reaffirmed that the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir would be made in accordance with the will of the people of Kashmir expressed through a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United

Nations. It reiterated the resolution of 30 March 1951, that any action taken by the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir would not be legal. The resolution envisaged further consideration of the dispute.

The next month, in February, another resolution was introduced in the Security Council. This deplored the lack of progress in the solution of the dispute and suggested that a proposal to post a UN force in Kashmir might be considered. The resolution requested the President of the Council, Gunnar Jarring, once Swedish Ambassador to India, to consult the Government of India and Pakistan on proposals that were likely to contribute to the achievement of demilitarisation and a settlement of the dispute, keeping in mind the resolution passed by the Security Council and UNCIP.

Of the two main proposals, that is, one for the appointment of a UN mediator and the other asking for the consideration of the installation of a UN force, Nehru reacted violently against the second. He characterised the resolution as being "against international law and the UN Charter unless India accepts it. We have made it clear that under no circumstances will we accept any foreign force in our territory". This time Soviet Russia exercised its veto and the reference to the posting of a UN force had to be dropped. A modified resolution was passed, appointing Gunnar Jarring as the mediator to consult India and Pakistan and make proposals for the solution of the dispute.

Jarring belonged to a neutral European country—Sweden. He was not involved in big power

politics. But he came in at a time when India and Pakistan had drifted far away from each other and had taken rigid positions. Even the old agreement on a plebiscite had disappeared. Jarring did not take long to realise "the grave problems that might arise in connection with and as a result of the plebiscite". The two countries would not agree whether Pakistan had or had not implemented Part I of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August. Jarring suggested that the matter might be referred to an arbitrator. The reference was a limited one and did not include a decision on the fate of Kashmir, yet in an atmosphere surcharged with suspicion, India was not prepared to accept arbitration for any purpose or in any form.

Jarring made a report to the Security Council which made a refreshingly new approach to the problem. It said:

"In dealing with the problem under discussion as extensively as I have during this period just ended, I could not fail to take note of the concern expressed in connection with the changing political, economic, and strategic factors surrounding the whole of the Kashmir question, together with the changing pattern of power relations in West and South Asia. The Council will furthermore be aware of the fact that the implementation of international agreements of an ad hoc character, which has not been achieved fairly speedily, may become progressively more difficult because the situation with which they were to cope has tended to change."

Jarring made no observations before the Council on the merits of the report. He left the Council to decide upon its future action.

The report came up for discussion before the Council in September and October. After a prolonged debate marked by charges and counter-charges, Dr Frank P. Graham was once again despatched to the sub-continent to find a solution to the dispute. The resolution was opposed by both India and Pakistan and at one stage Soviet Russia threatened to exercise its veto. Pakistan was displeased with the resolution because it made a reference to Part I of the 13 August resolution which, according to Pakistan, had been fulfilled. India's position had consistently been that the question of considering demilitarisation could not arise unless Part I of the resolution had been fully implemented, and she therefore objected to the inclusion of demilitarisation in the text of the resolution. It was finally passed in a modified form, which did not make any reference to demilitarisation.

On 18 March 1958, Graham reported to the Security Council that the withdrawal of Pakistani troops and the bulk of Indian troops was fraught with dangerous complications, not anticipated in the UNCIP 13 August resolution. India, it was understood, was committed not to cross the CFL, though the Kashmir State's notional sovereignty over areas vacated by Pakistan troops would be recognised. How would this territory be managed? What would be the nature of the UN surveillance over the local authorities? Who were the local bodies? Was Pakistan's administration in the northern

region a local authority? When new and unforeseen situations develop, the old solutions become in-applicable. This held good both in the case of Pakistan and of India.

Graham proposed that the two Prime Ministers should meet and re-affirm their faith in the CFL. They should appeal to their respective peoples to assist in the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere favourable to further negotiations. The two should work out details for the administration of the territory vacated by Pakistan and consider the possibility of a UN force being posted on the Pakistan side of the CFL. He suggested, lastly, that an early agreement should be reached on the interpretation of provisions relating to a plebiscite. The dispute was thus referred back to mutual negotiations.

Three years later, in January 1949, efforts were renewed on behalf of Pakistan by Zafrulla Khan, who once again came on the scene to invoke the direct jurisdiction of the Security Council. He informed the Council of the failure of direct negotiations and of certain statements made by Indian leaders which amounted to a call for the occupation of Pakistan-held Kashmir. He contended that the deployment of Indian forces within striking distance of Pakistan constituted a threat and created an explosive situation.

India assured the Council that she had no intention of starting any military action. The Soviet representative stated that the issue of the final accession of Kashmir to India had been decided by the people of Kashmir through a democratic process. What remained to be done

was a guarantee like the one given by India, that Pakistan would not take the initiative in starting military action. The Soviet representative warned the Council that he would veto any proposal for arbitration or for intervention by a third party. After some months of fruitless discussions, a resolution moved by Ireland received the support of Chile, China, France, the U.K. and the U.S.A., but was negated by the Soviet Union. The dispute was once more referred back for mutual negotiations by the parties.

Once again in October 1949, Pakistan complained to the Council that India proposed to further integrate Kashmir with itself, that there had been serious political rioting following the loss of the Holy Relic and asked for an emergency meeting of the Council to discuss the abrogation of the special status of Kashmir and the dangerous trends set in motion by the Indian policy. India replied that what she had done was within the framework of the Constitution and there was no need to call a meeting.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who had succeeded Zaf-rulla as Pakistan's representative, twisted the Hazrat Bal incident into a sign of 'open rebellion' against the Governments of Kashmir and India, although the demonstration was an expression of resentment only against some individuals. This time no formal proposal was moved. But the President of the Council prepared a statement of points on which there was general agreement among the members of the Council and of points on which there was a difference of opinion. Outstanding among the latter was the

mediator's role assigned to the Secretary-General in Indo-Pakistani negotiations. Some thought that it would help towards a solution; others thought that outside intervention would further complicate matters.

The Council had held five sessions since the matter was first referred to it in 1948. It had set up one commission, the UNCIP, and appointed three representatives—Sir Owen Dixon, Frank P. Graham and Gunnar Jarring—to bring about a solution of the dispute. There were four interregnums for mutual negotiations but with the failure of each effort, the situation had deteriorated. Pakistan had not once renounced its ultimate right to use force, and had made repeated threats of jihad. India of course had her hard-liners, but anti-Pakistan propaganda in India was not organised like anti-India propaganda in Pakistan. Pakistan contended that changes in the situation had been brought about by India's own action but forgot that India had not gone there to keep Kashmir eternally fixed at the stage where it was in 1948. There was little realisation that the dynamics of change could not be contained.

Pakistan decided to accept American arms. The military potential of a nation is the sum total of the men, military equipment and logistics under its control. Pakistan's military potential had been augmented by increase in the numbers and improvement in the arms of the AKP. The air strips in the northern region had increased Pakistan's military capability. India could not ignore these developments when the question of demilitarisation arose. Gunnar Jar-

ring had drawn the Council's attention to the changed conditions and Graham reported that the UNCIP 13 August resolution had not foreseen the situation that would arise from the withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the area occupied by them. The members of the Council would not allow Indian forces to cross the CFL. They closed their eyes to the new situation and pressed for out-dated and outmoded solutions.

References to the Council by Pakistan had become a periodical exercise. No good had come out of these references nor was there any chance of any good coming out. The Council had become an international forum for Pakistan to do anti-India propaganda. What was said on the floor of the Council was reported extensively abroad and by Indian and Pakistani newspapers and radios. The relations between the two countries and the two major communities of the sub-continent had worsened. India's publicity abroad was weak and her image was sullied.

The feeling of disillusionment as to the effectiveness of the UN to settle international disputes is not confined to India but has also affected the U.S.A. President Nixon's top aide, Henry Kissinger, is reported to have told the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG), the highest political advisory body of the President, that: "If the UN can't operate in this kind of situation effectively, its utility has come to an end and it is useless to think of UN guarantees in the Middle East". The remark was made in the context of the UN's failure to stop the fighting during the recent 14-day Indo-Pakistan War.

Soon after the outbreak of Indo-Pakistan hostilities in September 1949, the Council expressed its concern at the deteriorating situation along the CFL and asked the parties to stop fighting and withdraw their forces to their original positions. However the Council could not bring about peace until the 20th September. Then, after consulting the Governments of India and Pakistan, a resolution was passed by the Council demanding that a cease-fire should take effect on Wednesday 22 September and calling for a subsequent withdrawal of the forces of the two countries to positions held by them before 5 August last. When that was done, the Council would decide what action should be taken to achieve a political settlement of the issues that underlay the conflict. The Governments of India and Pakistan both accepted the resolution and issued orders to their forces to stop fighting from 7 o'clock in the morning of the appointed day.

Efforts to bring about an enduring settlement were not made through the agency of the UN but the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union invited the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan to a meeting at Tashkent for peace parleys. The talks resulted in a declaration signed by Lal Bahadur Shastri and General Ayub Khan on 10 January 1949, which was calculated to restore normal and peaceful relations between the two countries. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan reaffirmed their obligation under the UN Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes through peaceful means. They

agreed to withdraw their forces not later than 25 February to positions held by them prior to the previous 5 August and to observe the cease-fire terms on the CFL. The two countries undertook to refrain from interfering in each other's internal affairs. They agreed to discourage hostile propaganda, to exchange diplomats and to restore economic and cultural relations, trade and communications. They also both agreed to repatriate prisoners-of-war but maintained their respective positions on Kashmir. The declaration was registered with the United Nations as an international agreement.

The Tashkent declaration ushered in a short-lived truce and not a lasting peace. According to a recent newspaper report, General Ayub Khan is reported to have admitted: "Personally I tried to implement the declaration, but my opponent politicians in Pakistan foiled all my steps." In 1949 Kashmir was involved in another Indo-Pakistan war, though this was sparked off by barbarous atrocities committed by the Pakistani Army on the people of East Bengal, and the flight into India of about ten million refugees. When Pakistan's military dictator, Yahya Khan, realised that his army could no longer hold East Bengal, he made a desperate bid to capture Kashmir to use it as a bargaining counter at the negotiation table.

The third Indo-Pakistan war started on 3 December 1949. America convened a meeting of the Security Council, in which a resolution calling upon India and Pakistan to cease hostilities and withdraw their forces to their original positions was moved. India was suffering under the

unbearable burden of millions of refugees and so long as the military rulers of Pakistan held East Bengal, the refugees could not return home. The choice before India was either to have her economy disrupted and communal peace disturbed or to give support to the guerilla fighters of the Mukti Bahini and get East Bengal cleared of the Pakistani Army.

India was irritated by the United Nations silence on the gruesome happenings in East Bengal. The plea of the UN was that it was an internal affair of Pakistan. The admission of Communist China into the Security Council converted the U.S.-Soviet bilateral tangle into a three-cornered struggle of power politics. When the proposal for a cease-fire on the Indo-Pakistani conflict came before the Security Council, there was a bitter verbal duel between the representatives of Moscow and Peking and a free exchange of insults. America watched these antics with some amusement. Twice in succession Soviet Russia exercised its veto and the resolutions were lost. America took the matter to the General Assembly and got a resolution through calling upon the combatants to stop fighting, by a staggering majority of 104 to 11. However, Assembly resolutions are not mandatory. They merely record an opinion which the disputants may or may not accept. After all that had happened, India would not allow a let up in her all-out campaign in East Bengal.

The Commander of the East Bengal forces, Lt. Gen. Amir Abdullah Khan Niazi, had a few days earlier vowed that 'Dacca would fall only over my dead body'; but when faced with the

realities of the choice between surrender and a suicidal fight, Lt. General Niazi decided that discretion was the better part of valour. He surrendered to Indian Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Aurora, and along with Niazi about one lakh of Pakistani regulars and para-military forces also surrendered. On 17 December, with the declaration of a unilateral cease-fire in the western sector, the 14-Day Indo-Pakistani war formally ended. However, Yahya Khan indulged in some filibustering before he ordered a cease-fire on all fronts.

On 22 December the Security Council performed a post mortem. It recorded a resolution making a demand on the parties for a durable cease-fire and the cessation of all hostilities until the withdrawal of the two forces from advanced positions to beyond the cease-fire line. This melodramatic move did not, however, restore the lost prestige of the world body.

Doubts about the effectiveness of the United Nations to maintain world peace came to be aired freely. The American President has gone on record to say "Its (United Nations) role has been far short of satisfactory—and it has been far better than nothing". The big powers have the power to veto any resolution of the Security Council because they are permanent members. They are virtually immune from the Council's jurisdiction. When America and the Soviet Union were on the verge of war in 1919 over the Bay of Pigs episode, no one seriously suggested that the dispute be referred to the Security Council. This immunity can be extended to the proteges of big powers. The small nations.

fight their battle in the United Nations through proxies, and they prefer to ally themselves with one or other of the permanent members. Whether the dispute is between two big powers or the smaller ones, if a big power takes a firm stand, the Security Council is immobilised.

Any remedy sought under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter can be only by way of negotiations, mediation or proposals for a solution. Their acceptance or rejection depends upon the free will of the parties. Chapter VII provides for economic and military sanctions, but the experience of the working of the United Nations has shown that these sanctions are rarely applied and whenever applied they are not effective. When big powers are ranged on opposite sides, the sanctions meet the same fate as they did in Korea. As long as the great nations are divided into power blocs, the role of the United Nations as the warden of international peace will remain precarious.

A NEW KASHMIR

BAKSHI Ghulam Mohammad had carved out for himself in the years since 1947, the position of deputy to Sheikh Abdullah. He had shown bold initiative in organising popular resistance against raiders through the National Conference volunteers. He became the Deputy Prime Minister and had the support of the majority of the members of the Council of Ministers and of the Working Committee of the National Conference. He was known for his non-communal outlook and enjoyed the equal confidence of Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists and Sikhs. His attitude to Pakistan never suffered from any ambivalence. He supported Kashmir's accession to India and had no reservations in seeking her advice and guidance. Bakshi's succession to the office of Prime Minister was smooth.

But Bakshi had inherited a broken Kashmir. The set up and administration of the Maharaja had fallen, but nothing had been installed in their place. The courtiers and feudal lords disappeared with the fall of the ruling dynasty, but the Sheikh had not built up anything like a united and dynamic democratic leadership. The abolition of landed estates was laudable: but the Sheikh's failure to set up an authority to look after the private kuhls, which used to be maintained by the zamindars and gave free irrigation to peasants, had offset many of the benefits of abolition. Kashmir's market economy was disrupted; there was little surplus produce in the

farms. The State's export of handicrafts, timber and fruits had slumped for want of adequate transport and communications. The tradition of communal harmony built up by the National Conference during the struggle against the autocratic rule of the Maharaja had yielded to suspicion and communal bickering. In Jammu and Ladakh there were distinct signs of secessionist tendencies.

The task before Bakshi was formidable. It was to build a new, secular, and democratic Kashmir. Bakshi was an active and dynamic man. He knew his job. During the numerous tours of the Valley which I undertook with him during my five years of office as the Union Food and Agriculture Minister, I often found that crowds of men and women with written petitions waited for Bakshi along the roadside. He would listen to them, pass orders, and hand over their petitions to a secretary who accompanied him. I was told that Bakshi used to check up as to whether his orders had been implemented. He was in the saddle for eleven years and during this period he laid the foundations for a stable and prosperous Kashmir, though his efforts in many cases only bore fruit when he was no longer in office. If Bakshi had not shown a fatal weakness in his later years for what was nick-named the B.B.C. or Bakshi Brothers Corporation, a group of corrupt relations and hangers-on, he would have won a lasting place in the history of Kashmir.

In the mountainous and difficult terrain of Kashmir, where the possibility of an extensive rail transport system is remote and air services

costly, efficient road transport was essential. But the Pathankot-Jammu-Srinagar road, which provided the only effective link with India, was narrow and tortuous, incapable of carrying heavy traffic. As late as 1959 when I was motoring to Srinagar, a whole fleet of cars, trucks and buses was held up by a landslide a few miles from Jammu for the good part of a day. Such landslides were common during the rainy and winter seasons. The State Government undertook a programme of straightening and widening the road, but it could not be made all-weather until the Jawahar tunnel had been bored across the Banihal in 1949.

The traditional route had to be traversed on foot, pony or yak. It was open only during the four or five summer months. By the mid 'fities the construction of a motorable road had started. By 1957 the Srinagar-Kargil-Leh road, a feat of real engineering, had been laid and the first Unimog, a special type of mountain vehicle, jogged along it. By 1949 the road had been fully developed and heavier civilian and military vehicles were using it. Now, on an average, as many as seventy-five vehicles a day use the road during the summer season. The internal routes of the plateau have been surveyed: seven routes have been found fit for jeep transport.

In the Valley and Jammu, the development of the road system during the first three Plans has been remarkable. For every 1000 square miles of territory, the road area had risen from 20 miles to 71 miles, an increase of more than 250 per cent. Foodgrains, fruits and raw materials are freely transported from the interior to

Srinagar and Jammu for local consumption and for export. The towns of Srinagar and Jammu are well-served by local motorised transport.

Whatever private transport had existed in the Maharaja's times was either destroyed or damaged by the raiders. Kashmir started almost from scratch in 1948, when a transport organisation was established, which came to be called the J. K. Government Transport Undertaking. It began with 250 vehicles and has since grown to five times its original size. The Undertaking now lifts defence and other government supplies to Leh, Kargil, Gurez, Tithwal and Poonch, sometimes crossing 15,000 feet high passes. A programme for the gradual nationalisation of private buses on the main routes is in progress. The Pathankot-Srinagar road is now the monopoly of G.T.U., the 25 private transporters' fleet operating on it having been nationalised. The passenger traffic inside the Valley and to India has increased several times over. About one hundred deluxe coaches operate on the main roads and luxury buses take visitors on sight-seeing trips.

No other trade has benefited so much from the improvement in the transport system as that in fruit. The demand for temperate zone fruits, specially apples, had been growing fast in the Indian markets. Against the pre-Partition export of fruits valued at Rs. 50 or 60 lakhs a year, the Valley is now exporting fruits worth Rs. 10 to 12 crores. A small fleet of ten vehicles was set aside by the G.T.U. for the transport of fruit direct to Delhi in 1949. By the 1949 fruit season the Undertaking had been granted 150 permits

for direct transport. The fruit haulage by the G.T.U. which stood at 2.38 lakh maunds in 1949 rose to 4.75 lakh maunds in 1949 from originating centres to Delhi. A delicate fruit like the cherry, half of which used to perish in transport in pre-Partition days, now reaches Delhi within 24 hours of loading. The public transport carries only 30 per cent of the fruit load and the balance of 70 per cent is lifted by private transporters, which creates a healthy spirit of competition. It will not be long before refrigerated vans begin to transport fruit from Kashmir.

In the Maharaja's days orchards occupied barely 31,000 acres of the Valley of Kashmir. In 1949, this area has risen four-fold, that is, to 120,000 acres. The production of fruit has gone up from 16,000 tons to 152,000 tons, almost ten-fold. Last year, Kashmir exported more than 100,000 tons of fruits, mostly apples. When the new orchards mature and the old orchards are upgraded, the production is expected to increase to 440,000 tons.

According to the experts, more than one fourth of Kashmir's sown area, that is, four to five lakh acres, is suited for fruit growing because of the climate. The Fourth Plan lays down an ambitious programme of planting new orchards on 75,000 acres and upgrading 50,000 acres of old orchards. Research is being done at the Shalimar Garden, to increase the yield of the low-yielding but highly delicious Amri apple through spraying, fertilizers and the budding of Amri on dwarf root stocks. The nationalised banks are helping the intensive fruit programme by advancing loans. A programme of spraying insecticides

and for the supply of quality saplings is well under way. New areas such as Kandi in Jammu and other backward areas are being put under the Horticultural Area Development Programme. Inaccessible areas are being opened by constructing roads. Considerable research work has been done on the acclimatisation of mulberry trees from abroad, especially Japan, on sericulture and on growing sugar beet. Two new research stations are to be set up and the existing ones strengthened.

The fruit revolution in the Valley awaits the implementation of a proposal to set up an all-India corporation on the lines of the "Banana Corporation" and the growth of fruit preservation to process the pre-fellings and injured fruit into jam, marmalade and juice. The programme to set up ware-houses and cold storage plants and the provision of grading and packaging will increase fruit production.

The Kashmir Valley has been deficit in food. The demand for rice by the State during my stewardship of the Union Food Ministry (1954-1959) was ever on the increase. Rice was given to Kashmir at a subsidised rate, about half of the import cost from Burma. The cheap sale prices of imported rice in Kashmir affected the farmer's economy. It was a damper on production. The disparity in the market prices of imported and local rice gave rise to rampant corruption, involving large numbers of National Conference workers and M.L.As. Rice in Kashmir Valley had become a racket. There was a demand for rice from Ladakh where it had never been consumed before. Bakshi flew rice from the Valley to Leh.

I took serious objection to the big price differential and the system of rice distribution and in particular to lifting rice by air to Leh. There were many arguments between Bakshi and myself before I could persuade him to sell four rather than five seers of rice for a rupee, when rice in India was sold at two seers for a rupee.

The main problem on the rice front was to increase the per acre yield. The high-yielding exotic varieties first came into vogue about and before that all the State could do was to replace the customary varieties with the non-shedding, higher-yielding local varieties. The use of high doses of fertilisers has become possible only after the introduction of exotic varieties. Bakshi did his best to substitute non-shedding and improved varieties of paddy seed which broke the traditional apathy of the peasants. At present out of the total area of 5.6 lakh acres under rice in the State, between one and one and a quarter lakhs are covered by imported varieties. The rice yield in Kashmir is about 20 per cent higher than the country's average.

The Valley is a single crop area. The rice crop is harvested late and not enough time is left for preparing the soil and sowing a second crop before the winter snows. How to convert the single crop area of the Valley into a double crop area is the major problem. Through a series of experiments it has been found practicable to reap a short-duration early paddy crop and still have enough time to sow a dwarf variety of wheat. In , a second rabi crop of wheat, Lerma Raju and Sonora-64, was raised. Sown after reaping the rice crop, it germinated before the

snows and matured the following spring. Within two years the local adaptation of Mexican wheat, Sonalika and Safed Lerma, were sown over an area of about 12,000 acres. The popularisation of this practice has still to be brought about. Some progressive farmers have taken yields as high as 50 maunds an acre though the State's average is 20 maunds.

The use of the waters of the Indus, Jhelum, Chenab and their tributaries flowing in Jammu and Kashmir is restricted by the Indus Water Treaty signed by India and Pakistan in 1960. The treaty limits the consumption of water to the customary uses and prescribes some quantity for new uses. This limits the possibilities of the future extension of irrigation in the State. The engineers and the people of Kashmir feel aggrieved that their interests were not properly looked after by the treaty.

The areas put to improved seed and fertilisers have certainly made spectacular increases, but the single factor which has contributed most to the agricultural break-through is irrigation. The whole State has one of the highest percentages of irrigated area to the sown area, namely 40 per cent. The Valley is incredibly fortunate and the percentage there is as high as 62.5, of which more than two-thirds is accounted for by private kuhls. The kuhls stood in urgent need of irrigation improvements and dams to ward off the curse of floods. The State Government drew up a programme to take over and maintain more than 2,000 major kuhls, to construct regulators and cross drainage works and also to align channels and strengthen their embankments. The recur-

rent problem of water-logging is being looked after through batteries of de-watering pumps along the embankments. Fairly extensive areas have thus been made available for agriculture.

To control the scourge of floods, a Master Plan was drawn up in 1958 which envisaged a three-phase programme. The first phase of the programme comprises works on the Jhelum in the upper reaches from the source to Srinagar, the second from Srinagar to the Wular Lake and the last from the Wular Lake to Khalanyar. The 1959 floods showed government the necessity for an increased discharge capacity of the channel beyond the Wular and now dredgers are working to double it. During the eight years of the Third Plan and the three annual plans, an expenditure of Rs. 8.5 crores has been incurred and the Fourth Plan has made a provision of Rs. 5.5 crores, which add up to Rs. 13 crores for flood control.

The Indus Water Treaty makes a provision for the supply of water for one lakh acres in Jammu in addition to the existing irrigation. The Ravi can irrigate another 85,000 acres of new land. The State has undertaken a programme of re-modelling the two important old canal systems, Ranbir and Pratap, to stabilise the existing area under irrigation and to bring in new areas. The Ravi-Tawi complex of lift irrigation now irrigates a compact area between the Tawi and the Ravi rivers. With the construction of another lift scheme on the Mannawar Tawi to irrigate the Chamb Nishat area and Paragoal island in the Chenab, the permissible irrigation potential of Jammu will be practically exhausted.

Two agricultural colleges — one in Jammu at Ranbirsinghpura and the other in the Valley at Sopore — have been founded. Srinagar has set up a milk processing plant and Jammu will soon have another. Work on the improvement of sheep stock to improve the supply and quality of wool and mutton is well on the way. Veterinary services, hospitals and dispensaries to look after the health of sheep and cattle have much improved and the ratio of veterinary units to animal population in the State is double that of the average in India.

The development of education in the State has also been spectacular. Expenditure on education in 1947-48 exceeds the total revenues of the State before accession. It is about thirty times what it was in 1947-48. The number of primary schools has increased by 600% and high and higher secondary schools by 110%. In 1947 there were only five colleges for general education and none for professional education. Now the number of colleges for general education is 19 and for professional education 11. In the Maharaja's days the colleges of the State were affiliated to the Punjab University at Lahore. In 1948 the Jammu and Kashmir University was established. It has since developed 21 post-graduate departments. The university has been split into two divisions, one for Jammu and the other for Srinagar. Recently these divisions have become full-fledged universities.

The State runs two Central Public Libraries, one at Jammu and the other at Srinagar. Branches of these libraries exist at the district headquarters — Anandnagar, Baramula, Ud-

hampur, Kathua and Leh. An academy of art, culture and language was set up in 1958 to promote fine arts, music, dance, drama and cultural activities in the different linguistic regions of the State. Writers are encouraged to publish books and a comprehensive dictionary of Kashmiri is under preparation. A history unit has been set up to write an authoritative history of Kashmir in recent times. The State aims to enrol as school students all the boys of the 6-11 years age group and 70 per cent of the girls of the same age group at the end of two years.

Kashmir has a network of Primary Health Centres (PHCS) to look after preventive and curative medicine. Because of the difficulties of travel in the State, some of these centres have already been equipped with clinical laboratories and dental and X-ray facilities. In the course of the Fourth Plan, these facilities are to be extended to the PHCS where they do not exist. Both in the Valley and in Jammu, the number of available beds will be increased. The State aims to provide every PHC with a suitable building and accommodation for doctors, nurses and staff. When the Study Team on Indian Hospitals appointed by the Government of India went round the Valley, they found that the State possessed a highly efficient system of PHCS, perhaps surpassed only in Kerala which has a long tradition of progressive health services. The State encourages the Ayurvedic and the Unani systems, which are very popular there.

Besides the Medical College at Srinagar, the State has started to construct another medical college at Jammu. The extension of the State

Hospital at Jammu to provide training facilities to medical students is also going ahead. The Family Planning Programme, integrated with the PHC, is popular in the Valley. It has not suffered from the apathy on the subject which is characteristic of the Muslim community in the rest of the country.

At the time of accession, there was hardly any industrial development in the State. In 1947 the power potential was as low as 3 MWs. Twenty years after it had gone up to 60 MWs. With the completion of two hydro-electric projects — Chenani in Jammu and Upper Sindh in the Valley, the State's power potential will go upto 95 MWs. A high tension line connecting Jammu and Kashmir is likely to be commissioned by the end of 1948. With the extension of the railway from Kathua to Jammu, the communication facilities in the Jammu region will improve. The Union Government has allotted a 50 per cent subsidy for road transport to improve industries in the Valley. The basic infrastructure for industrial development is fairly well established and the State can look ahead to a rapid industrial growth.

The Union Government has set up two central sector industries — a watch factory of the Hindustan Machine Tools Ltd. and an ancillary unit of the Indian Telephone Industries Ltd. It has also approved in principle the establishment of a tyre cord grade rayon pulp plant, which will produce 100 tons of tyre cord grade pulp. The National Chemical Laboratory, Poona, has certified the suitability of this pulp for manufacturing high grade cord.

The Kashmir Government has set up two State-owned corporations, namely, J & K Minerals Limited and J & K Industries Limited. The first corporation which was set up in 1960 has collected to its bosom a few mineral-based industries — Cement, Spun Pipe, Precast Concrete and Paddar Sapphire mining. It has received letters of intent for some more industries. The other corporation is running a number of industries — some pre-accession and others post-accession. The units are producing a variety of items such as silk, wool, bricks and tiles, pharmaceuticals, leather and willow goods. The government has recently decided to hand the sericulture development activities of the corporation over to a Government Department of Sericulture.

Fifteen Industrial Estates were put up in different parts of the State, as in other parts of the country, but they have not proved to be a success, more particularly in her rural areas. The State Government has now decided to set up three industrial areas for the location of medium and small industries — Bagh-i-Ali Maidan, Digrana and Kathua. The demand for industrial plots, especially in Jammu Province, is great and another estate may have to be developed. There are a few private sector industries manufacturing textile, ceramics, worsted woollen, etc. During the last two or three years, the private sector has shown greater interest and readiness to put up multi-grade pulp, television and electronic units.

But the world famous Kashmir handicrafts are still the most important export item. The

exports in 1948 are twice those in 1948. Among the measures to promote handicrafts are: creation of J & K Handicrafts (Sale and Export) Corporation, a quality marking scheme, higher import entitlement, customs clearance facilities for air-lifted articles at Srinagar Airport, participation in international fairs. Banking facilities have also been liberalised. The government has started a pilot scheme to provide centrally-heated sheds to handicraft workers to increase their productivity in the winter.

A Directorate of Industries and Commerce has been established to help industries in the selection of sites for small scale industries, acquiring raw materials, securing financial assistance, training in various arts and crafts, etc. The Industrial Corporation was set up as a special agency for promoting industrialisation and in the three years of its existence, the corporation has helped to promote a rice mill, a cigarette factory, a sugar factory, a cattle feed plant, etc. The J & K State Financial Corporation has been giving ever increasing financial aid.

The agricultural and industrial development of Kashmir constitutes a new and firm link with India. It forms part of India's overall planning system and follows the national pattern. New markets for Kashmir's fruits and handicraft have come up. The State's transport system is designed to help in the expeditious despatch of wares to Indian markets. Indian industrialists are taking more interest in making investments in ventures in Kashmir.

A new Kashmir has been born where both agriculture and industry have made tremendous

advances. Kashmir's orchards have multiplied and the trade in fruit has increased considerably. Kashmir now has a modern system of transport. Areas which have remained closed from times immemorial are now accessible. Health services have reached every corner of the state. The traditional handicrafts of Kashmir have developed new markets. Kashmir's growth has been a part of the overall planning of India. Her trade and transport are closely knit with India's trade and transport.

KASHMIR IN BIG POWER POLITICS

NESTLING in the heart of Central Asia, the State of Jammu and Kashmir was a rendezvous for caravans travelling from and to India, Central Asia and Tibet. Its geo-political position made it an area of considerable international consequence. An expert on Central Asia and once the Governor of the North-West-Frontier Province, Sir Olaf Caroe, said "It is convenient and true to see all Central Asia in a Kashmir focus. It is a point at which China, the U.S.S.R., India, Pakistan and Afghanistan meet. There are few points more strategically situated in any part of the world."

The proximity of Kashmir to the Pamirs of the Soviet Union gives it special importance both for the U.S.S.R. and China. Kashmir in the hands of a friendly power would be of high strategic value to Peking, not only in the three-sided political entanglement of India, China and Pakistan but also in any Sino-Soviet conflict in Central Asia. Kashmir has a strategic position both for the U.S.S.R. and China. It also holds the key to the relations between India and Pakistan.

The two obvious factors which added new importance to Kashmir in the late forties were the partition of India and the communisation of China. Partition opened a new frontier on the south and west of the State, about five hundred miles long, from Samba to a point where India, Afghanistan and Pakistan met. The inter-

national boundary thus determined was, however, soon over-run through the invasion of Kashmir by the tribesmen. In its place came a cease-fire line accepted by India and Pakistan as the actual line of control. India retains the lawful sovereign rights over the Kashmir territory to the west of the CFL. And Pakistan has not relaxed its efforts to take Kashmir to the east of the CFL by force.

After Peking had assumed full sovereignty over the Tibet region in the mid-fifties, the Chinese borders with India extended almost from the meeting of the borders of India, Afghanistan and Pakistan in the north-west to the meeting of the borders of India, China and Burma in the east, a distance of over two thousand miles. Since time immemorial, the traditional boundary on this border has conformed to natural features, that is, to the highest water-shed. It was supported by custom and some kind of administrative control, but Communist China refused to accept the boundary. The Communists denied the existence of a definite boundary between Tibet and India and began to nibble into territory to the west and south of the traditional boundary. Innumerable diplomatic notes and protests were exchanged and an India-China committee of officials appointed by the two countries produced no results. The border dispute persisted and escalated into the Sino-Indian War of 1948.

The State of Kashmir had been mauled and mutilated both in the west and east and large portions of its territory came under enemy occupation — from Pakistan in the west and north-west and China in the north-east. Kashmir has

been the battle ground of three Indo-Pakistan wars of 1947-48, 1948 and 1947, and of one war with China in 1948. On all four sides of the Kashmir border, soldiers of India have stood with fixed bayonets to defend the State against the armies of Pakistan and China.

Qaid-e-Azam Jinnah and his political party, the Muslim League, which only became powerful after the outbreak of the second World War, did not have enough time to think about Pakistan's relations with foreign powers, except occasionally when the League expressed a subdued sympathy for some Muslim countries. When Chiang Kai-shek came to India to plead with the British for the transfer of power to the Indian people's representatives, Jinnah called it interference in India's internal affairs. For several years after Independence, Pakistan was fully absorbed in her internal affairs — building an administration, maintaining law and order and settling five million refugees. There were two years of food scarcity. The stress and turmoil of this period still didn't allow Pakistan to give serious thought to its foreign policy.

Pakistan's hatred of India ever since Independence has endured. The main object of dispute was Kashmir. General Ayub Khan writes in his autobiography "Friends Not Masters" that: "The crux of the problem from the very beginning was that India was hostile towards us. We had to secure our position." Another Pakistani leader, Mian M. M. Khan Daultana said in the Pakistan National Assembly: "Kashmir is the ultimate test-zone of the success and failure of Pakistan as a nation before its people and before

the people of the world". India had decided to be non-aligned, that is, to keep open its options to act freely in a given international situation, as the sheet-anchor of her external policy. She refused to enter into military pacts with any of the big powers and did her best to keep Kashmir out of power politics. But Pakistan believed that the safety and future of the small States could be ensured only if each State were to be with a big power. This divergence in approach has stood in the way of peaceful negotiations between the two countries. Pakistan was averse to the Soviet Union from the beginning, probably because after the Second World War her exemplars, the British, had developed an hostility to the Soviet Union. She toed the line of the British.

The first major international problem before Pakistan after Independence was that of giving recognition to the communist regime of China. Pakistan was a theocratic feudal State, while Communist China was atheistic and Marxist. But, realistically speaking, Pakistan knew that China would be her neighbour, if the Pakistani designs on Kashmir succeeded. Pakistan accorded formal recognition to China and forcefully pleaded her case for admission to the United Nations in 1950. Pakistan's representative in the UN said: "China is not applying for admission in the United Nations. It is a member state, a permanent member of the Security Council, one of the big five. I do venture to submit, whether it is willing or not willing to discharge the obligations laid down by the Charter, it is entitled as of right to be represented in the Unit-

ed Nations.” The Sino-Pakistani honeymoon was, however, short lived. At no time during the next ten years did Pakistan ever support China’s entry to the United Nations.

The Pakistanis realised that Britain had lost her leverage in international affairs, and if Pakistan was to achieve her objective in Kashmir, she must divert her loyalty to a big power like the US. America was bitterly opposed to the seating of China in the United Nations. Pakistan became a signatory to some of America’s anti-communist treaties, and unabashedly changed its stand. When the question arose whether Formosa constituted a part of Communist Chinese territory, Pakistan’s attitude was strange. She would neither recognise nor reject the Kuomintang government.

But Red China’s stand on Kashmir also shifted according to political convenience. On 16 March 1956, Premier Chou En-lai had told the Indian Ambassador in Peking that “the people of Kashmir had already expressed their will.” The remark related to the Constituent Assembly’s decision on Kashmir’s accession to India. During the course of a private conversation in 1961, Chou En-lai confirmed this view to India’s Secretary-General for Foreign Affairs.

However, when China entered into talks with Pakistan on the drawing up of a boundary between Sinkiang and Gilgit, formally a part of India held in forcible possession by Pakistan, she denied that she had ever accepted Kashmir as a part of India. Peking wrote bluntly to New Delhi, “The Chinese government cannot leave unsettled indefinitely its boundary of several

hundred kilometres with the area the defence of which is under the control of Pakistan because there is a dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir". The agreement contained a clause that the boundary so fixed could be reopened if Kashmir's accession to India was finalised. Can anyone deny that it meant recognition of the unlawful occupation of Gilgit?

Pakistan's foreign policy began to take shape under the stewardship of a politically obscure person, Mohammad Ali Bogra, who was flown from Washington to Pakistan and within a few hours of his arrival sworn in as the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Mohammad Ali was at the time Pakistan's Ambassador to the US and reputed to be staunchly pro-American. His appointment as Prime Minister was acclaimed by Washington. It was widely believed in Pakistan that Mohammad Ali was made Prime Minister of the country through America's influence.

After the Indo-Pakistani dispute on Kashmir had been rolled back from the Security Council to the forum of mutual negotiations, Mohammad Ali's predecessor Khwaja Nazimuddin initiated talks and Mohammad Ali started off where Nazimuddin had stopped. Mohammad Ali made a peaceful start and talked of Jawaharlal Nehru as his 'elder brother.' He stood off the extreme outburst of resentment in Pakistan on Sheikh Abdullah's arrest. Talks between Mohammad Ali and Nehru began about the middle of August and an agreement was reached. It was this agreement which I had taken to Srinagar for the Kashmir Government's approval.

The happy trend of negotiations, however, soon received a severe jolt. The Indian newspapers came out with the news that Mohammad Ali had agreed to replace Admiral Nimitz by a representative of a small nation as Plebiscite Administrator, preferably an Asian. This was a rebuff for the Americans. It gave a handle to the anti-Indian members of Mohammad Ali's cabinet. Mohammad Ali denied that he had ever agreed to replace Nimitz, and accused the Indian Government of false propaganda. Nehru reminded Mohammad Ali that the decision about Nimitz had been made but was not mentioned in the agreement. When Admiral Nimitz resigned, the controversy died out.

The initial enthusiasm created by negotiations on the Kashmir dispute had worn thin. The anti-Indian elements in Pakistan got the upper hand. About the end of October 1953, clenched fists, reminiscent of Liaquat Ali Khan's famous 'clenched fist' of 1951, were raised against India in a session of the Muslim League at Karachi. An anti-Nehru campaign began in Pakistan. The era of amity and cooperation had ended. The icy winds of enmity were fanned by the cold-war between Soviet Russia and the United States.

After the cease-fire in Korea, the Republican regime of President Eisenhower decided to try to contain communism by entering into regional pacts with new Asian nations, equipping them with modern arms and establishing bases in Asia. This plan aimed to create an Asian replica of Europe's NATO. Pakistan had been in search of allies and for her it was a welcome opportunity. Pakistan joined the Mutual Defence

Assistance Agreement in May 1954. It provided for the supply of American arms. Pakistan was, however, striving for something bigger. Her President Ghulam Mohammad visited Washington and had long talks with Eisenhower.

The perfect occasion to make closer ties between America and Pakistan arrived when the U.S.A. decided to set up the South-East Asiatic Collective Defence Treaty Organisation (SEATO) comprising three Asian States (Thailand, Pakistan and Philippines) and the United States, Britain, France, Australia and New Zealand. It became operative in February 1955, and provided for collective defence against aggression and subversion (Article 2) and common action in defence against aggression and other forms of threat to the sovereignty or political independence of the members (Article 4). America inserted a saving clause that under Article 4 her assistance could be invoked only against aggression by a communist country. But "in the event of other aggressions or armed attacks, it (U.S.) would consult under the provisions of Article 4". In 1947, the U.S. Secretary of State explained that 'the Treaty obligation of U.S.A. does not depend upon the prior agreement of other parties since this obligation is individual as well as collective'.

Jawaharlal Nehru was not a man to take this lying down. He was indignant and wrote to Mohammad Ali: "It becomes rather absurd to talk of demilitarisation if Pakistan proceeds in the reverse direction with the help of the United States". The Kashmir problem could not be isolated from the overall situation on the sub-

continent. How could Kashmir be demilitarised when Pakistan was adding to its armed potential? Mohammad Ali asked for a session of the India-Pakistan Joint Committee of officials to work out a plan for a plebiscite and for the demilitarisation of the State, but Jawaharlal wrote back that in the light of the new developments the session would not serve any useful purpose.

On 1 March 1954, Jawaharlal read out a statement in the Indian Parliament saying that: "the grant of military aid by the United States to Pakistan creates a grave situation for us in India and for Asia. It adds to our tension. It makes it much more difficult to solve the problems which have confronted India and Pakistan. It is necessary for India and Pakistan to solve these problems and develop friendly and co-operative relations which their geographical neighbourhood as well as their long common history demand. These problems can only be solved by the two countries themselves and not by the intervention of others". Mohammad Ali justified the arms aid from United States by pointing to the disparity between the armed strength of India and Pakistan. He estimated the disparity to be in the ratio of 4:1 against Pakistan. He said in a letter that the supply of US arms to Pakistan would not constitute a threat to India's security.

Notwithstanding the Sino-Indian Agreement of Friendship of 1954, differences continued to persist between India and China on the border problem. Nehru broached the subject with Chou En-lai more than once, but Chou avoided

a discussion. The correspondence exchanged on the issue between the two countries only showed that the dispute was deep rooted. Pakistan was only too willing to take advantage of the rift between China and India. In private, Rawalpindi assured Peking that if hostilities broke out between America and China, Pakistan would not join the war. Peking knew that Pakistan could be a powerful ally against India and adopted a conciliatory attitude. At Bandung, Chou En-lai told the Political Committee of the Conference:

The day before yesterday, after lunch, I paid a visit to the Prime Minister of Pakistan. He told me that although Pakistan was a party to a military treaty, Pakistan was not against China. Pakistan had no fear (that) China would commit aggression against her. As a result of that, we achieved a mutual understanding although we are still against military treaties.... The Prime Minister of Pakistan further assured (me) that if the United States should take aggressive action under the military treaty or if the United States launched a global war, Pakistan would not be involved in it.

China's desire to befriend Pakistan should be understood in the context of the growing Sino-Soviet tension, the increasing Indo-Soviet amity and the worsening Sino-Indian border situation. But China was not prepared to fall in head-long with Pakistan and kept open her option of making up with India. Pakistan too was not prepared to let up on efforts to build her friendship

with America. Pakistan next year became a member of the Middle East Defence Organisation (the Baghdad Pact) which, after the withdrawal of Iraq, was named the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO), a pact between Pakistan, Turkey and Iran. Under it the contracting parties had *inter alia* agreed to cooperate in the security and defence measures of the contracting parties and not to enter into any international arrangement inimical to the agreement.

The fall of Mohammad Ali Bogra in 1955 opened an era of weak and unstable civilian governments in Pakistan headed by Choudhri Mohammad Ali, Shahid Suhrawardy and Feroze Khan Noon, which ended in 1958, when General Mohammad Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, established a military dictatorship. Central Asian politics had, by then, become full of double-crossing, cheating and deception, reminiscent of the Arab diplomacy of the Middle East. Pakistan wanted the United States to assist her in taking Kashmir. It mattered little to Pakistan from what source support came. The Prime Minister of Pakistan, Shahid Suhrawardy, in the course of his visit to China paid glowing tributes to the Communists for their all-round progress and assured Peking that Pakistan's policy of alignment with the western bloc was not meant to be against China. Within weeks, Pakistan assuaged the feelings of United States by voting in the Steering Committee of the General Assembly for the exclusion of China from the United Nations. China hated the U.S.-sponsored pacts but would not

break off relations with Pakistan for the reason it had joined them.

During Chou En-lai's visit to Pakistan in 1956, the people of Pakistan wanted him to take a positive stand on Kashmir in their favour and they were disappointed when the Chinese Premier described the Kashmir dispute as "the evil fruit left over by (the) colonial rule" and advised India and Pakistan to initiate negotiations to settle it amicably. China had not reached the stage of closing its option with India. One wonders how Pakistan was naive enough to believe that China would break away from India, while she on her part was actively negotiating pacts with the U.S.A. For Soviet Russia, there was hardly any option left. She had a friend neither in China nor in Pakistan. If she wanted to be active in Asian politics, she must befriend India.

Before John F. Kennedy assumed the office of U.S. President, Pakistan had signed at least four security arrangements with US — the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement, the SEATO and CENTO pacts, and a bilateral Agreement of Co-operation (1959). America had, through these pacts, under-written the security of Pakistan against any aggression by Communists. She also assured India that the last agreement was not aimed at her and Nehru told Parliament that it 'could not be used against India'. The object of the 1959 Agreement has to this day remained obscure.

On assuming the office of the US President, Kennedy made a review of the Asian situation. To him India was 'the key area' in Asia. She was busy making a bold attempt to achieve eco-

conomic modernisation through the democratic process. India was in a position to face the challenge from China. Kennedy had said in the Congress, 'We want India to win the race with China.' .if China succeeds and India fails, the economic development balance will shift against us.' Kennedy had not inherited Dulles's hostility towards non-aligned nations. He assigned to India one of his confidants and a good friend, J. K. Galbraith.

Kennedy lifted the ban on economic aid to India and secured for her an appropriation of 500 million dollars. But this aid was matched by a proposal to supply twelve F-104 fighter planes to Pakistan. It caused almost a wave of consternation in India and the significance of the economic aid was lost. Galbraith wrote to Washington: "We committed half a billion in aid to India and twelve F-104 planes to Pakistan. The ratio of questions, words, comments and emotions has not been less than 10 to 1 in favour of the planes. Such is the current yield of Dulles's policy."

Ayub was upset by the grant of economic aid to India. He complained against the aid to a country which professed neutralism. If friends and 'neutrals' were treated alike, it would be difficult for the member countries of regional pacts to justify their membership. Kennedy decided to pacify Ayub and invited him to America on a state visit. He was given a warm welcome. Kennedy said that 'Americans in private and their public life appreciate the value of friendship and consistency of friends.'

Kennedy assured Ayub that he valued collective security and that he was not thinking in terms of abandoning friends and embracing 'neutrals'; all he had in mind was 'neutrals' should not be treated as enemies. Ayub condemned India's 'intransigence' in Kashmir and reminded the President that there could be no peace on the sub-continent so long as the Kashmir dispute remained unresolved. He wanted America to use pressure on India and make her accept a solution which favoured Pakistan. Pakistan would be satisfied with nothing short of full accession. But Kennedy was then overwhelmed by America's own problems — the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the Berlin imbroglio. He could not spare enough time for South Asia.

During the two talks between Nehru and Ayub, one at Palam Airport, Delhi, and the other three weeks later at Karachi when Nehru had gone to Karachi to sign the Indus Water Treaty, the political stance of the two countries became clearer. Nehru wanted a no-war pact but Ayub would not accept it unless the potential of the Indian Army was reduced. Ayub had, it appeared, some sort of military parity in mind. The Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan agreed to set up a committee to negotiate a settlement but both seem to have forgotten the failure of the Joint Committee of 1953 to work out a plan for a plebiscite and demilitarisation. This committee, too, did not meet with any better fate. On the basic approach, the two countries differed widely.

Mohammad Ali Bogra had offered India in 1953 a proposal for the joint defence of the sub-

continent, but Nehru had turned it down because it violated the basic principles of India's foreign policy. Principles apart, any scheme of common defence would, by implication, require harmony in foreign policy but Pakistan was heading towards military pacts and agreements, while India would have none of them. When Ayub revived the offer of mutual defence, Pakistan was "America's most allied ally in Asia."

The rigid positions taken up by India and Pakistan had made a compromise difficult. Jawaharlal told Ayub that Kashmir had already gone through two elections and a third was in the offing. India had spent large sums on her economic development. There was a substantial Muslim minority in India and the impact of the loss of Kashmir on the Indian Muslims could be disastrous. Any hasty action on Kashmir would jeopardise India's social and political stability. Thus, a prolonged thaw was necessary before any meaningful dialogue could start.

To Ayub this seemed rank hypocrisy. He retorted that the elections in Kashmir were bogus. The Pakistani people had always felt strongly about Kashmir. They would not brook any more delay. Where was the assurance that India would not use any interval to consolidate her position? The Muslims of Kashmir were not hostages. They could not be denied their right to determine their fate because the Hindus might react violently against the Muslims of India. The gap was too wide to bridge.

The attack on the Indian border by China in October 1947 created an even more explosive situation. The first attack was followed by a

bigger one in November, and China occupied another two thousand square miles of Indian territory in Aksai-Chin, which added upto fifteen thousand square miles in the western sector. In NEFA, both at the Sela Pass and in the Walong valley, the Indian forces suffered humiliating defeats.

If India lost to China, communism would overrun the whole of South Asia. America was more concerned with anti-communism than with Pakistan's crusade against India. When Jawaharlal asked for weapons, both the US and U.K. responded generously. India gave two shopping lists, one for small arms, that is, infantry weapons and light artillery, costing a few million dollars, and the other comprising tanks, aircrafts, heavy artillery and machinery for arms manufacture. Within days of the request, C-130 freighter planes loaded with small arms were flown to India.

General Ayub's own assessment was that China had a limited objective. The India-China war was in the nature of border skirmishes. He wrote to Kennedy:

....we do not believe that China can bring to bear against India her major forces through the difficult terrain of the Himalayas to achieve decisive results and even if she has any such intention the way to do it would be a simpler way of doing it and in cost it would be cheaper. If the Chinese intentions were more than limited and they were to expand into the territories of Assam, we would have as much cause for

concern as India, as East Pakistan would be directly affected.

• This view was not shared by Galbraith who wrote to the US President that:

“....the trickle of evidence (during the week preceding November 13) on forces north of the frontier, the concentration in the real danger areas which are the Chumbi Valley and back near the Burma border, the incursions and patrol actions in new places and the drift of Chinese propaganda caused me to conclude that we should assume something more serious.”

There were two tasks before the US and U.K. —one military, that is the supply of arms to India; and another diplomatic, to prevent Pakistan from embarrassing India for the duration of the war. Kennedy assured Ayub that India had been given arms under the express condition that she would use them against China and in no event against Pakistan. He suggested that Ayub might write to Nehru assuring him that Pakistan would not harass her when she was fighting with China. Such an act of large-heartedness would help to soften India's attitude on the Kashmir dispute. But Ayub wrote back:

“Mr. President, what you now ask of us is to give an assurance to Mr. Nehru of a kind that will enable him to deploy his troops, at present concentrated against us, elsewhere. I am surprised that such a request is being made to us. After all, what we have been doing is nothing but to contain the threat that was continuously posed by India to us. Is it in conformity with human nature that we should

cease to take such steps as are necessary for our self-preservation? Or, will our own people ever accept such a position?"

Later, Ayub wrote to British Prime Minister Harold McMillan:

"If the flow of your arms supply is so regulated as to influence India to be in a more amenable frame of mind, positive results are bound to follow from negotiations now under way."

The US and U.K. wanted Pakistan to win India's goodwill by a friendly gesture, but Ayub insisted that the arms supply should be regulated so as to pressurise India.

An official of the US Embassy told me in 1947 that the Americans were thinking of a solution of the Kashmir dispute on the lines of a condominium, that is, opening trade and transit from the State to both India and Pakistan, maintaining over the State a notional sovereignty of India, setting up a common administration for the Valley. The proposal brought before me visions of the ghastly atrocities perpetrated by raiders and Pakistani nationals barely 15 years before. I retorted by saying that it would be more honest to ask for a straight gift of the Valley than to propose a scheme which would humiliate India and cost Kashmir untold suffering.

In his letter to President Kennedy, Galbraith gives some idea of this line of thinking. He wrote:

The plebiscite (was) an idea in which there was no longer any future. The only hope lies in having full guarantee of the head-waters of the rivers. Each side should hold on to the

mountain territory that it has and there should be some sort of shared responsibility for the Valley. I really don't think that a solution on these lines is impossible. It may be wise, incidentally, when the time comes to have the British do it as a Commonwealth exercise.

A sense of fatality appears to have over-shadowed negotiations on Kashmir. On 26 December 1947 an 'agreement in principle' was announced about the alignment of the border between the Sinkiang region of China and that part of Kashmir whose defence, as described by the Chinese, was the responsibility of Pakistan. It was just one day previous to the ministerial talks between India and Pakistan to be held at Karachi. The leader of the Indian Delegation wasted no time in conveying India's resentment to the President of Pakistan. India lodged a formal protest both with Pakistan and China but to no effect.

Two months after, a formal agreement was concluded between Karachi and Peking and maps depicting the new Sino-Pakistani alignments of boundary were signed. According to Karachi there was a dispute over 3,400 square miles of territory between Pakistan and China. It was claimed that the agreement gave Pakistan 1,350 square miles and China 2,050 square miles of the disputed territory.

In a statement before Parliament on 5 March 1947, Jawaharlal's conclusions were different. He said that the parties had agreed "to delimit the boundary on the basis of the traditional, customary boundary line including natural

features", but the boundary fixed by the agreement did not in fact follow the customary boundary line. The dispute between Pakistan and China related to 2,100 square miles, out of which Pakistan conceded to China 1,600 square miles.

Whatever meagre chances of successful negotiations existed at the time were totally finished.

WHERE INDIA FAILED

THE first Prime Minister of India who presided over the destiny of the nation for over sixteen years and with no real deputy to share his power after Vallabhbhai Patel's death, Jawaharlal was bound to dominate all spheres of State activity. His long and illustrious career in the struggle for the country's freedom had given him a unique status. Kashmir affairs were Nehru's special preserve from the beginning. Policies concerning Kashmir were initiated by him, and whether it was Gopalaswami Ayyangar who handled Kashmir affairs at New Delhi and in the Security Council, or Krishna Menon who powerfully presented India's case at the United Nations, or myself, who was given a watching brief over the Ministers of Kashmir during the tumultuous days of Abdullah's first arrest, or Lal Bahadur Shastri who was assigned the task of giving a special 'deedar', the limits of their authority were laid down by Nehru. According to B. N. Mullik, when the Home Secretary and he had succeeded in convincing Lal Bahadur Shastri of the dangers of an adverse verdict inherent in the special 'deedar', Shastri was reported to have said that he was there to carry out Nehru's instructions and not ask him to review them.

A few months after Sheikh Abdullah's arrest in 1953, Jawaharlal Nehru made a proposal to the Informal Committee on Kashmir comprising Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, Rafi Ahmad

Kidwai, Mahavir Tyagi and myself, that the Sheikh might be released and given another chance. The Maulana reacted with unusual vehemence in Bakshi's support. He retorted that Bakshi deserved at least the same number of months as the Sheikh had been given years to consolidate his position. The matter ended there. Jawaharlal was mentally averse to detaining people without trial and over and over again, he would bring up the question of the Sheikh's release. But he yielded to the advice of his colleagues, except on two occasions — once in 1958 and again in 1964.

Nehru knew that the Sheikh had not shifted at all from his stand on Kashmir. When the Sino-Indian hostilities were at their height and the existence of the nation was in peril, the Sheikh wrote a nasty letter to Nehru from jail. He assailed Nehru for his faulty policies on Kashmir, and laid on India and Pakistan the responsibility to find a solution which was acceptable to India, Pakistan and the Kashmiri people. He did not care to define what would be acceptable to the Kashmiris. When the Sheikh put the same proposal to Ayub Khan, he rejected it without entering into arguments. The Sheikh had not put in the letter a single word of sympathy or sorrow for India or a word in condemnation of China.

The Sheikh was bumptious and crude. He looked with contempt on all Indian leaders with the possible exception of Nehru. He thought that they were inferior to him. He would show no regard either for the age or learning of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. In contrast, the Indian

leaders, especially Nehru, showed great courtesy to the Sheikh and his family. When the Sheikh was in prison, his son and the Begum could come and stay with Nehru. They spread all kinds of stories on their return to the Valley, but Nehru did not mind.

The Sheikh had no regard for law or rules. He addressed the Security Council from jail. He would smuggle out letters which were given wide publicity, but no restriction or check was put on his visitors. He could with impunity insult the prosecution lawyers, the presiding magistrate or the judge trying the conspiracy case, but was not punished for contempt of court. All this went to magnify the Sheikh's image in the eyes of the Kashmiri people. The Sheikh's followers kept alive the myth that he was born to rule Kashmir; no power could curb him. The Sadiq government and the opposition vied with one another in welcoming the Sheikh on his release in 1947.

The dual policy of prosecuting the Sheikh on the one side and lionising him on the other may have been good human relations, but it was bad politics. India's supporters could not be sure of their position. They were afraid that India would make up with the Sheikh. Compared to what happened then, Mrs. Indira Gandhi's clear-cut policy, which is neither vindictive nor over-generous, has tended to put Kashmir politics in its proper place. Making the propagation of secession a penal offence and requiring candidates for the Union and State Legislatures to swear "faith and allegiance to the Constitution

of India as by law established . . . (and) uphold the sovereignty and integrity of India" have brought about some sense of realism. The firm handling of persons, who though technically not guilty of an offence but who are covertly engaged in secessionist activities, is producing results. The latest example is the change in Moinuddin Karra's stand on a plebiscite.

Sheikh Abdullah was released from detention on 8 January 1958. Soon after his release, he again started his anti-Indian tirades. He accused India of being anti-Muslim, and said that Kashmir's accession to India was provisional. The only solution of the Kashmir problem was a plebiscite. He publicly announced that the invasion by tribesmen followed after the oppression of Muslims had started in Jammu. The State Government issued a warning to Abdullah to refrain from questioning the constitution of the State. This offended Abdullah. He said that after his arrest the Constituent Assembly, which had framed the Constitution, had lost representative character. The Constitution was a farce. He declared that "all those who supported the plebiscite were Kashmir's friends and all those who opposed it were its enemies". He tried to rouse religious frenzy and encouraged the forces of lawlessness. The Sheikh became the spearhead of subversive elements and the Kashmir Government arrested him again on 30 April 1958.

This time the Sheikh was not to be detained but proceeded against on a charge of conspiracy. Conspiracy cases are by nature complicated and difficult to establish. Every effort was made to

make sure there was a cast-iron case. Before the filing of the charge-sheet in the court, the Home Minister Govind Ballabh Pant, an able and shrewd lawyer, went through the whole evidence and the case was started only after he was satisfied. Several hundred documents, some using code words, were filed before the magistrate and explained to him. Large numbers of witnesses were produced, of which all save one who had been won over by the defence, withstood stiff cross-examination and provocative insinuations. The Sheikh and his co-accused spared no opportunity to interrupt the court proceedings. On every small matter they would go to the High Court or the Supreme Court and ask for an interim stay. Finally the magistrate committed the case to the Sessions Court.

All through, Mridula Sarabhai and her workers were stating in New Delhi that the responsibility for the delay lay on the prosecution which did not have a good case. At last the constant propaganda did its work and many M.Ps. who had formerly condemned the Sheikh's activities, wrote to the Prime Minister asking for his release. After the case had continued for five years, Nehru made an enquiry from the prosecuting counsel, and was told that the case might take three years more. Jawaharlal's patience was exhausted and he wanted to release the Sheikh, but once more he yielded to the opposition of the Kashmir leaders — Ghulam Mohammad, Mohammad Sadiq, D. P. Dhar and the Sadair-i-Riyasat.

Jawaharlal had suffered a mild heart attack in April 1947. When the Chinese attacked

India, he suffered the severest shock of his life at this betrayal by a friend. The debacle of the Indian forces in NEFA and their retreat in Aksai-Chin were unbearable humiliations to a proud man who had never met defeat. At Bhubaneswar, when the Indian National Congress was holding its annual session, Nehru suffered a severe heart attack on 6 January. Less than two months after Bhubaneswar, Nehru had a stroke on the left side. In May when Nehru, accompanied by his sister Vijayalakshmi and Padmaja Naidu, took breakfast at my ashram on their return journey from Dehra Dun to New Delhi, one could see that he was a finished man. I can never forget the pathetic voice in which he asked Vijayalakshmi whether he could have a second helping of his favourite sweet, jalebis.

New complications of major significance which, but for Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad's petulance, would not have affected Kashmir politics, were arising in India. Among Congressmen there was a strong feeling that the Congress governments had become prisoners of the official machinery. They had drifted away from the people. The day was not far off when the Congress would lose its popular hold. In the three bye-elections held about the middle of 1954, the Congress lost the seats of Amroha, Rajkot and Farrukhabad.

Two of these, namely, Amroha and Farrukhabad, were in U.P., where I was the President of the State Congress. Our candidates were top Congressmen — for Amroha, Hafiz Mohammad Ibrahim, who had been a popular Minister in the U.P. Government for over ten years and

was then a Union Cabinet Minister; and for Farukhabad, B. V. Keskar, a veteran Congressman, who had held offices in the organisation and had been a Union Minister. All through I was moving in one or the other of the constituencies but, to my sorrow, it was apparent that the Congress had lost its power over the people. A complete rot had set in, which called for an 'agonising reappraisal'. During the whole campaign, I never heard a word spoken against Mohammad Ibrahim or Keskar. Even so both of them lost heavily. I reported the situation to Nehru and the Congress President, K. Kamaraj.

Kamaraj had prolonged consultations with his colleagues and suggested to Nehru a programme, which came to be known as the 'Kamaraj Plan'. Who the real author of the plan has remained obscure. But its objectives were well understood. It was intended to retire senior leaders who had held office for a long while as Union Cabinet Ministers or as State Chief Ministers, so that they could devote their whole attention and time to the organisation. Nehru offered to retire but was persuaded by Congressmen to remain in office. As Nehru was receiving resignations from Central Ministers and State Chief Ministers, it looked as if some mysterious force was pushing Bakshi towards his political grave. Bakshi was not a primary member of the Congress. He belonged to the Kashmir National Conference, a friendly body sharing common ideas and aspirations with the Congress, not a subsidiary or associate body.

Bakshi displayed an unusual vigor, which later events showed was not quite genuine and

insisted on resigning from his office of Chief Minister. When someone raised the objection that he was not a primary member of the Congress, Bakshi got a membership form, filled it, signed it and paid his four-anna subscription. He took a used envelope and wrote his resignation on it. Jawaharlal had no desire to retire Bakshi, but was startled by this display. Bakshi assured Nehru that Mohammad Sadiq would succeed him as the leader of the party and he would get him elected unanimously. Bakshi went out of office at a time when an explosive situation in Kashmir was in the offing.

By the time Bakshi reached the Valley, he seems to have realised his folly and to have second thoughts. He began to waver and caused an inordinate delay in his successor's election, which gave an impression that he was trying to wriggle out of his commitment. Ghulam Mohammad's brother, Abdul Rashid, declared his candidature and asked for a free election as in the States of U.P. Bihar and Madhya Pradesh. Ghulam Mohammad did not do anything which could be interpreted as support of his brother's candidature, but there was no dearth of critics who believed that Rashid had been set up by him. Bakshi and Sadiq would not agree on the procedure for the formation of the new ministry. Sadiq wanted to exercise the right to recommend the names of ministers on his own. Bakshi insisted that the new ministers should be appointed after his approval. As there was no agreement, Bakshi got one of his stooges, Khwaja Shamsuddin, elected.

Shamsuddin was the Chief Minister of Kashmir on the fateful night of 26|27 December 1963 when the Moe-e-Muquddas was stolen while the Valley slept under a thick blanket of snow and the pilgrims had retired to *hujras*. Early next morning the side door of the passage and the locks of two inner door leading to the sanctuary were found broken. The five-inch long quartz tube containing the Prophet's hair was missing. The news of the theft spread like wild fire to all corners of the Valley. All roads in Kashmir lead to Srinagar and huge crowds began to converge on the city asking for the immediate restoration of the Holy Relic and the punishment of the thief. The town was sunk in deep mourning; all work was suspended; offices, courts, schools, shops, restaurants and cinemas closed.

A minor indiscretion of Abdul Rashid, General Secretary of the Kashmir National Conference, at Hazrat Bal turned the mob's fury against him. The police rescued him with great difficulty. The Bakshi brothers were declared guilty of perfidy by the yelling crowds who raided a hotel and a cinema owned by Bakshi Abdul Majid, another brother of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad. When the police intervened, the mob attacked them and set fire to the Kotibagh Police Station. The police had to open fire and three persons were killed. After some months when I visited the site, I saw the remnants of the Police Station. I was surprised that this had been done by the habitually mild Kashmiris.

During the nine days intervening between the theft and the recovery of the Holy Relic, the whole of India passed through a dreadful

time. The Valley was literally on fire. Kashmiris were in an angry mood and capable of doing anything. Pakistan began to fan anti-India propaganda. Unless the Moe-e-Muquddas was recovered, all the good work done by India in Kashmir would be lost. The following account of the happenings during this crucial period is based on my personal assessment of what a large number of persons, pro-Bakshi and pro-Sadiq, told me during my stay at Srinagar:

All through the critical period, vast groups of resentful and wailing men and women filled the streets of the town. Vehicular traffic was virtually at a stand-still. The few cars on the road carried black flags in token of mourning, but even that would not assure free movement. It was only with the permission of the Action Committee volunteers that a vehicle could move. As the military vehicles could not fly black flags, they had to be withdrawn from the road. Large crowds of country-folk carrying their food, bedding and splinters of wood for warming, were flocking into Srinagar streets. The temperature at night was some degrees below the freezing point but days were no better. The sun was mostly invisible. It was raining and snowing all the day. Several meetings were held every day, when the audience in their fifty thousand, sat on ice-blocks with snow flakes falling from above, listening for hours in devout attention to the haranguing of the Action Committee members.

The Action Committee had arisen out of nothing. It was like a wild growth which requires no seedling. Let by the Mir Waiz of Kashmir, Moulvi Farooq, it comprised anti-Indian and pro-Pakistani elements, that it, members of the Plebiscite Front, Karra's Political Front and Abdullah's Razakars. The Action Committee had become the de facto ruler of the Valley. It fixed hours for hartal and times for the opening and closure of grocery, meat and vegetable shop. It controlled movements in streets and fixed meetings. Anybody violating its orders was given rough and ready justice. It had opened *langars* (free kitchens) to feed outsiders. Shamsuddin and his Ministers were in the town but they were shut up in their homes and had not the courage to come out.

The Pakistan and Azad Kashmir Radios were feeding Kashmiris with inflammatory material. India was accused of manipulating the theft of the Holy Relic in order to demoralise and humiliate the Muslims of the valley. Her stooge, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, was proclaimed to be guilty of theft and his arrest was demanded, generally without naming him but on one or two occasions expressly by name. When the Action Committee was asked to supply the material justifying his arrest, they supplied nothing. The demand for Bakshi's arrest was followed by a demand for the Sheikh's release, who alone could recover the Holy Relic and punish guilty persons. Some posters suggested that the United Nations should intervene and conduct an inquiry

through six or seven Muslim countries including Pakistan.

The matter was one which concerned the whole Muslim world and India could not be trusted with it. The Kashmiris were asked to rise in revolt and break their chains of slavery. Pakistan had never met with such a success either by aiding the trival invasion or by infiltrating saboteurs or by instigating internal revolts.

Several alternatives including the imposition of President's Rule through the Sadar-i-Riyasat were considered but rejected for one reason or another. Mohammad Sadiq was asked to take over the administration of the State but he would not touch it before the recovery of the Holy Relic. The one thing that could save the situation was the Moe-e-Muquddas. But the search for the Hair was worse than searching for the proverbial needle in a haystack. Something mysterious, however, happened and at five o'clock on the evening of 4 January the Holy Relic was made to travel back to its abode in the same manner as it had disappeared — no one knows how. The recovery was announced to the world the same night through a broadcast on All India Radio. A wave of jubilation swept the Valley. There were mutual greetings of '*mubarak*'. The strike was called off, the shops opened and courts and offices began to work.

Pakistan was thus baulked of the prize which had appeared to be within her reach. Yet she would not admit defeat and played another card.

Both Pakistan and Azad Kashmir Radios sent out messages that the Moe-e-Muquddas produced by the Indian police was a fake and asked the Action Committee to renew the agitation. Not one member of the Action Committee had seen the Prophet's Hair closely but the Committee claimed the right to identify it. The Kashmir Government turned down the demand for a special "deedar" on the ground that the District Magistrate had already got the Relic identified according to law. The Action Committee once again became active and the Razakars put green badges on their arms.

Jawaharlal was worried that after all that India had done for Kashmir during fifteen years, its people could be stirred by flimsy propaganda to hysterical hatred against her. He thought that some radical change was called for. He decided upon a three-fold programme, viz. removal of Shamsuddin, release of the Sheikh and a special 'deedar'. Lal Bahadur Shastri, who had been re-appointed a Minister without portfolio, was deputed to go to Srinagar and hold a special 'deedar'.

On reaching Srinagar Shastri talked with the members of the Action Committee and made a compromise with them on the choice of identifiers. They were to be selected by him out of a list supplied by the Action Committee. But the Action Committee went back on its commitment and did not give the list. Lal Bahadur's future depended upon the successful identification of the Holy Relic and perhaps his luck helped in selecting good identifiers. As the hour of identification approached, Lal Bahadur was

seen sitting in a corner of the Hazrat Bal mosque. The fourteen holy men chosen to identify saw the Holy Relic and gave their verdict that the Relic was genuine. This ended the story of the theft of the Holy Relic but not of the woes of Kashmir.

Shamsuddin had no roots, and his displacement was easy enough. But who should succeed him? Bakshi stood thoroughly discredited by the happenings of the last two months. There was no one else of his group who could aspire for the office. Mohammed Sadiq alone was left in the field, but he could not be elected the leader of the party without Bakshi's support as his followers were in a majority in the State Assembly. Lal Bahadur Shastri was superb at evolving compromise formulae and he made both the Bakshi and Sadiq groups solemnly pledge that they would stand together. Sadiq received a consensus and was sworn in as Chief Minister. But the love affair was short-lived.

I had kept myself informed about developments in Kashmir. Shamlal Saraf, who had been a Minister in Kashmir, was in those days a member of Parliament. I had held several talks with him about the happenings in the State. The news reaching Delhi from the Valley was causing alarm and I asked him whether a visit by me could do any good. He knew of my long association with the Valley and welcomed the idea, but warned me to stay at a neutral place so that members of both groups could meet me. I talked to Lal Bahadur Shastri, who had succeeded Nehru as Prime Minister, and asked him how he liked the idea of my visit to the Valley. He sug-

gested that I might talk it over with D. P. Dhar, who was staying at the Kashmir Emporium in New Delhi. I met D. P. Dhar, who told me that he saw no harm in my going but would like to check up with Sadiq on the phone. Later I gathered that the Kashmir Government was not enthusiastic but would not misunderstand me, if I went there. I was offered State hospitality, but as it was a purely private visit, I decided to stay on my own in a houseboat.

My visit appeared to have evoked some interest, for when my plane landed at the Jammu airport, there were quite a few persons waiting for me. They took a promise from me that, on the return journey, I would spend a day at Jammu, which I did. At the Srinagar airport, I was surprised to find an unusually large number of M.L.As. and National Conference workers, who had come to greet me. I drove straight to my houseboat where groups of public men, pro-Bakshi and pro-Sadiq, began to pour in. The biggest among them was a batch of twenty-five pro-Bakshi legislators of Kashmir. Bakshi was in jail and they were a flock without a shepherd. They claimed to be honestly pro-India and complained that Sadiq had joined hands with Sheikh Abdullah. Sadiq and Abdullah had gone together in a car to the Mission School's Parents Day celebrations, and when the people shouted 'Sheikh Zindabad', the Chief Minister felt small.

Sadiq's men were accusing Bakshi and his brothers of amassing ill-earned wealth. They wanted Bakshi to be tried in a law court. Bakshi's supporters accused the Ministers of equally bad acts of dishonesty; the only persons who

escaped accusations were Mohammed Sadiq and Mir Qasim. In my diary for the day, I recorded that: "If all the charges of corruption, one against the other, by Kashmir politicians are summed up, Kashmir would be a cesspool of corruption".

One Ghulam Mohammad Sofi complained to me that about a month previously his house had been plundered in broad daylight but no police help was forthcoming. He had written to the Divisional Commissioner and the Deputy Inspector-General but even then no inquiry was made. He said that the doors and sills of his house had been removed by miscreants. I could not believe that such an act could take place in the heart of Srinagar city and went to the spot to verify the facts. Exaggerated reports about my activities reached Mohammad Sadiq and he sent Girdharilal Dogra and Mir Mohammad Qasim to meet me in the house-boat at about nine o'clock at night the next day. Mir Qasim told me that his men were perturbed over my receiving so many of their adversaries and in particular over my visit to Sofi's place. I told him that I had not invited anybody but if I refused to hear those who wanted to meet me, the object of my visit would be lost. I had heard those who met me but had not expressed myself. I had gone to Sofi's place to verify what appeared to be unbelievable.

I met the Sadar-i-Riyasat, Yuvaraj Karan Singh, who received me with an open heart and a jovial smile. He was wise beyond his years. He told me that in deciding on the arrest of Bakshi, the choice before them was between democracy

in reality, as against a democracy in form. If Bakshi was not arrested, the consequence to democracy would be disastrous. Sadiq was not a stickler for office. He was not keen to remain the Chief Minister and would prefer the imposition of President's rule straight away. Karan Singh was genuinely averse to President's rule. He thought that if matters were handled a little more cautiously, the Cabinet expanded and rigidity of behaviour relaxed, Bakshi could be rendered harmless. He ruled out a rapprochement between Sadiq and Bakshi and suggested that Bakshi be given some assignment outside the State. The National Conference was finished as a political body and could not be revived. The Indian National Congress should immediately set up a unit in the Valley.

Shamlal Saraf had fixed a programme for the third day to take me out to the countryside but before he could arrive, a State Minister came and said that Saraf's engagement was cancelled and he himself would accompany me on a tour of the Valley. We drove to village Pattan and the towns of Sheopuri and Baramula. At Pattan, the villagers came out in a crowd and someone asked me rather rudely why I had come to the Valley. I replied coolly: "Just the anxiety of a friend to see how the people of Kashmir were doing". He was calmed by the reply though, I believe, not quite satisfied. At Sheopuri and Baramula, the local officials had arranged meetings and some of those present—Muslim and Hindu—spoke about the virtues of the Sadiq administration, but the majority remained silent. Anybody with a discerning eye

could see that all was not well in the Valley. The Sheikh was a powerful factor and he was not reconciled.

The following is a summary of my impressions of three days' talks with people of different shades of opinion in Kashmir, which has been pieced together from my notes:

The position in the Valley was more intriguing than what we in Delhi thought it to be. There were at least three important groups—pro-Bakshi group, pro-Sadiq group and Abdullah's Plebiscite Front, Farooq having become a virtual part of it. The Hindus felt panicky but were busy making money. The Bakshi brothers were openly charged with corruption, but that Bakshi wielded influence among the Hindus of the Valley and Jammu and a section of the Muslims admits of no doubt. Opinion on the stability of the Sadiq government was divided. It had yet to dig in its toes. The best that Syed Mir Qasim, Gir-dharilal Lal Dogra and Mir Abdul Sammad could claim was that given six months of a free hand, the National Conference would come up and Sadiq would stabilise. Kashmiri MLAs were thoroughly unreliable. They were constantly changing sides between Bakshi and Sadiq. Some of them said with glee and pride that, till the other day, they were with Bakshi, but now they were with Sadiq. The atmosphere was vitiated and few persons could be depended upon. The Sheikh had not a bit changed his anti-India stance.

On return, I gave a faithful account of what I had seen to Lal Bahadur Shastri, but made no written report to save him embarrassment.

On 5th April 1964, the Chief Minister issued a press note withdrawing the conspiracy case against Sheikh Abdullah. It was issued without consulting the Union Government; at any rate Lal Bahadur Shastri did not know of it. Perhaps Sadiq wanted to have a monopoly of credit for an inevitable act. The prosecuting staff was thrown into complete disarray. Years of their labour had come to naught, though they had a premonition of what was going to happen. They knew that they would no longer be able to protect witnesses who had come forward at considerable risk to make depositions against the Sheikh.

Sheikh Abdullah's release was a matter of days. His entry into the Valley was hailed by a grand welcome—like Napoleon's return from Elba. Huge arches were put up to welcome him. Large crowds gathered in villages and by the roadside to greet the 'Lion of Kashmir'. The Sheikh had won and his enemies had lost. He was the same old Sheikh and soon began to reorganise the Plebiscite Front for anti-India propaganda. Nehru invited him to Delhi. Nehru took special care that nothing was done which might irritate the Sheikh. He was able to meet anybody he wanted to, including the Pakistan High Commissioner. He could, if he liked, go on a visit to Pakistan.

The Sheikh and Afzal Beg went to Pakistan and met General Mohammad Ayub Khan. The

General has recorded his impression of the visit in 'Friends Not Masters'. He thought that the Sheikh and Mirza had been sent by Nehru to probe into the possibilities of a settlement. However, when they talked of a confederation between India, Pakistan and Kashmir, Ayub rejected it as fantastic. The General appears to have set his mind on a military solution. Ayub writes that "they (Abdullah and Beg) left me in no doubt that their future was linked with Pakistan". Jawaharlal died of heart failure on May 27 and on hearing of the death, the Sheikh rushed back to India. He joined Nehru's funeral procession but remained unreconciled to the India for which Nehru had lived and died.

THE MILITARY DICTATORS OF PAKISTAN

MILITARY dictators the world over, because of their faith in the use of force and training in arms, are prone to seek military solutions for their problems. Generals are often good at fighting but, with a few exceptions, they have been failures at the negotiating table, Pakistan had been under the rule of two military dictators—General Mohammad Ayub Khan and General Yahya Khan—for fully thirteen years. And that spans two Indo-Pakistani wars fought in

General Ayub was popular with the Americans. In their programme of foreign aid, the Americans were not swayed by any ideological bias. Civilian governments and military dictatorships were equally welcome to them. One school of American thought believed that the true criterion was which government could hold a society together during a period of transition. They thought that civilian governments tended to be soft and unstable whereas military governments could provide the security necessary for economic growth. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. has quoted a former American diplomat as saying: "Consider what Ayub Khan achieved in Pakistan against what Nehru did for India". This attitude seems to have remained unaltered since. Said President Nixon in his Report to the Congress (February) that "We are prepared now for a serious dialogue with India

on the future of our relations.... This will depend not on an identity of policies, but on respect for each other's views and concerns."

When the Sino-Indian hostilities had come to an end, after the unilateral withdrawal of the Chinese forces twenty kilometres to the north and east of the line of actual control, General Ayub Khan felt that the Western Bloc led by the U.S. and U.K. had let him down. They had not put enough pressure on India to settle the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan. The Pakistan Representative at the U.N. Agha Shahi, at one time complained that: "SEATO did not even lift a finger to do anything when Pakistan came under attack in 1947. SEATO members were under an obligation to consult together, if any of them was attacked by a non-communist power. So we are utterly disillusioned with these military pacts". The Western Powers were not prepared to give India the impression that they were out to exploit her difficulties. However, America had made it clear to India that a long-term programme of aid would depend upon the conditions prevailing in South Asia.

In a mood of frustration, General Ayub began a fresh reappraisal of Pakistan's foreign policy. He turned his attention first to China and decided upon what he called the normalisation of Pakistan's relations with China. In this process, however, he did not want to antagonise the U.S. which was Pakistan's main source of weapon supplies. "Her (Pakistan's) entire armed strength depended on the United States, which also supplied an estimated 40 per cent of Pakistan's annual budget". It was tight-rope walking,

no doubt, but Pakistani leaders did it with exquisite skill. General Ayub Khan writes that the Chinese have a "feeling that the United States, in collaboration with the Soviet Union, are trying to draw a ring round China so as to contain and isolate her. Now, if Pakistan were to join in any such arrangement either with the Soviet Union or with the United States of America, then the relationship would collapse. So we have to convince the Chinese that we are not in the market for any such deal". Thus began the process of achieving a close Sino-Pakistani friendship, without losing America's support. India was worried by the new entente.

The link-up started with the signing of an air transport agreement, which would allow Pakistan to avail herself of two air services—one from Dacca through Shanghai to Tokyo, and the other from Lahore or Karachi to any point in China. China was given reciprocal facilities to run air services to Pakistan. Later, in 1919, two agreements covering radio photo and photo services were signed by the two dominant news agencies of Pakistan and China. Pakistan fell in line with China in the matter of signing the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. In February 1964, Chou En-lai landed at Karachi with a massive entourage. He praised Pakistan's economic development and signed a joint communique declaring that: "The Kashmir dispute would be resolved in accordance with the wishes of the people of Kashmir as pledged to them by India and Pakistan". China gave active help to Pakistan in training guerillas and planning their tactics.

Pakistan began to bring about a rapprochement between China and the Islamic countries of the Middle East where Peking and Moscow were both wooing Muslims. How far it was due to Pakistan's efforts may not be clear but Turkey, a NATO and CENTO member, decided to recognise the Peking regime. In 1947, General Ayub paid a visit to China and was warmly welcomed. Two new pacts—one on border protocol and the other on cultural relations—were thereafter signed at Rawalpindi by the two countries. General Ayub's Foreign Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was a great admirer of China and believed that there was nothing wrong in normalising relations with a neighbour which happened to be the largest in Asia. "We do it because it is in Pakistan's interest to normalise its relations with China" asserted Bhutto. The new strategy paid off and after the 1947 war, China became the next most important source, after the United States, of arms supply including MiG 19s and T-59 tanks to Pakistan.

The U.S. did not relish Pakistan's love affair with China and two American officials of some importance — George Ball and Philips Talbot — were sent to Pakistan to dissuade her. But the political ties between Pakistan and China had already stretched too far.

Ayub Khan was also determined to pull down the barrier built over decades between Pakistan and the USSR. Since Pakistan's birth, the two countries had known each other only through the United Nations and, even there, they were ranged on opposite sides. Russia was deeply hurt when Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact

which was obviously directed against her. Many people in Pakistan looked with deep suspicion on the Soviet cult of Communism.

In April 1947, General Ayub Khan accompanied by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, went to Moscow to repair the long-standing damage to Soviet-Pakistan relations. They began somewhat haltingly. About the first meeting with the Soviet leaders on 3rd April 1947, Ayub has recorded that: "We had a formal conference in Mr. Kosygin's office on a bitterly cold and gloomy afternoon. Mr. Kosygin had Mr. Polyansky, Mr. Gromyko and some other members of the government with him. The atmosphere inside the room was no less cold in spite of central heating. The Soviet delegation looked stolid and sullen".

The central theme of Ayub's talk was India. He expressed extreme displeasure at the supply of American arms to India which, he feared, would be used against his country. Ayub showed some understanding of the arms supplied by the Soviet Union, accepting that the latter did not want to leave India wholly in the orbit of the U.S. Whatever were the motives, said Ayub Khan, India had benefited from both arms supplies which augmented her firm stand in not resolving the Kashmir dispute. Ayub complained that the Soviet Union had, all through, been bailing out India in the Security Council by the exercise of her veto.

Ayub Khan made it clear that Pakistan's membership of the U.S.-sponsored pacts did not mean that she would join in any aggression against Soviet Russia but it was meant to ensure her own security against aggression by India. He

regretted his country's role in permitting the establishment of the U-2 base at Peshwar. Thereupon, the Soviet leaders began to show an understanding of Pakistan's stance. Ayub returned satisfied with the visit and recorded: "I think there was general recognition on both sides that the meeting might prove a turning point in our relations and that there were tremendous possibilities of co-operation. I found the Soviet leaders extremely knowledgeable. They were courteous, polite and hospitable but firm on their basic assumptions. I venture to think that they recognised our sincerity and came to have a better appreciation of our position".

These talks were followed by an agreement between the two countries for the supply of machinery to improve civil aviation facilities in Pakistan which, in financial terms was not much but in terms of psychology meant a great deal. Ayub's Moscow visit paid dividends. For some years, the Soviets supplied arms to Pakistan to try and wean her away from China, but the attempt failed. During the Indo-Pakistan war, at the Tashkent peace negotiations, and later till the Indo-Soviet Treaty of 'Peace, Friendship and Cooperation' was signed in 1947, the Soviets had played at being friends of both India and Pakistan.

General Ayub Khan had won the 1947 general election by defeating Miss Fatimah Jinnah, sister of the founder of Pakistan, and it was feared that he might use his mandate to precipitate a military crisis. The Pakistani leaders felt sure that they could go ahead with their schemes against India.

Pakistan began her operations against India early in 1947. Her forces intruded into a portion of India's border territory in the Rann of Kutch. The Rann is inhospitable and uninhabited, a marshy area of salt wastes measuring about 3,500 square miles lying along the borders of India's State of Gujarat and Pakistan's province of Sind. A small portion of this area had, since Independence, been under dispute between India and Pakistan. When I visited the Rann, I was left with no doubt that it was of little economic or strategic value and certainly not worth a war. Pakistan's action was in the nature of a trial ball in a cricket match to test one's own bowling and the opponent's batting. Militarily, Pakistan wanted to judge how her soldiers would handle the sophisticated weapons supplied by the United States. Politically, she wanted to assess America's tolerance of the use against India of weapons which were meant for use only against communist aggression. Pakistan could also test the mettle of the Indian soldiery.

In the Rann, Pakistan had lured India into a difficult logistical position. She blasted posts deep inside Indian territory. For some time it looked as if the hostilities might spread along the Indo-Pakistan international boundary. Indian troops were alerted in the Punjab. But the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, intervened and at the Shastri-Ayub meeting during the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in June, an agreement was reached and a cease-fire imposed from the first of July in the Rann of Kutch. The status quo ante as on the first of

January was to be restored. The dispute was then referred to a tribunal.

While the agreement to refer the Kutch dispute to the World Court was being negotiated, Pakistan mounted its activities against the Kashmir CFL. In the first three weeks of April, Pakistan violated the CFL 200 times. In May, India reported no less than 339 violations of the CFL by Pakistan to the Chief of the UN Military Observers in Kashmir, the deceased General R. H. Nimmo. Since January last, General Nimmo had received 2,239 complaints of cease-fire violations from both sides. On investigation, he confirmed 377 violations of all categories, of which 218 were committed by Pakistan and 159 by India. When Indian complained of aggression, Pakistan refuted the charge by alleging that the guerillas were local insurgents in revolt against India's oppressive rule.

Impartial evidence was, however, heavily weighted against Pakistan. General Nimmo, who had investigated complaints on the guerilla activities, reported to the UN Secretary-General, U Thant, that Pakistani infiltrators were active behind the CFL on the Indian side. The Secretary-General decided to publish the report but had to change his mind when Pakistan threatened to leave the United Nations if the report was given publicity. The Secretary-General has recorded that: "General Nimmo had indicated to me that the series of violations that began on August 5 were, to a considerable extent, in subsequent days in the form of armed men, generally not in uniform, crossing the CFL from the Pakistan side for the purpose of armed action on the

Indian side". The blackmail paid. When the report was sent to the Security Council on 3 September, India and Pakistan had gone to war. "In this respect, the UN failed again to serve as an impartial fact-finding body at a time when these services were urgently needed."

The mass incursion of Pakistani guerillas and saboteurs on the Indian side of the CFL had begun on 5 August. These people had been trained near Murree under the charge of the Commander of the 12th Infantry Division of Pakistan. Their arms bore the marks of the Pakistan Army. The Sada-e-Kashmir Radio was set up at Khari near Muzaffarabad to call upon the Kashmiri to help Razakars and Mujahids. Within days, a number of bridges, schools, panchayat ghars and villages in the Valley were set ablaze. Many places of worship were fired upon. On 14 August, a whole mohalla of three hundred dwelling houses on the outskirts of Srinagar was reduced to ashes. However, the infiltrators failed to invoke the widespread local response without which guerilla activities lose their force. Many guerillas and saboteurs were caught by the people and handed over to the Indian Army or to the local militia.

The Pakistan Army in sizable strength crossed the CFL and launched an attack near Bhimbar. The Indian forces retaliated by attacking north-west of the CFL in the Tithwal sector and occupying two strategic positions which sealed the infiltrators' route to the Valley. On 23 August, the Defence Minister of India confidentially informed Parliament that the enemy's artillery offensive in the Chamb and Tithwal sectors

had failed after the enemy had suffered heavy casualties. The Indian Army was entrenched along the CFL. In the Uri sector, the jawans had consolidated a number of key positions and crossed the CFL to the Pakistani side. The Haji Pir Pass, a highly strategic point on the Uri-Poonch road, and one of the main invasion routes from Pakistan, was in our possession. Upset by these losses, Pakistan launched a major offensive. What had begun as guerilla activity developed into an Indo-Pakistani war.

On the morning of the first September, after an hour-long shelling, the main attack in two brigade strength and a hundred tanks, two-thirds of which were American-made Pattons, was launched in the Chamb area. The Indian forces were out-numbered by six to one and had to retreat. The object of the enemy offensive was to cut the supply line to Jammu. If this plan had succeeded, the Indian forces would have been bottled up in the upper regions of Jammu and the Valley.

The terrain was difficult, but still capable of being defended, as was later shown by the experience of the 1919 war. May be that in 1919, we were not well prepared. India was left with no option but to forestall Pakistan's air offensive by launching an air attack on the Pakistan forces at Chamb. By the evening on the first day of the war, twenty-eight British-made Vampires had strafed and bombed the invading forces and destroyed 13 enemy tanks and several armoured vehicles. Pakistan brought into battle Sabre jet fighters which were confronted by India's small but highly manoeuvrable Gnats. The Gnat has

won a world-wide reputation. By 4 September, the Pakistan Army had cut a salient 18 to 20 miles deep into Jammu and the next day it reached the vicinity of Akhnoor where a bridge on the Chenab was the only road link with Naushera, Rajouri and Poonch. The new road to Naushera, which proved of high strategic value in the 1919 war, had not been built then. Pakistan was jubilant and her Commander-in-Chief, General Musa, told the troops: "You have got your teeth into him. Bite deeper and deeper until he is destroyed. And destroy him you will".

Any wavering at this crucial hour would have been fatal and the Indian Government authorised the Army to open new fronts in the Sialkot and Lahore sectors to relieve the pressure of enemy forces on the Chamb-Jaurian sector. Lal Bahadur Shastri told Parliament that: "When our Generals consulted the Government about the situation, I told them firmly that there was no room for indecision, that they must go ahead, and not flinch."

On 6 September, along a 30-mile long international border, the Indian forces mounted a three-pronged attack from Gurudaspur, Amritsar and Ferozepur. The Amritsar column reached Burki, a heavily defended town on the bank of the concrete-cemented Ichhogil canal, an irrigation-cum-protective work. The Gurudaspur column crossed the Ichhogil Canal and reached the Bata shoe factory on the outskirts of Lahore, but was beaten back to the east of the canal after suffering heavy losses. The next day, the Indian forces made another thrust towards Sialkot, which had the desired effect of forcing the with-

drawal of Pakistani armoured forces from the Chamb-Jaurian sector to halt India's new offensive in the Sialkot sector. Thus, India's life-line to Kashmir was saved though it raised a storm all the world over against India, for she was accused of violating the international border and of committing aggression against Pakistan.

The two highlights of the war were the tank battles in the Khem Karan and Sialkot sectors. On learning of the Ferozpur column's advance towards Kasur, Pakistan moved its first armoured division, comprising 225 tanks, towards the Indian border to beat her offensive. The Indian tanks were out-numbered. But the Indians enticed the Pakistani division deep into their territory and fell back 15 miles inside to the village of Assal Karan. Then the Indians cut the dykes and flooded the area to slow down the movement of the heavy Pattons on the marshy ground. The Indian tanks concealed in ambush behind the sugarcane fields, took the enemy by surprise. Not less than two-fifths of Pakistan's tanks were maimed or destroyed. A group of State Governors, of whom I was one, who had been invited to the frontier, was taken round by General Dhillon to the graveyard of the Patton tanks.

About the same time the biggest tank battle since the Second World War, deploying over a thousand tanks, was fought in the Sialkot region. It went on for fully fifteen days until the cease-fire was announced. The Indian jawans reached the outskirts of Sialkot and cut the railway track. They dug in about 400 yards from the city and were on the point of encircling it. Both at Khem

Karan and Sialkot, Pakistan used the latest Pattons with a longer ranger higher fire power and easier manoeuvrability, while our tanks were Second World War vintage — Centurions and Shermans. The defeat of the Pattons caused serious concern to the Americans.

When the India-Pakistan war was at its height, China accused India of putting up over 50 installations in Tibet and stealing several hundred Tibetan yaks — a fantastic charge, as if India was itching to open a second front with China when she was locked in combat with Pakistan. On 16 September, Peking peremptorily asked New Delhi to withdraw her installations and restore the yaks within 72 hours, a period which was extended by another 72 hours. But when India denied the charge and declared her resolve to face the consequences, the bluff was called off under the clumsy face-saving excuse that India had dismantled the installations. The truth is that the installations had neither been put up nor demolished. The accusations against India did demonstrate to Pakistan China's solicitude for her.

The poor countries of the world cannot afford the luxury of a modern war. When they fight, they do so at the cost of their economic development. Their wars are fought mostly with imported weapons, supplies from the super powers — America and Soviet Russia, and to some extent from China. Their fighting capability is naturally limited. When the super powers desire smaller nations to stop fighting, they withhold arms supplies. America had banned the supply of arms to India and Pakistan at the outbreak

of hostilities. Pakistan was almost wholly dependent for weaponry on America. For India, the 1962 Sino-Indian war had been a shock and had compelled her to develop an armament industry, which was in its infancy during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war. Both India and Pakistan suffered heavy losses in men, tanks and planes. Their estimates have differed but there is little doubt that Pakistan suffered heavier losses than us. According to the Institute of Strategic Studies, London, India lost 4,000 men — dead and wounded. Pakistan's loss was about 5,000.

The Soviet Union, which had for some years played a friendly role towards India in UN, counselled her to stop fighting. Russia's official news organ 'Pravda' and her news agency 'Tass' made an open appeal saying that the Indo-Pakistan conflict did no good to anyone and should be ended. The Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin wrote to Shastri Ayub Khan that the hostilities benefitted only those powers which were interested in disrupting the Asian unity. When the proposal for a cease-fire came before the Security Council, the Soviet Union gave it full support.

The Secretary-General of the United Nations paid two visits to India to counsel peace. Both the US and U.K. advised India and Pakistan to accept the cease-fire. Though the tide of war had turned in her favour, India had begun to feel the pinch of economic pressure. Ayub Khan showed a spirit of realism and remarked that "this business of taking bits of each other's territory is not the answer." The Security Council climaxed its effort by passing a third resolution demanding a cease-fire from both countries, with-

drawal of their armed forces to positions held before the start of hostilities and an agreement to negotiate a political settlement. At that time India held 740 square miles of Pakistani territory and Pakistan 210 square miles of Indian territory. The proposal for a cease-fire was accepted by India and Pakistan. It became operative on 23 August. The greatest beneficiary from it was the Soviet Union whose dominant position in Asian affairs was recognised.

Kosygin made repeated proposals to Lal Bahadur and Mohammad Ayub to hold peace talks at Tashkent. Lal Bahadur, who had publicly declared that Kashmir would not be discussed and that the Indian forces would not withdraw from the recaptured areas of Kashmir, had to relent. Both Shastri and Ayub went to Tashkent as guests of the Soviet Union. On 10 January 1965, the Tashkent Declaration was signed and a communique issued saying that "all armed personnel of the two countries shall be withdrawn not later than February 25, to the posts they held prior to August 25, 1965; that both the sides shall observe the cease-fire terms and cease-fire line; and that the two countries agree to re-establish diplomatic relations and to consider measures for restoring economic and cultural relations". Lal Bahadur asked his family on the telephone about the reactions of the agreement in India and died of shock when he was told that they were not favourable.

The worst legacy of the Second World War was the arms race between the super powers and their desire to bring satellites into the orbit of their influence. America had built a formid-

able war industry which she was not prepared to disband. The Pentagon invented the device of declaring surplus weapons, which were supplied to America's allies at book value. This was a throw-away price. When America undertook to supply heavy weapons valued at 15 million dollars in 1919, estimates of their real value differed and some persons put the price at ten times the book value. To mollify the critics American officials described the deal as a 'one-shot affair'. Another equally dubious method of arms supplies was through third parties. It meant that the arms supplied to one country could be diverted with America's consent or connivance to another. In this manner F-86 Sabre jets were transferred to Pakistan by Germany and Iran. Libya and Jordan are two other countries which have earned a doubtful reputation for supplying American arms to Pakistan.

The Soviet Union did not lag behind America and entered the race to supply arms to her satellites. The Arab-Israeli war of 1919 was fought by Egypt with Soviet weapons and by Israel with American weapons. The Soviet Union won tremendous influence among the Arab countries while America's policy of support to Israel had virtually isolated her from the Arabs. If America lost Pakistan her loss of influence in Asia would be irretrievable. America took a decision to lift the ban on arms supplies to India and Pakistan. Although the decision appeared to be fair to both the countries on the surface, the real beneficiary was Pakistan.

During the Sino-Indian conflict America had supplied arms to India but the supply compris-

ed communication equipments, mortars, mountain howitzers, winter clothing and medicines to improve the Indian soldiers' capability to withstand the rigours of exhausting Himalayan altitudes. All these wares were worth 83 million dollars. As against this supply, America had given Pakistan, on a grant basis, weapons valued at 730 million dollars which included sophisticated items like F-104 Star fighters, B-57 bombers and Patton tanks. One thing was clear, namely that since 1919, America's policy had been directed towards modernising and strengthening Pakistan's armed forces.

At a rough estimate, the 1919 war had left Pakistan with about 500 American-made tanks, some of which had been damaged. Others had been rendered inoperative for want of spare parts. Pakistan continued the pressure on America to lift the ban on arms supplies. In early 1919 the US decided to sell non-lethal weapons to India and Pakistan either on credit or for cash. In 1919 the US further liberalised the policy of arms supply by throwing open sales of spare parts for weapons supplied earlier. Pakistan could thus repair her weapons of American origin and put them on a war footing.

Pakistan did not dry up other sources of arms supply. In 1919 she received at least five squadrons of MiG 19 fighters and fighter-bombers and 200 Chinese tanks, sufficient to equip two new divisions. She also imported a number of T.54/55 tanks from the Soviet Union. On 9 August 1919, the Defence Minister of India gave Parliament his assessment of the military situation and said that Pakistan had recouped her

losses in arms and equipment sustained in

India was also alert. She went ahead in building up her weapon production potential and made purchases from the Soviet Union and the U.K. and to a smaller extent from non-Communist countries like France, Canada, Australia and Japan. India did not gain any benefit from the lifting of the ban on spare parts by the US as almost all her equipment was of non-American origin. The possibility of another Indo-Pakistan war had become a reality.

Nations expect speedy results from their military dictators. When the latter fail in their objective, they fall precipitately. Ayub Khan had waged a war against India but had failed to defeat her. He put on a brave face and wanted his people to believe that his army had come out victorious, but the facts were too obvious. Ayub Khan's prestige in the western wing had sunk low. He was even more unpopular in the East where he had lost heavily to Miss Fatima Jinnah in the general election.

There was deep-rooted resentment in the eastern wing against the ruling junta of Pakistan. The Bengalis felt that they were being exploited economically and politically by the Punjabis. Ayub Khan went to Dacca and ordered the arrest of Mujibur Rahman and other Awami League leaders. He prosecuted them on a charge of criminal conspiracy to overthrow the government established by law, with the aid of India. This case came to be popularly known as the 'Agartala conspiracy case'. However, hardly any reliable evidence of value was forthcoming.

Throughout the east wing there was a clamorous demand for the withdrawal of the conspiracy case and for the release of Mujibur Rahman. Large crowds came out into the streets to demonstrate. The police fired on them in Dacca and Narainganj inflicting heavy casualties. But the agitation showed no signs of slackening and Ayub Khan had to yield to popular demand. He withdrew the case and released Mujib. He then called a round-table conference for a political settlement. In this, delegates of the east wing put forward a demand for regional autonomy. This upset the military junta and the big businessmen, who were afraid that it would mean the loss of the eastern market to them. They would not yield and the conference ended in failure.

Resentment against Ayub's regime was mounting and he had to give place to a younger and more sprightly General, Mohammad Yahya Khan. Ayub met the fate of Iskander Mirza, whom he had not only driven out of office but also out of politics. After his resignation, Ayub lived in obscurity.

East Bengal had a feeling that it was being treated as a colony of West Pakistan. The per capita income in the east wing during the decade had gone up only by one half of the increase in the west. The bulk of foreign economic aid was channeled to West Pakistan. East Bengal earned between 50 to 60 per cent of the total foreign exchange of Pakistan mostly by exporting tea and jute, but the bulk of the earnings went to the west. East Bengal was a captive market for the high-cost manufactur-

ed goods of Punjab and Sind. The East Bengal share in civil and military services was notional, about 5 per cent. Only West Pakistan's stooges from the east were appointed to political offices.

Both in India and Pakistan there had been a change of leadership. In India it came about on the death of Lal Bahadur Shastri, who was succeeded as Prime Minister by Mrs Indira Gandhi, daughter of Jawaharlal Nehru. In Pakistan, Ayub Khan had lost his hold and was succeeded by General Yahya Khan as Military Dictator in early 1919. Yahya Khan made a start with the policy of the carrot and the stick. He superceded the National Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies and declared Martial Law throughout the country. However, he promised that the general election in Pakistan would be completed by December of the following year, and power handed over to the elected representatives of the people.

The people of the east kept their patience and waited for the election. In November 1919, East Bengal was affected by one of the severest cyclones within living memory, which cost about a quarter of a million lives. The world community came forward generously to help the cyclone-affected people by way of relief and rehabilitation. But West Pakistan showed a cynical unconcern for their suffering. There was maldistribution of relief and large sums were suspected to have been misappropriated. The east was seething with discontent.

The election was held as scheduled. It was free and fair. In the east wing, Mujibur Rahman's party, the Awami League, swept the polls

and won 167 out of 169 seats. It formed an absolute majority in the National Assembly with its 312 members. In the west the gains of Bhutto's Peoples Party were impressive but not so massive as Mujib's in the east. The People's Party won 80 out of 140 seats and was the second biggest party in the country. Yahya Khan summoned a session of the National Assembly for 3 March. Its first task would be to frame a constitution for Pakistan. But the West Pakistani oligarchy, comprising politicians and the '22 families' of fabulously rich industrialists, was thrown off its feet. They knew that the installation of the Awami League and its leader, Mujibur Rahman into power would cost them their hold in the east. They pressurised Ayub Khan, who yielded and postponed the National Assembly session.

Mujibur Rahman had fought the election on a programme which called for a parliamentary majority rule based on adult franchise, prevention of the flight of capital from one wing of Pakistan to another and elimination of economic disparities between the two wings. East Bengal would have a para-military force of its own. The power of taxation would vest in the federating units, and the federal government would handle only two matters—Defence and Foreign Affairs. The door to further negotiations was not closed and when Yahya Khan flew to Dacca, Mujib negotiated with him. He made no demand for independence and stated that some kind of a loose federation was acceptable to the east.

East Bengal was infuriated by the postpone-

ment of the National Assembly session. It had almost reached the verge of disintegration and chaos, when Mujib gave a call for a general strike in the east. He asked the people to be non-violent and not to cooperate with the military rulers of the west. Thousands of young Bengalis—students, professors, professionals and intellectuals—took to the streets. There was confrontation with the police and the army and large numbers of people were killed. Mujib organised a complete boycott against the western rulers. From the vegetable vendor and the *panwala* in the street to the Chief Justice of the High Court, nobody would cooperate with the Pakistani officials. The Governor-designate could not be sworn into office because the Chief Justice would not administer the oath. General Tikka Khan was then made the Martial Law Administrator, but that did not improve the situation. Non-cooperation was a heritage left by the great saint, Gandhi, to the people of South Asia. It was a complete success. The West Pakistanis were baffled. They did not know how to deal with it.

Yahya Khan flew to Dacca. Bhutto also arrived there. For about two weeks Yahya Khan put up a show of holding negotiations with Mujibur Rahman while the military was building up a strength of three to four divisions. On the night of 25th March the negotiations were abruptly broken off and in the middle of the night Yahya Khan flew back to Islamabad, leaving the military to unleash a reign of terror. Then it was all murder, arson and rape. The Hindu minority was made the special victim of

the army's wrath. It was the worst genocide ever known to mankind.

There is a limit to human suffering and the non-violent non-cooperation collapsed. The slim Bengalis, scantily dressed in shirt and lungi, and barefooted, rushed to improvised training centres and for fully six months bore the brunt of the fighting against Pakistan's mighty military machine. When the rains came, the Pakistan Army and its heavy weapons were confined to the cities and towns and more and more of the countryside fell under the influence of the Mukti Bahini, as the guerilla force had come to be known. The number of persons killed is not known but according to reliable estimates it would be anything between one half to one million. There were mass murders of men and women. There is hardly a town in the east wing, which had been in the occupation of the army, where thousands of dead bodies and skeletons have not been exhumed. Ten million residents of East Bengal, mostly Hindus, were made to cross the border into the neighbouring Indian states of West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya and Tripura.

India was faced with an agonising dilemma. If she did not act, the burden cast on her by the refugees would disrupt her economy and might explode in a countrywide communal holocaust. She was forced to create conditions for the return of the refugees to their homeland. The refugees made it quite clear that they would not return so long as their oppressor, the Pakistani Army, was in East Bengal. The Prime Minister of India went to Europe and America re-

questing the governments of some leading countries to use their good offices to persuade the Pakistan Government to withdraw its army from the east, so that the refugees could return to East Bengal. But the response was meagre. The pre-conditions for another Indo-Pakistani war were thus created.

In the previous Indo-Pakistani wars, East Bengal had remained outside the arena of military operations. One of the reasons was that it was more than a thousand miles from the major scene of hostilities. Besides there were differences in the emotional, linguistic, racial and cultural make-up of the Bengali people and the people of West Pakistan. The Kashmir problem had never moved Bengalis emotionally as it had the Punjabis and the Pathans. In the east wing, people had never raised the slogan of jihad. The 1971 war was, however, a different affair. It broke out in the east and later travelled to the west wing.

During the rains it pours in East Bengal and every streamlet swells into a mighty river. The Himalayan rivers bring down large quantities of water and silt and convert the flat plains into a slushy pool. This hampers the manoeuvrability of regular troops—tanks, gun carriages and armoured vehicles. The Pakistan Army was hoping that once the rains were over and the ground had hardened, they would fan out and teach the rebels a lesson. They did not know that the Mukti Bahini had by then grown into a sizeable force.

On 25 November, General Yahya Khan warned a distinguished gathering at a state ban-

quiet that in a few days he might not be there, in Rawalpindi, but fighting a war at the front. The General was tragically prophetic and at dusk on 3 December while the President of India and Members of Parliament were celebrating the silver jubilee of the Public Accounts Committee in Parliament House, the Prime Minister of India was on a tour of the border areas and the Defence Minister was out of the capital, Yahya Khan ordered a pre-emptive attack, on the pattern of the Israelis in the six-day war of 1967, on Indian airfields, with French-made Mirages, US built F-104 Star-fighters, F-86 Sabre jets and Chinese manufactured MiG 19s. But Yahya Khan was not a military genius like Moshe Dayan. The targets selected were too many and too widely spread—Srinagar and Avantī in Kashmir, Ambala in Haryana, Agra in Uttar Pradesh and the desert town of Jodhpur in Rajasthan. Each one of these targets was attacked by three or four planes.

The objective of the attack was to render the Indian airfields inoperative and to destroy the Indian aircraft before they could take off. India was not unprepared for a surprise assault and either her aircraft had been sent outside the range of Pakistan's planes or were so well bunkered in concrete revetments that they were virtually immune to the attack. Pakistan's blitz failed and the Indian Air Force Chief, Air Marshal Engineer said: "They have not been able to bruise, let alone hurt us."

Within hours the Indian Air Force combat fighters were in the air, counter-attacking Pakistan's strategic targets at Chanderi, Sialkot, Sar-

godha, Murree, Mianwali, Marur (Karachi), Risalwali (Rawalpindi) and Changla Mangla (Lahore). Pakistan was not prepared for an attack. Although India's first estimates of the losses inflicted by the Air Force on Pakistan were modest, as information began to reach Indian Air Headquarters the final estimates of the damage rose. Within 24 hours, the P.A.F. had been seriously damaged. When India's Hunters pounded Pakistan's tanks at Longewala in the Jaisalmer desert an Indian military officer described the event: "It was a duck shoot. They had no defence, no place to hide". Likewise when the oil dumps at Karachi were set ablaze by the I.A.F., the Pakistani planes did not take to the air to fight from their heavily guarded armed bases. The I.A.F. had gained the mastery of the sky.

India wanted to achieve quick results in the east. Her combat planes, specially the Gnat, gave a determined fight to Pakistan's Sabre-jets and within days the Pakistani land forces operating in the east were deprived of their air cover. India's army began to tighten the noose around Dacca. The well fortified cantonment of Jessore capitulated without a fight. The Pakistani forces were on the run leaving behind empty bunkers, burnt-out vehicles and piles of ammunition. However in some places, they put up a good resistance. Another column of Indian Infantry moved towards Rangpur and Bogra from the north-west. Sylhet was besieged and the strategic town of Comilla captured, disrupting the road communication between Dacca and Chittagong. The Indian Navy blockaded the ports of Chittagong.

and Chittagong and India's aircraft carrier, the Vikrant, put out to sea to fight its maiden battle for its country. Chittagong and Cox's Bazar ports were bombarded and six naval craft full of Pakistani soldiers trying to escape were hit. All escape routes were sealed and the bulk of the Pakistani forces began to converge on Dacca. The I.A.F. dropped paratroops and crossed the Meghna by helicopters and barges. Dacca was collapsing.

Yahya Khan's attack on India's west had a definite objective. He had wanted to capture the whole or some portions of Kashmir by quick action which could serve as a bargaining counter at the negotiating table. However the Indian forces on the CFL and the Indo-Pakistan international border were well entrenched and alert.

The attack on Kashmir followed the pattern of the 1919 war. The Pakistan Army attacked the Poonch sector in full strength and dropped hundreds of commandos behind the lines. In the battle that ensued, the Pakistani forces were thrown back and the Indian Army occupied some important Pakistani posts on the road to Kotla.

The major battle on this front was, however, fought in the Chamb area. The Pakistani forces numbering 30,000 men supported by an armoured brigade of 150 tanks made at least five repeated attacks with growing ferocity. The Indian forces were outnumbered and lost the area to the west of Munnawar Tawi to the enemy. On one occasion the Pakistani forces crossed the Tawi and reached its eastern bank; soon there-

after they were forced to retire to the west bank. The battles fought in the Chamb sector, some 50 or 60 square miles in area, were comparable in ferocity to some of the most hard-fought battles of the Second World War. The Pakistani forces could not make as deep a thrust as they had done in 1919. The Indian forces captured the Pakistani enclave near Akhnoor called the "Chicken's Neck" and made the rear of the Indian forces at Chamb safe.

Along the CFL at Kargil and Tithwal, the Indian forces took the offensive. Near Kargil they captured more than two dozen high Pakistani posts, overlooking the Kargil-Leh route and made the road safe. Near Tithwal an Indian column moved into the Lipa Valley and captured some portions of the Pakistani occupied territory of Kashmir. The route to the Valley was sealed. The Indian forces tried to capture Haji Pir Pass, which they had done in 1919, but failed.

On the international border, to the south of Jammu, India launched a pincer attack from the north and east on the fortified town of Shakargarh. The Baba Nanak enclave across the Ravi fell into Indian hands. The objective of the attack was the same as that on Sialkot in 1919, namely to relieve the pressure of Pakistani forces in the Chamb area. Near Fazilka the Indian enclave was occupied by Pakistani forces, who also captured a portion of the Husainiwala bridge.

Pakistan suffered some of its heaviest losses at Longewala in the Jaisalmer desert. On the Barmer border Indian troops made two attacks

in the Naya Chor area and towards Rahimyar Khan, and large chunks of territory were occupied in these offensives. In Gujarat the Chhad Bet area, which the World Court had conceded to Pakistan, was captured by Indian forces.

The Indian Navy's role in the Arabian Sea was magnificent. It not only blockaded the port of Karachi but entered the port and sank at least two destroyers and one mine-sweeper. The oil dump at the port was set ablaze. The losses of the Pakistan Navy were estimated to be one-third of its total strength.

With the surrender by General Niazi in the east, India declared a unilateral cease-fire on 16 December, and after a show of impotent belligerency, Yahya Khan ordered his troops to stop firing. Yahya Khan had been completely discredited. He could hold office no longer and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a volatile politician who blows hot and cold in the same breath assumed power. More than 90,000 regular troops and paramilitary men became India's prisoners of war. India had achieved her three-fold objective, namely the liberation of Bangla Desh, the return of the refugees to their homeland and the release of Mujib, who had been flown as a prisoner to West Pakistan.

Bhutto went on a pilgrimage to Peking, Washington, Moscow and the Arab countries in search of help. There had been increasing pressure on him for the release of POWs. Bhutto has resisted the recognition of Bangla Desh, but since America has accorded it, his resistance may not last long. Mujib would not negotiate with Bhutto unless Pakistan recognised Bangla

Desh. The POWs had surrendered to the combined command of the Indian forces and the Mukti Bahini, though they are now in India in the custody of the Indian Army. Bhutto's problem is how to get the release of the POWs.

The U.S.A. not only suspended all economic aid to India but named India as an aggressor, although a good section of the American public had considerable sympathy with India's cause. China continues in a mood of belligerency and has equipped two divisions of the Pakistan Army. References to Kashmir in the joint declaration issued by America and China after Nixon's visit to Peking are ominous and cast dark shadows on the future.

FUNDAMENTALS OF THE INDO-PAKISTAN CONFLICT

THE Vale of Kashmir, beautiful and enchanting, was coveted both by Jawaharlal Nehru and Mohammad Ali Jinnah. India and Pakistan fought for the hand of the fair damsel as Spartans and Greeks had fought for Helen of Troy. The struggle has lasted for about 25 years; sometimes on the battlefield; sometimes in the chambers of the United Nations; sometimes on the conference table. But the end of the struggle is yet nowhere in sight. The conflict symbolises deeper urges which have run through the history of the sub continent.

The Hindus have always been a pluralist society; that is, they believe that people of different faiths, persuasions, beliefs and cultures can live together on equal terms. Hinduism is not a religion like Islam. It is a way of living and comprises monotheist, polytheist and atheist. Individuals and groups are free to have their own ideas of man and God and their inter-relation. Ellora, where the temple of the Hindu Sun-God, the Buddhist viharas and the Jain monasteries co-exist, epitomises supremely the idea of tolerance. The Bellur temple in Mysore was begun by a Jain king and when his successors were converted to Brahmanism, they did not demolish the base but built a super-structure over it.

Islam is a purist religion. It means that in Islamic countries, the non-believers have either

no place, or must live as sub-citizens. Islam believes in one God, one Book, and one Prophet. A person who does not subscribe to any of the three cannot be a Mussalman. When the Muslims launched their campaign of world conquest, it was to convert infidels to the true religion. Country after country in the west, along the Mediterranean coast right up to Gibraltar and eastward to Mongolia, was converted to Islam and unbelievers put to the sword. The whole of North Africa and West and Central Asia are now wholly Muslim.

The onslaught of Islam was halted in Europe by the well-organised Christian communities and to the south of the Great Himalayan ranges by the established Hindu religion and culture. The Muslims ruled over India for over seven centuries and many Muslim rulers were zealots, but they could not destroy the Hindu pantheon or the Hindu caste system or its Brahmanical hierarchy. There were mass conversions to Islam but nevertheless the Hindus survived as a majority in the major part of India and as a substantial minority in the remainder.

The concepts of a pluralist and a purist society during the Mughal rule were symbolised by two great rulers—Akbar and Aurangzeb. Akbar developed the concept of a mixed society which is near to a secular society of our times. He separated statecraft from the ruler's religion. Many Hindus were appointed to the highest military and political posts: Mansíng, Todarmal, Birbal, to name only a few. These persons owed full loyalty to the throne and basked in its glory. They would fight to suppress Hindus.

and Muslims who rebelled against their master. They were put in command of important campaigns and fought hard to extend the Empire.

Akbar had collected men well-versed in different religions and sat like the Sun in the centre with the *navaratnas* (nine jewels) around him as satellites in the Hall of Worship. He listened to religious discourses and tried to cull the best of every religion. Akbar wanted to lay the foundation of a universal faith, Din-e-Ilahi, which offended the orthodox Ulemas and Moulvis. They foiled his efforts.

Akbar had married a Hindu princess Jodhabai. She gave birth to the successor to the Mughal throne, Salim who, on becoming Emperor, styled himself Jahangir. Jodhabai was never converted to Islam. She continued to worship the Hindu Gods, eat Hindu food and lead a pious Hindu life. Akbar won the heart of his Hindu subjects and became the chief architect of the Mughal Empire.

Akbar's great-grandson Aurangzeb was of different mettle. He was an ardent believer in Islam and earned his livelihood by scribing the Quran. He would not spend on himself a copper from the public exchequer and was bitterly opposed to idol worship. Aurangzeb pulled down Hindu temples, destroyed Hindu Gods and built magnificent mosques from the debris. He is reported to have deprived the Brahmans of Kashi of their baptismal threads which, in the aggregate, weighed several maunds. Islam was opposed to music and Aurangzeb prohibited the playing of music and singing. When a group of musicians took out a mock funeral of the God-

ness of Music, the Emperor advised them to bury her deep.

Aurangzeb caused deep-rooted resentment among non-Muslims. The militant Sikhs under Guru Gobind Singh and the warring Mahrattas under Chatrapati Shivaji rose in revolt against the Mughal Empire. The last twenty years of Aurangzeb's life were spent on the battlefield fighting Sikhs and Mahrattas. He died a lonely death in the south far away from the seat of the Empire. Aurangzeb's bigotry shook the foundation of the Empire built by Akbar and his two descendants.

In our times the two concepts of a pluralist and a purist society had been symbolised by Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Mohammad Ali Jinnah. Gandhi realised that a united India of the Hindus and Muslims was a pre-condition to freedom. He had won the confidence of the Muslims in South Africa and after his entry into Indian politics late in the second decade, he made a bid to win the confidence of the Indian Muslims.

The opportunity arrived soon after the Indian Muslims were outraged by the treatment meted out by the British to the Khalifa. After the first World War, Turkey was being systematically dismembered by the victorious allies. The Indian Muslims had fought against their co-religionists of Palestine and Jedah, on the express promise that the British would preserve the holy places of Muslims in Palestine and Jazir-ul-Arab and maintain the integrity of the Khilafat. When the British violated this pledge the Indian Mus-

lims were deeply hurt. Gandhi propitiated the Khilafat Committee, which had sprung up overnight in north India, when the Khalifa's fate was in jeopardy.

Gandhi gave unconditional support to the cause of the Khilafat. He waited in a deputation upon the Viceroy to plead for the Khalifa. The Khilafat was incorporated in the nation's triple programme of struggle which included redress of the Jallianwala wrongs and the winning of Swaraj. Three out of every four persons who fought for the Khilafat in India were Hindus. It was in glaring contrast to the wholly Muslim countries of Iran and Afghanistan who showed cynical unconcern for the Khalifa's future. Nor did the Muslim minorities of Russia raise a little finger to safeguard the holy places of Islam and the Khalifa's powers. The people of Malaya and Dutch Indonesia remained unmoved.

History is replete with instances when the faithful have fought for a religious cause. The Christian rulers of Europe fought crusades against Muslims to win their holy places. Richard, Coeur-de-Lion, traversed the whole European continent to cross swords with Sultan Salauddin. The Muslims fought for propagating the message of Islam and the Christians for the advance of Christianity. But there are no instances in the world's history when an idolator fought for the cause of the iconoclast or an infidel to preserve the faithful. The home of the Khilafat was thousands of miles away and many of Gandhi's unsophisticated followers, the mass of simple villagers, mistook the khilafat for 'mukhalfat', that is, opposition to government.

The Khilafat was abolished in Turkey by Kimal Ata Turk and when the *casus belli* had disappeared in its homeland, the Khilafat movement died out in India. With the death of the Khalifa, the short-lived zeal for communal unity disappeared and the rest of the British period was full of communal riots and communal bickerings, which ultimately led to the partition of the country.

When the six provincial Congress ministries resigned after the outbreak of the second World War, the erstwhile nationalist, once a member of the Congress, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, was the President of the Muslim League. He celebrated the deliverance of Muslims from the tyranny of Congress rule. The Lahore session of the Muslim League in 1940 gave its approval to a demand for a sovereign State of Pakistan. The demand had its origin in the theory that the Muslims were a separate nation and could not live with the Hindus under the same political system. Meanwhile the estrangement between Congress and the British widened and on 9 August 1942 Gandhi gave a call for the 'Quit India' movement, which was a virtual declaration of revolt against British rule. The Allies were being pressed hard by the Axis powers. Malaya and Burma had fallen to the Japanese army. The Japanese had bombed Calcutta and some coastal areas. There were rumours that their army might land at any time on the shores of India. The British rulers stood isolated. They made a frantic search for political allies. Jinnah took advantage of the opportunity and threw in

his lot with the Government in return for the promise of Pakistan.

The bargain to partition India was struck much earlier than is commonly known. Briefing the Governor-General Lord Linlithgow on the Draft Declaration of the British War Cabinet (1942), the Secretary of State for India, Ernest Amery referred to the Congress with cynical unconcern and wrote: "It remains to be seen whether in face of the external danger any of the Congress leaders can be persuaded to realise that the half loaf, which is all that either we or the rest of India can give them, is better than no bread". Towards Jinnah he struck a note of confidence and recorded: "Jinnah, I should have thought, will be content to realise that he has now got Pakistan in essence, whether as something substantive or as a bargaining point." Explaining the Declaration in a broadcast on the All India Radio, Sir Stafford Cripps repeated the homily: "If you want to persuade a number of people who are inclined to be antagonistic to enter the same room, it is unwise to tell them that once they go in there is no way out — they are to be forever locked in together". Cripps conceded to the non-conforming units the right to opt out of the federation made by the joint Constitution-making body and to form a self-governing union of their own.

Armed with the commitment Jinnah became thrice adamant. Gandhi's efforts at Bombay to persuade Jinnah to accept that a change of religion does not imply change of nationality and that the majority of the Indian Muslims were converts from Hindus and retained Indian nation-

ality, was foreclosed. At Simla, where after releasing the leading Congressmen, Governor-General Lord Wavell invited the Indian leaders for a dialogue on the political settlement of India, Jinnah took up the amazing attitude that he would not participate in a Cabinet where a Muslim nominee of Congress sat. The Simla Conference was wrecked on the communal issue. Thus the concept of Pakistan was accepted and the controversy was limited only to whether the British should partition India and then withdraw or withdraw after conceding the Muslims the right of form a sovereign State of their own.

Jinnah won and the Congress lost. The British agreed to partition India before their withdrawal on 15 August 1947, though the partition did not proceed on the lines desired by Jinnah. The exchange of Muslim and non-Muslim minorities between India and Pakistan, though not provided in the scheme of partition, was a corollary of the country's partition. The exchange of minorities between West Pakistan and the western region of India was complete; in the east it was partial. There were periodic spurts in the migration of the Hindus from East Bengal, and when the Pakistan Army cracked down on the Bengalis in March 1947, some eight or nine million Hindus, half of their numbers at the time of Partition, were left in East Bengal. These people were made the special target of military operations and driven across the border in the hope that India's economy and communal peace would be disrupted.

Jinnah's dream of one religion and one State remained incomplete unless Kashmir, which had

a majority of Muslims, acceded to Pakistan. He depended more on the use of force than persuasion. India was not keen on Kashmir's accession during the days of Partition, but once the accession of the State to India was made by the Ruler of Kashmir in accordance with the right given to him by the Independence of India Act, India would not yield to force or to the threat of force. Hence the running sore of Kashmir which has lasted 25 years.

In Pakistan, whether the Government was civilian or military or was made up of the popular leaders or of a dictator, there was not sufficient realisation of the dynamics of change. The ever-growing quest for new knowledge — the induction of science and technology in man's life, the travel facilities opened by air traffic, the growth of tourism, the exchange of cultural and sports programmes between the nations of the world, are opening new areas of friendship and cooperation. About 25-30 years ago, an inter-communal marriage would invariably provoke in India a riot or a period of prolonged tension between the two communities. Now hundreds of Hindu girls are the wives of Muslim boys, and hundreds of Muslim girls take Hindu husbands. Considerations of economics and welfare have won dominance over religious affinity. The concept of a theocratic State has become obsolete.


General Ayub claims to have produced a map of Kashmir and pointed out to Nehru during one of the negotiations that the sources of all

the rivers, which provided life-giving waters to Punjab and Sind, had their origin in Kashmir. Pakistan's major rail and road communications and canal headworks were inter-linked with Kashmir. But the signing of the Indus Water Treaty by Pakistan was a recognition of the reality that there could be an alternative solution to territorial accession. Pakistan was assured the exclusive use of the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab waters and she renounced her claim to the Ravi, Beas, and the Sutlej. The supply of water to the magnificent irrigation system of Punjab and Sind is thus assured. With the coming up of the Mangla Dam, irrigation supplies in Pakistan are flourishing.

The improvement of the Srinagar-Jammu road and its conversion into an all-weather link through the Jawahar Tunnel has reduced the significance of the pre-accession Srinagar-Rawalpindi route. New markets in India and abroad have come up for Kashmir's fruits and handicrafts. The Valley's tourist trade is routed through India. Whatever claims Pakistan may have had on Kashmir are now reduced to the one based on Muslim brotherhood.

The break-away of East Bengal and the declaration of the sovereign State of Bangladesh have destroyed the last vestiges of Pakistan's religion-based claim on Kashmir. Pakistan could not retain East Bengal as a part of its political system because the compulsion of economic and human welfare prevailed over religion. What it would cost Kashmir in terms of human misery

by upsetting the new life and new relations built over 25 years is difficult to imagine. Kashmir is not a plaything in the game of big power politics. She is a living and growing human society. The need of the hour is to develop an independent policy for South Asia based on new realities.



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